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NOTES AND COMMENTS
A New Footnote in Erie v. Tompkins: "Cannon Is Overruled"
At dawn one recent day I dreamed that St. Peter had granted my
request to enter the golden portals to consult Justice Brandeis about
a most pressing matter. It was certainly not a bad dream, although it
must have had its genesis in my brooding over the opinion in Berkman
v. Ann Lewis Shops,1 decided last June by the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals. What is surprising is that I escaped a nightmare after
reading in the opinion such words as "the leading case of Cannon Mfg.
Co. v. Cudahy Packing";2 "the defendant was not 'doing business'
within the meaning of that phrase as it was construed in the Cannon
case" ;3 and "we do not believe that the Florida legislature... intended
to 'overrule' the Cannon rule."4 Students in my Conflicts classes had
often heard me say with much confidence that, after Erie,5 Cannon was
as obsolete as Swift v. Tyson.6 The common authorship of the opinions
in both cases did not negate that conclusion; until the Erie revolution,
even the most outspoken critics of the "general federal common law"
doctrine often joined in decisions and even wrote opinions that applied
it.7 I was sure, however, that, once liberated by his own victory in
Erie v. Tompkins, Justice Brandeis would be ready to disown his opinion
in Cannon.
In the Cannon case a North Carolina corporation brought an action
in North Carolina for breach of contract against a Maine corporation.
The statutes of North Carolina then, as they do now, authorized service
on a local agent of any foreign corporation "doing business" in the
state.8 The only service on the defendant Maine corporation was
effected by delivery of the summons and complaint in North Carolina
to the officer in charge of the local operations of an affiliated Alabama
corporation doing business in North Carolina. The Alabama corporation
was a wholly owned subsidiary of the defendant Maine corporation;
they had interlocking directors and officers; they did a great deal of com-
mon business. The plaintiff contended that there was such identity of
the two corporations that their separate entities should be disregarded
'246 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1957).2 267 U.S. 333 (1925). Quotation from 246 F.2d at 47.
1246 F.2d at 47.
'Id. at 49.
'Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
0 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
'See, e.g., Justice Holmes' opinion in Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Goodman, 275
U.S. 66 (1927).
' C.S. § 1137 (1924) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-38 (1950), 55-144 (Supp. 1955).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
and the business done in North Carolina by the subsidiary should be
deemed business done by the parent. After service of the summons the
case was removed to the United States District Court on grounds of
diversity of citizenship.
The district judge agreed with counsel that the issue was whether,
under the facts of the intercorporate relationship, the defendant was to
be treated as "doing business" in North Carolina. After carefully
analyzing the activities of the two corporations and their officers, he
reached the conclusion that there were separate legal entities and that
service on the subsidiary was not equivalent to service on the parent.
In his opinion, rejecting the attempted service, he cited no state court
decisions, but relied heavily on the United States Supreme Court's
holding in Peterson v. Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry.9  His decision was
unanimously affirmed by the Supreme Court,10 with Justice Brandeis
writing an opinion that also referred to no decisions of North Carolina
courts. One Alabama decision was cited," but none on the "doing
business" issue.
In my dream I climbed "up there" to see if Justice Brandeis would
agree that the Cannon case should be expressly and ceremoniously in-
terred in the tomb with Swift v. Tyson. If the author of the offending
opinion felt as I did, and would give some concrete indication of his
concurrence, earthly judges, I felt sure, would at long last be constrained
to stop relying on its outworn rationale. I was emboldened by the be-
lief that none of the Justice's economic predilections would be offended
if the decision as to what is "doing business" were left with the state
courts. Perhaps, of course, his conclusion that there was no jurisdiction
over the defendant in the Cannon case could be traced to his preference
for small business units. Nevertheless, he could have had no reason to
believe that North Carolina judges would have tended to foster bigness
by finding a closer tie between parent and subsidiary than had the federal
courts. My plea for a different methodology should not necessarily
produce a different substantive outcome.
I was escorted from the pearly gates, so went my dream, to the
Brandeis quarters by a messenger with scrawny, almost featherless
wings. The great judge, on the other hand, was pillowed by a great
mass of white wing feathers as he reclined on a throne-like chair. Ex-
cept for the feathers, he looked much as one remembered him at the teas
served at his Washington home after he retired from the bench.' 2
I commented on the magnificence of his wings and asked how one
'205 U.S. 364 (1907).
"Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 292 Fed. 169 (W.D.N.C. 1923),
aff'd, 267 U.S. 333 (1925).
"First Nat'l Bank v. Winchester, 119 Ala. 168, 24 So. 351 (1898).
12 See MAsoN, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LiFE 603-04 (1946).
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obtained such a fine set. He answered that each feather was supposed to
represent an achievement during life, and he had, he supposed, been
lucky. I then noticed that each feather was marked with a name or
title, and I could see the words "Muller v. Oregon,"'3 "Savings Bank
Life Insurance," and other familiar names here and there. To get to
the point of my visit promptly and thus be able to finish before the
Justice's personal guardian angel, fluttering near by, should declare
the interview over, I asked if by any chance there was a feather for his
opinion in Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing.
Justice Brandeis assured me that there was.
"My Secretary pointed out," he said, "that it has been cited over a
hundred times,' 4 and so he included it in the list when applying for my
wings. He insisted that anything cited a hundred times is worthy of a
feather in one's wing. But why do you ask about that particular case?"
Then I told him what was troubling me. I pointed out that lower
courts have continually relied on Cannon to strike down service on a
foreign corporation operating in a state only through a subsidiary. The
able students on the board of the Columbia Law Review have, in an
otherwise perceptive comment, called Cannon "the leading case in this
area" and "still the law today."'15 A leading, up-to-date casebook on
Conflict of Laws cites it without a caveat to beware of its possible feet
of clay.1 Even the Supreme Court has since Erie used it in a footnote as
though it still carried weight.17 The courts keep citing it to support
the principle that such a corporation is not, in the words of the state
statute, "doing business" there. With that citation they stop, not con-
sidering it necessary to seek state court rulings on the meaning of those
words in that particular statute.' 8 In at least one horrible example, 19
a district judge had analyzed the law of North Carolina-Cannon's own
state-and had found that the defendant before him had been engaged in
activities that he thought the North Carolina courts would have found
to be "doing business" there. Then he said, "For what the law actually
is, however, I must consider the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Cannon Manufacturing v. Cudahy Packing Co.... The Can-
non Case has not been overruled and.. . , not being distinguishable so far
"208 U.S. 412 (1908).
"4 See SHEPARD'S UNITED STATES CITATIONS (Case ed. 1943 and Supps. 1952,
1956, 1957).
11 Note, 56 COLUM. L. REv. 394, 409 (1956).
1' CHEATHAM, GooDRIcH, GRISWOLD AND REEcE, CONFLIcr OF LAWS: CASES
AND MATERIALS 129 (1957).
27 National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422, 439, n. 31 (1949).11 See, e.g., LeVecke v. Griesedieck Western Brewery Co., 233 F.2d 772, 776
(9th Cir. 1956).
"Harris v. Deere & Co., 128 F. Supp. 799 (E.D.N.C. 1955), affd, 223 F.2d
161 (4th Cir. 1955).
1958]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
as I can see, seems to settle the question and requires me to hold with
the defendant.120
I asked Justice Brandeis if this course of action did not strike him
as committing the pre-Erie error of assuming the existence of "a trans-
cendental body of law outside of any particular state."121 He listened
with his renowned politeness as I cited a number of recent cases that
have treated, rightly, it seemed to me, the issue whether a defendant
is "doing business" in the state as a question exclusively of state law.
22
Bornze v. Nardis Sportswear2 3 is a good example. Judge Learned
Hand there said that "the first question is whether the service was
valid under the New York decisions .... [I] f we conclude that it was,
there arises the second question: i.e., whether the service was valid under
the Constitution. ' 24 Farther along in the opinion Judge Hand seems to
have been expressing doubt as to the validity of the Cannon approach,
for he said of another case,25 "In any event the majority cited only
federal decisions, and apparently proceeded on the assumption that
these were conclusive .... "26 His whole opinion reflected the view that
the International Shoe case27 was not an interpretation of a state statute,
but a test of the constitutionality of the state's interpretation of its own
law.
The premise of my plea, I pointed out to Justice Brandeis, was that
the Court in International Shoe was merely holding that a state does not
exceed its jurisdictional powers if it interprets the "doing business"
phrase in its statute as including the kind of activities found in that case.
The Supreme Court certainly was not suggesting that the question of
what constitutes "doing business" is a matter of "general law" that a
federal court can find as readily as a state court. It expressly accepted,
I continued, the statutory interpretation previously declared by the state
court. It was a state statute they were interpreting, and in the words
of Justice Frankfurter in another case, the last word on its meaning
20 Id. at 804-05.
21 Black and White Taxicab and Transfer Co. v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab
and Transfer Co., 267 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) ; Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,
79 (1938).
22 Riverbank Laboratories v. Hardwood Products Corp., 220 F.2d 465 (7th
Cir. 1955); Partin v. Michaels Art Bronze Co., 202 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1953);
Pulson v. American Rolling Mill Co., 170 F.2d 193 (1st Cir. 1948); Hilmes v.
Marlin Firearms Co., 136 F. Supp. 307 (D. Minn. 1955); Solt v. Interstate
Folding Box Co., 133 F. Supp. 7 (E.D. Pa. 1955) ; Kenny v. Alaska Airlines, 132
F. Supp. 838 (S.D. Cal. 1955) ; Radford v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 128 F.
Supp. 775 (E.D. Tenn. 1955). See also Roberts v. Evans Case Co., 218 F.2d
893 (th Cir. 1955).
165 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1948).
21Id. at 35.
"Deutsch v. Hoge, 146 F2d 201 (2d Cir. 1944).
21 165 F.2d at 37.
27 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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belonged neither to the Supreme Court of the United States nor any
other federal court, but to the supreme court of the state. 28
The Justice seemed ready to comment, and, though still dreaming,
I awaited his words anxiously. I had staked a lot to get his help in
eliminating one aberration in the twisted course of private international
law.
"Of course," Justice Brandeis observed, "Erie v. Tompkins itself
dealt with the common law, not with statutory interpretation. Still, I
imagine that if Cannon had come up after the Erie doctrine had finally
been accepted, my colleagues and I should have used a very different
approach. We surely should have sought state decisions as guides for
interpretation of the North Carolina statute. We should then have
tested that interpretation against constitutional restraints, as the Court
later did in International Shoe. But isn't it a bit late to recognize all
this? Even the Erie case couldn't overthrow res judicata."
I agreed that Cannon could not be reversed, but I pointed out that it
could be overruled. I said that, for myself, it seemed effectively over-
ruled by the words in Erie that the unconstitutionality of the Swift v.
Tyson doctrine compelled the final abandonment of that ancient prece-
dent. The bar and the courts, however, have too often not seen the cases
in that light. Since I am among those who welcome the Erie rule twenty
years later, I like to see it applied wherever it belongs, and therefore,
I told the Justice, I hoped something could be done to eliminate the
Cannon blot on the symmetry of the juridical scutcheon. I concluded
that I was certain that a few words attributed to him would have the
desired effect.
A discouraging look of doubt clouded the Justice's face. I then
waxed eloquent even in my dream, and recalled some of his own ex-
pressed views on the importance of bringing judicial opinions into agree-
ment with experience.29  "[I]t behooves us to reject, as guides," he
once said, "the decisions . . . which prove to have been mistaken," 30
especially where the precedent involves application rather than interpre-
tation of the Constitution, and where no rule of property was created,
around which vested interests had clustered.3 1 "It was you, Justice
Brandeis," I emphasized, "who first said that stare decisis, while ordi-
narily a wise rule of action, 'is not a universal, inexorable, command.' "32
More than once, I added, he had listed examples of overrulings by his
8 Railroad Conm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 499-500 (1941).
29 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 410 (1932) " (dissenting'
opinion).
" Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 42 (1927) (dissenting opinion).
"-Washington v. Dawson Co., 264 U.S. 219, 238 (1924) (dissenting' opinion).22 Ibid.
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Court, and I reminded him that in the Gobitis33 and Barnette8 4 cases
some of the Justices had perceived the error of their own decision and
had joined in overruling it three years later.35
"How I welcomed that action," interjected the Justice. "Black and
Douglas slipped as grievously in Gobitis as Holmes had done in the
Nebraska German language case.3 6 As I have often repeated, every man
has his weak moments, and man's judgment is at best fallible.37 But
when he has seen his mistake, it is right to correct it. Perhaps the
Cannon decision was correct in the climate of its day, but I agree that
it cannot survive into the post-Erie era. However, in my present posi-
tion, what can I do about it?"
Dreaming boldly along, I explained my idea of a new footnote to be
inserted in the Erie opinion, citing Cannon as one of the errors resulting
from the invalid doctrine of Swift v. Tyson. Not surprisingly, in the
phantasy of the dream, the Justice agreed to the proposal.
I smiled a dreamy smile, picturing myself citing the new footnote as
a long overdue epitaph for Cannon. As I bid the Justice good-bye, he
picked off the floor and handed me a lovely white feather, labelled
"Cannon v. Cudahy Packing Co." Its base had begun to disintegrate,
causing it to drop off one of his wings.
When I awakened, I resolved to write the story of my dream in the
hope that there would be some readers who would recognize the sound-
ness of its message and would help to make it come true.
MICHAEL H. CARDOZO*
Constitutional Law-Due Process- Denial of Admission to State
Bar on Ground of Communist Affiliation
In Konigsberg v. State Bar,' the United States Supreme Court in a
five to three decision held that past membership in the Communist
Party is not in itself an adequate basis for denying an otherwise qualified
applicant admission to a state bar. Because the petitioner had refused
to answer questions of the California Committee of Bar Examiners con-
cerning past membership in the Communist Party, the Committee re-
fused to certify him to practice law on the grounds that he had failed to.
prove (1) that he was of good moral character, and (2) that he did not
Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
"Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
"See also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404, 412 (1923) (dissenting opinion); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
"TNew State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310 (1932) (dissenting
opinion).
* Professor of Law, Cornell University.
1353 U.S. 252 (1957).
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advocate the violent overthrow of the government.2 The Court pointed
out that these grounds were the basis for the Committee's action, not
his refusal to answer the questions.3 However, the Court ruled that past
membership in the party, even if true, did not alone warrant the con-
clusions reached by the Committee, and that they therefore constituted
a denial of due process.4
Denial of a privilege based solely on past membership in the Com-
munist Party does not in every case violate due process. It has been
consistently held that an alien may be deported for that reason alone.5
In Galvan v. Press0 the Court said that under the Internal Security Act
of 1950,7 it is not even necessary that he joined the party fully aware
of its advocacy of violence.8
Present membership in the party is a valid ground for excluding a
person from certain positions. For example, it does not violate due
process to require as a condition precedent to a place on the ballot for
a municipal election an affidavit to the effect that the candidate is not
a communist.9 A physician may be denied a commission in the army
solely for refusing to state whether he is a member of the Communist
Party.10 In deciding that a municipal employer may inquire into the
background of einployees to determine their fitness for public service,"
the Court said: "Past conduct may well relate to present fitness; past
loyalty may have a reasonable relation to present and future trust.' 12
Aside from communism, there are other beliefs which may justify
denial of a privilege. A conscientious objector has been held to lack
2 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6060 (c) provides that an applicant must have good
moral character. Section 6064.1 provides that no one who advocates the violent
overthrow of the government shall be certified.
The California Supreme Court had denied Konigsberg's petition for review
without opinion. 353 U.S. at 254.
"If it were possible for us to say that the Board had barred Konigsberg
solely because of his refusal to respond to its inquiries ... then we would be com-
pelled to decide far-reaching and complex questions .... There is no justification
for our straining to reach these difficult problems when the Board itself has not
seen fit, at any time, to base its exclusion of Konigsberg on his failure to answer."
353 U.S. at 261.
'U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
Due process will be considered in this Note only as applied to the power of
the federal and state governments to regulate the enjoyment of certain privileges.
Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954) ; Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S.
580 (1952).
0347 U.S. 522 (1954).
'Internal Security Act of 1950, 64 STAT. 987 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 781 (1952).
0 "It is enough that the alien joined the party, aware that he was joining an
organization known as the Communist Party which operates as a distinct and active
political organization, and that he did so of his own free will." 347 U.S. at 528.
'Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56 (1951).
"0 Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 (1953). The Court said, "The petitioner
appears to be under the misconception that a commission is not only a matter of
right, but is to be had upon his own terms." Supra at 90.
1, Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951).12 Id. at 720.
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the necessary fitness for admission to a state bar because he could not
in good faith take the required oath to support the state constitution."
In the above decisions, the Court has apparently fixed or agreed to
standards which must be met by one seeking a position or status in-
volving honor and trust. Its position in the principal case is not easily
reconciled with these decisions. Membership in a state bar is a
privilege burdened with conditions,"4 and good moral character is well
established as a requisite for admission.15 In proceedings for admission,
the burden of proving good moral character is on the applicant,'0 and it
has been held that there is an absolute duty on him to make a full dis-
closure of relevant matters.17 If he fails to satisfy the state bar ex-
aminers, then it is their duty to deny his application.18
Thus it can be seen that the states themselves have fixed high
standards for admission to the bar, and necessarily so. Attorneys oc-
cupy a quasi-judicial office. 19 They are officers of the court,20 and, like
the court, they are instruments to advance the ends of justice.21 There-
fore a state has both a right and a duty to control and regulate the
practice of law in order to protect the public welfare.22  However, a
decision which violates a right secured by the Federal Constitution
authorizes intervention by the Supreme Court.2 3
In the principal case, most of the testimony corroborated the good
"lit re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945).
"lIn re Rouss, 221 N.Y. 81, 116 N.E. 782 (1917).
" Spears v. State Bar, 211 Cal. 183, 294 Pac. 697 (1930); In re Stover, 65
Cal. App. 622, 224 Pac. 771 (1924) ; In re Roberts, 30 Hawaii 588 (1928) ; In rc
McDonald, 200 Ind. 424, 164 N.E. 261 (1928) ; In re Farmer, 191 N.C. 235,, 131
S.E. 661 (1926); It re Dillingham, 188 N.C. 162, 124 S.E. 130 (1924); In re
Casablanca, 30 P.R. 368 (1922); In re Law Examination of 1926, 191 Wis. 359,
210 N.W. 710 (1926).
18 Spears v. State Bar, supra note 15; It re Wells, 174 Cal. 467, 163 Pac. 657(1917).; Rosencranz v. Tidrington, 193 Ind. 472, 141 N.E. 58 (1923); Baker v.
Varser, 240 N.C. 260, 82 S.E.2d 90 (1954) ; In re Farmer, supra note 15; In re
Crum, 103 Or. 296, 204 Pac. 948 (1922).
Spears v. State Bar, sutra note 15. The court said, "We are aware that this
requirement calls for a high degree of frankness and truthfulness . . . but no good
reason presents itself why such a high standard of integrity should not be required."
Supra at 187, 294 Pac. at 698.is Spears v. State Bar, supra note 15; Baker v. Varser, 240 N.C. 260, 82 S.E.2d
90 (1954).
"Langen v. Borkowski, 188 Wis. 277, 206 N.W. 181 (1925).
"Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 162 N.E. 487 (1928).
"Nelson v. Smith, 107 Utah 382, 154 P.2d 634 (1944). The right to' control
and regulate the practice of law is not one of those powers transferred to the
federal government. BradweUl v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
In exercising this right, Maryland has disbarred an attorney for present partici-
pation in the Communist Party. Braverman v. Bar Ass'n, 209 Md. 328, 121 A.2d
473 (1956). But the states are not in agreement as to the extent to which the
right should be exercised. For example, in Fellner v. Bar Ass'n, 213 Md. 243, 131
A.2d 729 (1957), an attorney was permanently disbarred for putting slugs in a
parking meter, whereas in*'Kentucky State Bar Ass'n v. McAfee, 301 S.W.2d
899 (Ky. 1957), a conviction of willful income tax evasion was held to be an
insufficient ground for disbarment.
"lit re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945).
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moral character of the petitioner.24 In addition, there was no evidence
that he had in fact ever been a member of the Communist Party.2 5 It is
therefore submitted that the question of whether past membership in
the party is a valid ground for denying one admission to a state bar was
not in issue, and that the Court thus went beyond the bounds necessary
to its decision and rendered what may be a dangerous precedent.
RIcHARD C. CARMICHAEL, JR.
Constitutional Law-egulation of Obscene Matter
Dissemination of obscene books, publications, and other materials
has been punishable both under common law' and under modern statu-
tory law. 2 All forty-eight American states currently exercise some
form of regulation over obscene materials and extensive restrictions in
this area are imposed by the federal government.3
Toward the end of its 1957 session, the North Carolina General
Assembly enacted chapter 12274 as a supplement to existing state laws.5
The new statute is designed to suppress commerce in the obscene and
redefines "obscenity" by taking into account contemporary circumstances,
scientific and sociological knowledge.
1, In all of its essential parts, the legislation is an enactment of section
207.10 of the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code,6 which was
tentatively approved by the institute in May 1957.7 With the adoption
of the statute, North Carolina became the first state in the union to ac-
cept this definition of obscenity.8
Fourteen days later the United States Supreme Court in Roth v.
2 Forty-two witnesses attested to Konigsberg's good moral character. Among
them were a Catholic priest, a Jewish rabbi, lawyers, doctors, professors, business-
men, and social workers. None testified that his moral character was bad or
questionable in any way.
- The only evidence that Konigsberg might have been a member of the Com-
munist Party was the testimony of one ex-communist. However, she did not
testify that he had in fact been a member, but only that he had attended meetings
of a party unit in 1941. This was the sole basis for her belief that he was a
communist. She did not know him personally, nor was her identification of him
convincing.
1 See Alpert, Judicial Censorship of Obscente Literature, 52 H~Av. L. REv. 40-53
(1938).
2 See Lockhart and McClure, Literature, The Law of Obscenity and the
Constitution, 38 MINN. L. Rav. 295 (1954).
'E.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1461-64 (1952), concerning use of the mails for sending or
receiving obscene materials, importation or sending obscene matter by common
carrier or ex press company, displaying obscene matter on envelopes or postcards,
and using obscene language in radio broadcasting.
'N.C. Sess. Laws 1957, c. 1227.
1 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-189 to -194 (1953), as amended, § 14-189 (Supp. 1955).
'ALI Model Penal Code § 207-10 (Tent Draft No. 6, 1957).
Schwartz, Criminal Obscenity Law, 29 PA. B. Ass'N Q. 8 (1957).8 Schwartz, supra note 7, at 13.
19581
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United States and Albertsv. California,9 combined for hearing, held for
the first time'0 that obscenity statutes are constitutional when they are
"applied according to the proper standards for judging obscenity.""
In indicating what these "proper standards" are, the Court drew
many of its words directly from the North Carolina and American Law
Institute definition. The Court said that "obscenity" is utterance
"utterly without redeeming social importance."' 2  "Obscene material
is material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient
interest."'13 The constitutionally valid test is "whether to the average
person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest.'
14
But Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for five members of the Court,
emphasized that materials are not obscene merely because they deal with
sex. He said, "Sex and obscenity are not synonymous," and "the
portrayal of sex, e.g., in art, literature and scientific works, is not itself
sufficient reason to deny material the constitutional protection of freedom
of speech and press."' 5
9 354 U.S. 476 (1957) affirming Roth v. United States, 237 F2d 796 (2d Cir.
1956), and Alberts v. California, 138 Cal. App. 2d 909, 292 P.2d 90 (App. Dep't.,
1955.14n an earlier test of the first amendment validity of such statutes, Doubleday
& Co. v. New York, 335 U.S. 848 (1948), affirming 297 N.Y. 687, 77 N.E.2d
6 (1947), the Court had divided equally and in a per curiam opinion upheld the
New York statute. Frequent dicta has also indicated that obscene utterance is not
protected expression. E.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952);
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948) ; Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931);
Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 736-37 (1877).
In affirming the Roth and Alberts convictions, the Court equated obscenity
with libel and pointed to evidence "sufficiently contemporaneous" with the adoption
of the first amendment "to show that obscenity, too, was outside the protection
intended for speech and press." 354 U.S. at 483. For a different interpretation
of some of this evidence see the concurring opinion of the late Judge Jerome N.
Frank in United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796, 806-10 (2d Cir. 1956).
1354 U.S. at 492.
12 Id. at 484.
'
13 Id. at 487.1 1 Id. at 489.
"
5 Id. at 487. The first amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and press
are made applicable to the states by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931) ; Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). Included are motion pictures, writings, and other
forms of expression designed merely for entertainment. Burstyn v. Wilson, 343
U.S. 495 (1952); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); Hannegan v.
Esquire, 327 U.S. 146 (1946). Distribution as well as publication is included and
the Court has struck down licensing or censorship systems which conditioned these
rights upon obtaining prior approval. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938);
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936); Near v. Minnesota, 283
U.S. 697 (1931).
But in Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957), decided the same
day as the Roth and Alberts cases, the Court upheld the validity of a state statute
permitting the legal officer of municipalities to obtain an injunction pendente lite
against the sale or distribution of allegedly obscene materials. The statute provided
for a prompt hearing on the issue of obscenity and required that the materials be
confiscated and destroyed upon the court's finding that they were obscene. Com-
paring the injunctive procedure with the criminal procedure sustained in the
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He warned that any statute attempting to regulate obscenity must
-not impose such standards that might include material which is legiti-
inately concerned with sex and which is constitutionally protected.' 6
While the decisions are not all that those who argue for absolute
freedom of expression in this area might have hoped for, the Court
,could hardly have been expected to open the gates to an unrestrained
flood of obscene and pornographic materials. The decisions appear to
have left this field in a better condition than that in which the Court
found it.
Courts have recognized that "the concept of obscenity remains
Alberts case, the Court concluded that the New York procedure does no more and
goes no further than the criminal statutes. Both interfere with the publication's
-distribution at precisely the same stage and in neither case need the materials have
passed into the hands of the public. Four members dissented; Chief Justice Warren
because the procedure placed the book itself on trial, and the decision was based
a"on the quality of art or literature" without taking into consideration the manner
of use, conditions of the sale, and the identity of the buyer and seller, id. at 445-46;
Justice Brennan because jury trial on the issue of obscenity was not guaranteed,
id. at 447-48; and Justices Douglas and Black because the procedure was "prior
xestraint and censorship at its worst" since an ex parte decree could be issued in
secret. They also considered the statute's authorization of a state-wide injunction
against distribution of the materials to be objectionable. The "nature of the
group among whom the tracts are distributed" was felt to have an "important
'bearing on the issue of guilt in any obscenity prosecution." Id. at 446-47.
1Id. at 488. See also Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957), unanimously
reversing a conviction under a state statute making it unlawful to sell a book
"'tending to incite minors to violent or depraved or immoral acts, manifestly
tending to, the corruption of the morals- of youth." The Court invalidated the
statute as not being reasonably restricted to the evil with which it attempted to
deal. "The State* insists that, by thus quarantining the general reading public
.against books not too rugged for grown men and women in order to shield
juvenile innocence, it is exercising its power to promote the general welfare.
Surely, this is to bum the house to roast the pig." Id. at 383.
In Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948), the Court held invalid a
statute, directed against "crime comic-books," which prohibited distribution of
"'collections of criminal deeds of bloodshed or lust." The Court stated that al-
though it could see "nothing of any possible value to society in these magazines,
they are as much entitled to the protection of free speech as the best of litera-
ture ... ." Id. at 510.
Censorship or "prior-restraint" problems are also sometimes raised by prose-
'cutors and sheriffs who furnish distributors and dealers with lists of "objectionable"
publications and order their removal with the warning that continued sales will
result in prosecution. See, New American Library of World Literature v. Allen,
114 F. Supp. 823 (N.D. Ohio, 1953) (enjoining police chief who ordered removal
of publications deemed offensive) ; Bantam Books, Inc. v. Melko, 25 N.J. Super. 292,
96 A.2d 47 (Ch. 1953), aff'd and modified, 14 N.J. 524, 103 A.2d 256 (1954) (en-joining county prosecutor who ordered removal of books from newsstands). But
cf. Sunshine Book Co. v. McCaffrey, 112 N.Y.S. 2d 476 (Sup. Ct. 1952) (refusing
injunction.).
See also reports of sheriffs in at least three North Carolina counties ordering
mewsdealers to stop selling present, as well as future, unpublished issues of publica-
tions termed "objectionable." Greenboro Daily News, Nov. 27, 1957, § A, p. 6, col.
7-8; id., Nov. 22, 1957, § A, p. 15, col. 1; Durham Morning Herald, Nov. 2, 1957,
§ B, p. 1, col. 4-8; The Durham Sun, Nov. 1, 1957, § C, p. 1, col. 8. The restric-
tions were also applied to one best-selling novel, the reprint edition of Grace
Metalious's Peyton Place, Durham Morning Herald, Nov. 16, 1957, § A, p. 1,
col. 1-4. For a discussion of similar activities elsewhere, see Note, 22 U. CHI. L.
REV. 216 (1954); 1 CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 226-28
(1947) ; CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 536-38 (1941).
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elusive,"' 17 that materials deemed to be obscene might vary from genera-
tion to generation,' 8 and that what was yesterday obscene may today be
acceptable, 19 or vice versa.20  Nevertheless, the term "obscene" has
generally been considered to be of sufficient definiteness to support a
criminal prosecution.21
No legal definition of obscenity is likely to be entirely satisfactory. 2 -
Too many facttrs are involved, ranging from indecent language-as
offensive words written in public places 2 --to ideological obscenity-as
the advocacy of changes in accepted sexual standards or institutions
contrary to the policy of the state,24 and including materials which are
thought to have a harmful effect on the reader's sexual thoughts, desires,
and possibly activity.25
Various standards for determining obscenity have been applied, but
courts have generally followed one of two major tests. Earlier cases
adopted a rule promulgated in the English case of Regina v. Hicklin,26
which called for a determination of the material's effect upon children
and sexually susceptible and perverted individuals. Under the Hicklin
1" American Civil Liberties Union v. Chicago, 3 Ill. 2d. 334, 343, 121 N.E.2d
585, 590 (1954).
' See Parmelee v. United States, 113 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1940); People v.
Miller, 155 Misc. 446, 279 N.Y. Supp. 583 (N.Y.C. Magis. Ct. 1935).
1" See United States v. Kennerley, 209 Fed. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
" See United States v. One Unbound Volume of a Portfolio, 128 F. Supp 280
(D.C. Md. 1955).
21 "Everyone who uses the mails . . .must take notice of what, in this en-
lightened age, is meant by decency, purity, and chasity in social life, and what
must be deemed obscene, lewd, and lascivious." Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S.
29, 42 (1896).
" See 1 CHAFEY GOVERNMENT AND MASS COmmUNICAroNS 200-18, for a
discussion of the difficulties in giving "obscenity" a legal definition.
2 See Pascagoula v. Nolan, 183 Miss. 164, 184 So. 165 (1938) (coarse words
written on side of automobile held obscene).
24 See Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Regents of New York University, 305
N.Y. 336, 113 N.E.2d 502 (1953), rev'd on other grounds, 346 U.S. 587 (1954)
(fact that film "La Ronde,' based on Schnitzler's Reigen, did not condemn the
adultery it described was an important consideration in concluding that film was
"immoral" and would "tend to corrupt morals") ; People v. Friede, 133 Misc.
611, 233 N.Y. Supp. 565 (N.Y.C. Magis. Ct. 1929). (Radclyffe Hall's The Well
of Loneliness held obscene because subject matter was "offensive to decency".)
"[U]nder the statute . . . punishment is apparently inflicted for provoking
... undesirable sexual thoughts, feelings, or desires." United States v. Roth, 237
F2d 796, 802 (2d Cir. 1956) (concurring opinion) ; "The meaning of . . .'obscene'
... is: Tending to stir the sex impulses or to lead to sexually impure and lustful
thoughts." United States v. "Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182, 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1933),
aff'd, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934).
28 L.R. 3 Q.B. 360, 371 (1868). The test was said to be "whether the tendency
of the matter charged as obscene is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are
open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort
may fall."
The rule was followed in numerous American decisions, e.g.. United States v.
Bennett, 24 Fed. Cas. No. 14,571, at 1103 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879); Knowles v.
United States, 170 Fed. 409 (8th Cir. 1909) ; United States v. Clarke, 38 Fed. 732(E.D. Mo. 1889); Commonwealth v. Friede. 271 Mass. 318, 171 N.E. 472 (1930) ;
Commonwealth v. Buckley, 200 Mass. 346, 86 N.E. 910 (1909) ; People v. Pesky,
254 N.Y. 373, 173 N.E. 227 (1930), aflinming 230 App. Div. 200, 243 N.Y. Supp
193 (1st Dept. 1930).
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rule, an entire book might be condemned because of selected excerpts or
passages. 27 The test was criticized, 28 fell into disrepute, and was finally
rejected by the Court in the Roth case as "unconstitutionally restrictive
of the freedoms of speech and press. '29  Later cases have tended to
follow rules which developed out of the litigation involving the importa-
tion of James Joyce's novel, Ulysses." These more recent decisions
have considered the book as a whole, tried to determine its predominant
effect, and condemned the publication as obscene only upon finding that
its tendency to arouse the sexual desires of the average, normal reader
was so substantial as to outweigh whatever artistic, literary, scientific or
other merits it might possess.31
However, central to both definitions was the idea that obscene publi-
cations were of a type that excited certain sexually stimulating thoughts
in the minds of readers and that by doing so corrupted and depraved
them.
Phrasing of the definition in these terms has caused courts and
writers to advance various forceful arguments against governmental
27 See New York v. Doubleday & Co., 297 N.Y. 687, 77 N.E.2d 6 (1947),
aff'd on other grounds, 335 U.S. 848 (1948) (Edmund Wilson's Memoirs of
Hecate County held obscene because of chapter, "The Princess with the Golden
Hair") ; Commonwealth v. Friede, 271 Mass. 318, 171 N.E. 472 (1930) (Theodore
Dreiser's An American Tragedy held obscene because of selected portions);
United States v. Bennett, 24 Fed. Cas. No. 14,571, at 1103 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879)(jury told to convict if "any" of the "marked passages .. . are obscene").
8In United States v. Kennerley, 209 Fed. 119, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1913), Judge
Learned Hand, although he applied the Hicklin rule because of its earlier ac-
ceptance by the federal courts, protested, characterized it as "mid-Victorian," and
stated that "it seems hardly likely that we are . . . so lukewarm in our interest
in letters or serious discussion as to be content to reduce our treatment of sex
to the standard of a child's library in the supposed interest of a salacious few ......
Judge Curtis Bok in Commonwealth v. Gordon, 66 Pa. D. & C. 101, 125 (Q.S.,
1949) aff'd sub nonr. Commonwealth v. Feigenbaum, 166 Pa. Super. 120, 70 A.2d
389 (1950), argued that "strictly applied, this rule renders any book unsafe, since
a moron could pervert to some sexual fantasy to which his mind is open the
listings in a seed catalogue."
20 354 U.S. at 489.
7 °United States v. "Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), aff'd, 72 F.2d
705 (2d Cir. 1934).
2 "iT]he work must he taken as a whole, its merits weighed against its de-
fects ... ; if it is old, its accepted place in the arts must be regarded; if new, the
opinions of competent critics in published reviews or the like may be considered;
what counts is its effect, not upon any particular class, but upon all those whom
it is likely to reach." United States v. Levine, 83 F.2d 156, 157 (2d Cir. 1936).
Examples of cases following this standard include Walker v. Pepenoe. 149 F.2d
511 (D.C. Cir. 1945) ; Parmelee v. United States, 113 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1940) ;
United States v. Levine, supra; Attorney General v. "Serenade," 326 Mass. 324,
94 N.E.2d 259 (1950); Attorney General v. "God's Little Acre," 326 Mass. 281,
93 N.E.2d 819 (1950); Attorney General v. "Forever Amber," 323 Mass. 302, 81
N.E.2d 663 (1948); Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 62 N.E.2d 840
(1945) ; Bantam Books Inc. v. Melko, 25 N.J. Super. 292, 96 A.2d 47 (Ch. 1953)
modified and aff'd, 14 N.J. 524, 103 A.2d 256 (1954).
But cf. Besig v. United States. 208 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1953) affirinig United
States v. Two Obscene Books, 99 F. Supp. 760 (D.C. Cal. 1951) ; Burstein v. United
States, 178 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1949) ; State v. Becker, 364 Mo. 1079, 272 S.W.2d
283 (1954).
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regulation of obscene materials. They have argued (1) that for either
a state or the United States lawfully to interfere with speech or press
by suppressing an allegedly obscene publication it must first be shown
that there is a "clear and probable"8 2 danger that overt criminal activity
or serious antisocial conduct would result from the distribution of the
publication,33 (2) that actually there are no reliable scientific or sociologi-
cal studies of the effects of obscenity on behavior although such legisla-
tion rests upon the assumption that reading these materials will induce
misconduct. Available studies seem to indicate that the individual who
is susceptible will be affected by whatever else is available. Present
day society is one which accepts a great deal of erotic appeal, and, aside
from books and other publications, innumerable other matters arouse
normal sexual thoughts and desires with greater frequency. Hence, in
the absence of data connecting obscenity with misbehavior, restrictions
on publications appear to be neither reasonable nor appropriate; (3)
that the function of criminal law is to punish behavior which falls below
accepted community standards, not to regulate thoughts and desires.
Immoral acts may be prohibited, not immoral thoughts and desires. The
latter would appear to be the concern of the church or the home, but not
of government; (4) that while admittedly a line must be drawn at some
point between decency and indecency, artistry and pornography, judicial
tests which condemn materials because of their tendencies to arouse
sexual thoughts and desires are unduly restrictive of freedom of expres-
sion for serious literature dealing with sexual problems and behavior . 4
The American Law Institute took these arguments into consideration
in adopting a definition for its Model Penal Code. A tentative de-
cision not to make private illicit sexual relations criminal had been made
earlier.8 5 Accordingly the Institute felt that the gist of the obscenity
" The phrase is borrowed from the sedition law where it is used to indicate
the exigency upon which advocacy may be suppressed. See Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) ; Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
"See Commonwealth v. Gordon, 66 Pa. D. & C. 101 (Q.S., 1949), aff'd sub
twin. Commonwealth v. Feigenbaum, 166 Pa. Super. 120, 70 A.2d 389 (1950).
This view was also advocated, with some modifications, by Judge Frank in his
concurring opinion in United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796, 826 (2d Cir. 1956).
See also, Lockhart and McClure, Literature, The Law of Obscenity and the Consti-
tttion, 38 MINN. L. REv. 295, 363-68 (1954).
The argument was rejected by the Court's holding in the Roth case. As
obscenity is not protected by the first amendment, no "clear and present danger"
test applies. 354 U.S. at 485-87.
" judge Frank's lengthy concurring opinion in United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d
796, 801-27 (2d Cir. 1949) presents the most recent detailed exposition of these
arguments. See also his concurring opinion in Roth v. Goldman, 172 F.2d 788,
790-98 (2d Cir. 1949). And see Lockhart and McClure, supra note 33, at 358-87;
Alpert, Judicial Censorship of Obscene Literature, 52 HARv. L. REv. 40, 73-76,
(1938) ; ALI MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10, comments at 8, 20, 24-28 (Tent. Draft
No. 6, 1957) ; Note, 6 BUFFALO L. REV. 305, 312-16 (1957) ; McKE ON, MERTON AND
GELLHORN, THE FREEDOM TO READ 67, 71-76 (1957).
"2 ALI MODEL PENAL CODE § 207-10, comments, at 14 (Tent. Draft No. 6,
1957).
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offense was "a kind of 'pandering' "3 and drafted the model statute
"to suppress commerce in the obscene. '37 Hence, the private possession,
writing, or lending to friends of obscene materials is not punishable
under the Model Code.38 In addition, the Supreme Court had granted
certiorari in the Roth case and the Institute felt that whatever the case's
outcome might be obscenity laws would have to be restricted so that they
would not include materials legitimately dealing with sex.39 Hence the
prevailing tests which defined obscenity in terms of its "tendency to
excite lustful thoughts" and "corrupt and deprave" were rejected,40
and the following definition was adopted instead:
A thing is obscene if, considered as a whole, its predominant
appeal is to prurient interest, i.e., a shameful or morbid interest
in nudity, sex, or excretion, and if it goes substantially beyond
customary limits of candor in description or representation of
such matters.41
The language was intended to recognize a "normal interest in
sexual matters, for which it should be lawful to provide satisfaction." 42
Further, since society tolerates much in literature, advertising, and art
which individuals or particular groups might consider to be appeals to
"prurient interest," the definition was restricted "to the prurient which
is disapproved by generally observed custom.
' 43
"Appeal to prurient interest" was said to refer to "qualities of the
material itself: the capacity to attract individuals eager for a forbidden
8 Ibid. 37 Id. at 13.
"Id. at 10-11. 9 Id. at 13.
"0 Id. at 10.
" Id. § 207-10 (2) ; N.C. Sess. Laws 1957, c. 1227, § 1 (b). In a further discus-
sion of "prurient interest" it is said that this "is an excerbated, morbid, or perverted
interest growing out of the conflict between the universal sexual drive of the
individual and equally universal social controls of sexual activity. The wall of
secrecy with which society has surrounded sexual behavior tends to build up in
the individual strong feelings of the shamefulness of sexuality . . . . Literary
or graphic material which disregards the social convention evokes 'repression-
tensions'; i.e., mixed feelings of desire and pleasure on the one hand, and dirtiness,
ugliness, revulsion on the other. This is especially likely if the material is presented
in a sly, leering manner, or in vulgar terms manifestly chosen merely to shock or
titillate the reader. Devices like these, serving to remind the reader that he is
enjoying 'contraband,' make the very fact of social disapproval a source of added
excitement and attraction. Society may legitimately seek to deter the deliberate
stimulation and exploitation of emotional tensions arising from the conflict between
social convention and the individual's sex drive." ALI MODEL PENAL CODE §
207.10, comments, at 29-30 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957).
"Id. comments, at 29.
" Id. comments, at 10.
In order to determine whether the material exceeds these boundaries, the
statute admits evidence of "public acceptance" of the material throughout the United
States. Id. § 207.10 (2) (d) ; N.C. Sess. Laws 1957, c. 1227 § 1 (b) (4).
One purpose of this provision was to "achieve a general and predictable policy
on obscenity, free of local or temporary distortions . . . " It was anticipated
that a "book could hardly be held obscene in one county of a state if it appeared
openly on public library shelves and in book stores throughout the state." ALI
MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10, comments, at 11, 44. (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957).
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look behind the curtain of privacy which our customs draw about sexual
matters."
44
Obviously, books and other material which may have a tendency to
excite lustful thoughts need not necessarily appeal primarily to prurient
interest. The North Carolina and Model Penal Code definition looks
to the appeal of the material, the type of appetite toward which the
publication is directed. The prevailing definitions, as pointed out, have
considered the supposed effect upon the reader's thoughts and behavior.
As a generalization, it might be said that the Code has drawn the
line between the obscene and the permissible considerably closer to the
pornographic45 than the heretofore existing tests.
The Model Penal Code was not directly involved in either the Roth
or Alberts cases. Both defendants had been convicted under con-
ventional statutes which as interpreted defined obscenity in terms of the
material's tendency to arouse lustful thoughts or deprave and corrupt
the reader. 46 The primary issue in both cases was the constitutionality
of these statutes47 and the obscenity of the publications involved was
not in issue.48 Nevertheless, all of the Justices appear to have been
influenced in their thinking by the Code and it is discussed in three of
the four opinions.49
Some confusion is created by the fact that Mr. Justice Brennan, in
the majority opinion, after defining obscenity in language adapted from
the Code, stated that the trial courts "sufficiently followed"510 this
standard. He further cites as examples of applications of the Court's
definition cases which applied the prevailing test defining obscenity in
terms of the thoughts it creates in the reader.5' Elsewhere, 2 he
"Id. comments, at 10.
""The term 'obscene' or one of its equivalents is 'often used to describe
typical under-the-counter pornography, which is, of course, not entitled to
constitutional protection." Lockhart and McClure, supra note 33, at 356. See
also Note, 6 BtrurAo L. REv. 305, 315-16 (1957), where pornography is said to be
distinguishable from obscenity "because it is deliberately designed to stimulate sex
feelings and to act as an aphrodisiac whereas an obscene book has no such
immediate and dominant purpose, although incidentally this may be its effect."
46354 U.S. at 486.
,7 CAL. PEN. CODE ANN. § 311 (1955) ; 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1952).
46354 U.S. at 481 & n. 8.
46 Although Chief Justice Warren did not specifically mention the Penal Code
in his separate concurring opinion, some of his language seems to have been at
least influenced by its provisions and his argument appears to embody the philoso-
phy behind the model legislation. He says: "It is not the book that is on trial;
'it is a person. The conduct of the defendant is the central issue, not the obscenity
of a book or picture. The nature of the materials is, of course, relevant as an at-
tribute of the defendant's conduct, but the materials are thus placed in context
from which they draw color and character. A wholly different result might be
reached in a different setting." He felt that the language of the majority opinion
was too broad and noted that both defendants "were plainly engaged in the
commercial exploitation of the morbid and shameful craving for materials with
prurient effect." He felt that both the state and federal governments could
constitutionally punish such conduct. 354 U.S. at 494-96.5O Id. at 489. 61 Id. at 489 & n.26.2 Id. at 487.
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substitutes a dictionary definition of "prurient interest" ("i.e., material
having a tendency to excite lustful thoughts") 53 for the American Law
Institute definition, and states: "We perceive no significant difference
between the meaning of obscenity developed in the case law and the
definition of the... Model Penal Code .... "54 Yet at the same time he
cites portions of the comments to the Code where the prevailing defini-
tions were expressly rejectedY5
Despite these inconsistencies, there seem to be strong indications
that the Penal Code definition is the standard toward which the Court
is moving.50 It has been suggested, also, that the Court "may have been
trying to bring existing law up to the level of the Model Penal Code
by the tour de force of declaring that it was already there."57
Even if the Court be said to have only indicated a qualified ac-
ceptance of the Model Penal Code definition and approach, it has never-
theless made clear that obscenity statutes must be so restricted that they
will not interfere with materials merely concerned with sex, that
obscenity and sex are not the same; obscenity is something more-the
appeal to "prurient interest" which goes beyond community standards
and is "utterly without redeeming social importance." Further, the
old restrictive Hicklin rule has been expressly rejected and allegedly
obscene materials must now be evaluated as a whole and their "dominant
theme" determined with reference to the average person, not the especial-
ly susceptible individual. How the Court's test will work out in ap-
" Id. at 487, n. 20.
" Ibid.
11 Ibid., citing ALI MODEL PENlAL CODE § 207-10, comments, at 10 (Tent. Draft
No.6, 1957).
',Mr. justice Douglas, in his dissenting opinion concurred in by Mr. Justice
Black, states that the Court's standard "in substance" seems to be the definition
of the Model Penal Code. However, he did not consider it valid because it "does
not require any nexus between the literature which is prohibited and action which
the legislature can regulate or prohibit." Equally invalid to him were the
standards applied by the lower courts in both cases because they "punish mere
speech or publication that the judge or jury thinks has an "undesirable impact
on thoughts but that is not shown to be a part of unlawful action.. . ." 354 U.S.
at 508-14.
Mr. Justice Harlan charged that "the Court compounds confusion" by super-
imposing the Model Penal Code definition on the two statutory definitions involved
in the cases. He did not feel that the definitions could be reconciled and
believed that the convictions should have been reversed if the American
Law Institute formula were the correct standard. He contended also that
each particular suppression of a publication as obscene involved a sensitive
question of constitutional judgment which in each case was the responsibility of an
appellate court. Upon making his own examination of the material involved in
Alberts, he concurred in affirming the conviction and concluded that suppression
of this material would not "so interfere with the communication of 'ideas' in any
proper sense of that term" that it would violate due process and the first amend-
ment. In Roth, however, he dissented because of his view of the differences be-
tween state and federal power and the danger of a uniform national censorship
imposed by the federal government. He felt that Congress could only regulate
"'hard-core' pornography" and that the materials involved in the case were not
such. Id. at 496-508. See also note 49 supra.
"' Schwartz, Criminal Obscenity Law, 29 PA. B. Ass'N. Q. 8, 11 (1957).
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plication remains to be seen from future litigation, s but the present
decision would seem to be conducive to greater freedom of expression
in this area. In the meantime, North Carolina-a state which has ap-
parently never had an obscenity case reach its highest court-stands in
the unique position of having an obscenity statute which, properly
applied,5 9 ranks with the most modem and liberal in the nation and
represents an acme toward which the law appears to be presently moving.
DAVID E. BUCKNER
Criminal Law-Assault on a Female-"Show of Violence"
Rule in North Carolina
In State v. Allen,1 the evidence tended to show that the defendant
followed prosecutrix in his automobile on several occasions as she
walked to a place on a public street where she customarily awaited her
ride to work, that the defendant stopped within a few feet of prosecutrix
but made no attempt to approach her or to communicate with her in
any way, that defendant gazed constantly at her, making motions with
the lower part of his body, and that because of fear of him, prosecutrix
quit walking the usual way to the place for her ride. These acts, on
the occasion before his arrest, caused prosecutrix to run to the steps of
a public school. This evidence was held sufficient to go to the jury in
a prosecution for assault on a female.2
The principal case is the latest of several recent borderline cases of
assault on a female which have been brought before the North Carolina
Supreme Court, and it serves well to illustrate the difficult problem
confronting the court in determining whether or not the particular acts
of a defendant are sufficient in law to constitute the criminal offense.3
" In three per curiam decisions since the preparation of this Note, the Court has
struck down prohibitions on the mailing of magazines which lower courts had held
to be obscene, as well as a similar ban on the showing of a motion picture. In all
of these cases the Court relied upon its decision in the Roth case.
See One, Inc. v. Olesen, 26 U.S.L. WEEK 3204 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1958) reversbtg
241 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1957) (over-turning the lower court's affirmance of a post-
office ban on "One," a magazine concerned with homosexuality, on grounds that
it was obscene) ; Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 26 U.S.L. WEEK 3204 (U.S.
Jan. 14, 1958), reversing 128 F. Supp. 564 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (nudist magazines,
Sunshine and Health and Sun Magazine, not excludable from the mails as obscene) ;
Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 355 U.S. 35 (1957), reversing 244 F.2d 432 (7th
Cir. 1957) (reversing Chicago censorship of the French motion picture "Game of
Love" on obscenity grounds). The Court's only explanation of these one-sentence
decisions was in its citation of the Roth case. Their inference, however, would seem
to be that the Court has imposed tight limits on permissible censorship for
obscenity. See also, Lewis, Censorsip Limited in 'Obscenity' Cases, The New
York Times, January 19, 1958, § E, p. 9, col. 6-8.
" See note 16 supra.
245 N.C. 185, 95 S.E.2d 526 (1956).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-33 (1953).
Technically, assault on a female is not a specific type of assault, as the degrees
of assault specified by statute relate to the extent of punishment and do not create
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The facts in this case present a very close question, and in many
jurisdictions it is doubtful that the conviction .would have been sus-
tained;4 particularly where the offense is prosecuted under definitive
criminal statutes, most of which define the crime as an unlawful attempt,
coupled with a present ability, to commit a violent injury upon the person
of another.5 In North Carolina, there is no statutory definition of
assault, and the crime remains one governed by the rules of the com-
mon law.
The common law offense of assault is generally defined as an
intentional offer or attempt,6 by force or violence,7 to do physical injury
to the person of another.8 Under this rule, a present intent to inflict
bodily harm is essential ;9 but it may be inferred from the acts, and if the
act itself is essentially wrongful or unlawful, intent will be presumed.10
There must be an overt act," amounting to an attempt,12 and mere
words, however insulting or abusive, will not constitute an assault,
because however violent they may be, they cannot take the place of that
force required to complete the offense.' 8 Violence, threatened or offered,
is an essential element, and mere preparation to do violence will not
suffice.14  A split of authority exists on the question of whether there
need be actual present ability to inflict the injury, and North Carolina
separate offenses. State v. Lefler, 202 N.C. 700, 163 S.E. 873 (1932). Further,
an assault on a female by a boy or man over 18 years of age is a general misde-
meanor, punishable in the discretion of the court. State v. Floyd, 241 N.C. 298,
84 S.E.2d 915 (1954); State v. Church, 231 N.C. 39, 55 S.E.2d 792 (1949);
State v. Jackson, 226 N.C. 66, 36 S.E.2d 706 (1946).
"Compare State v. Allen, 245 N.C. 185, 95 S.E.2d 526 (1956) with Loid v.
State, 55 Tex. Crim. 403, 116 S.W. 807 (1909).
'E.g., "Any attempt to commit a battery, or any threatening gesture showing
in itself or by words accompanying it, an immediate intention, coupled with an
ability to commit a battery, is an assault .... By the term 'coupled with an
ability to commit,' . . . is meant: 1. That the person making the assault must be
in such a position that, if not prevented, he may inflict a battery upon the person
assailed. 2. That he must be within such distance of the person so assailed as to
make it within his power to commit the battery by the use of the means with which
he attempts it." TEx. PEN. CoDE arts. 1138, 1141 (1948). See also Brimhall v.
State, 31 Ariz. 522, 255 Pac. 165 (1927) ; Ex parte McLeod, 23 Idaho 257, 128
Pac. 1106 (1913) ; People v. Lee Kong, 95 Cal. 666, 30 Pac. 800 (1892).
' For a distinction between "offer" and "attemp' see State v. Myerfield, 61
N.C. 108 (1867).
" The terms "violence" and "force" are synonymous when used in relation to
assault. People v. James, 9 Cal. App. 2d 162, 48 P.2d 1011 (1935).
8 State v. Sutt6n, 228 N.C. 534, 46 S.E.2d 310 (1948); State v. Hefner, 199
N.C. 778, 155 S.E. 879 (1930) ; State v. Reavis, 113 N.C. 677, 18 S.E. 388 (1893);
State v. Davis, 23 N.C. 125 (1840).
' State v. Hemphill, 162 N.C. 632, 78 S.E. 167 (1913) ; State v. McAfee, 107
N.C. 812, 12 S.E. 435 (1890) ; State v. Myerfield, 61 N.C. 108 (1867) ; State v.
Crow, 23 N.C. 375 (1841).
'o State v. Hemphill, supra note 9.
'x State v. Ingram, 237 N.C. 197, 74 S.E.2d 532 (1953); State v. Morgan, 25
N.C. 186 (1842).
" State v. Davis, 23 N.C. 125 (1840).
"i State v. Daniel, 136 N.C. 571, 48 S. E. 544 (1904); State v. Morgan, 25
N.C. 186 (1843) ; State v. Davis, supra note 12.
" State v. Davis, supra note 12.
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requires only that there be an apparent present ability, reasoning that
it is the imminent danger threatened which is decisive rather than the
actual ability to inflict the injury.15
If the principal case had been governed strictly by the above rules,
it is likely that the defendant's motion for nonsuit would have been
allowed.' Through the application of a somewhat broadened rule
which has developed in North Carolina, as well as in a number of other
jurisdictions,1? the acts of the defendant take on a different hue and
present a question for the jury. The rule, as stated by the court in the
Allen case, is as follows: "A show of violence, causing the 'reasonable
apprehension of immediate bodily harm' . . . whereby another is put in
fear, and thereby forced to leave a place where he has a right to be, is
sufficient to make out a case of assault.""'
The rule, of course, is not original with the Allen case. It evolved
from dicta in earlier cases where the threatened u se of weapons caused
the person assailed to retreat, to change his course, or to leave a place
sooner than he had intended.' 9 Perhaps the first clear statement of the
principle was made in State v. Shipman,20 where the rule was adopted
as a part of the law in North Carolina with respect to criminal assault;
since that time, it has governed in numerous adjudications on the sub-
ject by the court.
Thus, in North Carolina, there are two rules, either or both of
which may be applied in prosecuting a defendant for an alleged assault:
(1) the general common law rule, and (2) the "show of violence" rule.
Under the former, the emphasis is upon the state of mind of the person
accused.21 Under the latter, the emphasis shifts to a consideration of the
apprehension of the person assailed, limited by the requirement that the
" If a reasonable man would be led to believe that he would immediately
receive injury unless some force intervened, the assailant is within striking distance,
even though not near enough to reach the person assailed. State v. Martin, 85
N.C. 508 (1881). And see State v. McIver, 231 N.C. 313, 56 S.E.2d 604 (1949).
6 It seems reasonable that the defendant's acts could amount to no more than
a preparation to do violence, as distinguished from violence begun to be executed.
Can it be said as a matter of law that these acts amount to an offer to do im-
mediate physical injury? Or an attempt? See State v. Milsaps, 82 N.C. 549(1880) (using insulting language, and picking up a stone about 12 feet from
complainant, but not offering to throw it, held not to constitute an assault, but
only a menace of violence).
17 See, e.g., Cittadino v. State, 199 Miss. 235, 24 So. 2d 93 (1946); State v.
Hazen, 160 Kan. 733, 165 P.2d 234 (1946) ; State v. Lynn, 184 S.W.2d 760 (Mo.
App. 1945) ; State v. Rush, 14 Wash. 2d 138, 127 P.2d 411 (1942).
"8 State v. Allen, 245 N.C. 185, 189, 95 S.E.2d 526, 529 (1956).
1" State v. Rawles, 65 N.C. 334 (1871) (manure fork, hoe and gun); State v.
Church, 63 N.C. 15 (1868) (pistol, uncocked).
so81 N.C. 513 (1879).
"The element of fear or apprehension on the part of the person against whom
the attempt is made cannot be controlling, or in any way influence the determination
of the criminal liability of the aggressor, for the reason that "one may obviously be
assaulted although in complete ignorance of the fact, and therefore entirely free
from alarm." State v. Godfrey, 17 Or. 300, 302, 20 Pac. 625, 628 (1889). See
also People v. Lilley, 43 Mich. 525, 5 N.W. 982 (1880).
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apprehension be reasonable. The state of mind of the accused is no
longer the determining factor in those cases where the "show of violence"
rule is applied.22
Under the "show of violence" rule, it appears that there are three
basic elements: (1) a show of violence; (2) reasonable apprehension
of immediate bodily harm or injury; and (3) such apprehension and
fear causing the person assailed to leave a place where he had a right
to be, or to restrain from some act or conduct which he had a right to
exercise. The apprehension of the assailed, and a showing that such
fear and apprehension caused the assailed to forego some legal right,
become necessary parts of the evidence to be considered in determining
the guilt or innocence of the accused.23 With the possible exception of
the third element, it is evident that this rule is, in effect, the identical
rule used in cases where the plaintiff seeks compensation for damages he
has suffered as a result of a civil assault. 24 The traditional distinction
between civil assault and criminal assault vanishes where the rule is
applied in criminal prosecutions. 25
Although the "show of violence" rule has been applied in various
types of assault cases, it has had its most frequent application in cases
of assault on a female. There has been a definite trend in North Carolina
to extend criminal liability in this area. The question as to what acts
of a defendant are sufficient to constitute a show of violence is difficult,
if not impossible, to answer. An examination of the leading cases pre-
sents the only reasonable approach.
In State v. Williams,26 words amounting to an indecent proposal
were held to be a sufficient display of force when taken in light of the
fact that they were made by a negro man on several occasions to a fifteen
year old white girl, causing her to become so frightened that she fled
in a direction that she had not intended to go.
In State v. Sutton,27 the accused, in a drunken condition, entered the
office where the prosecutrix worked, asked her a proper question, and
followed her into the hall, staring at her constantly. She became
frightened, screamed, and ran up the steps as the defendant ran up the
steps behind her. This was held to be a sufficient show of violence
22 "Whether there has been an assault in a particular case depends more on
the apprehension created in the mind of the person assaulted than upon the
undisclosed intention of the person committing the assault." State v. Rush, 14
Wash. 2d 138, 139, 127 P.2d 411, 412 (1942) citing Peasley v. Puget Sound Tug &
Barge Co., 13 Wash. 2d 485, 125 P.2d 681 (1942).
" State v. Stansberry, 197 N.C. 350, 148 S.E. 546 (1929) (by implication).
2" See RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 21 (1934).
25 For a comparison of civil assault with criminal assault, emphasizing the
importance of apparent ability and apprehension in civil actions, see Note, 30
TEX. L. REv. 120 (1951).25186 N.C. 627, 120 S.E. 224 (1923).
"228 N.C. 534, 46 S.E.2d 310 (1948).
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to sustain a conviction, although these facts amount to an assault under
either rule.
In State v. Mclve, 28 upon facts strikingly similar to those in the
Williams case, the court held that if the character of the threat were
such as to cause another to go where she would not otherwise have gone,
or to leave a place where she had a right to be, that this was sufficient
to make out an assault. The conclusion to be drawn from the Williams
and McIver cases is that words amounting to an indecent proposal,
where made on repeated occasions, 29 may, of themselves, constitute a
sufficient show of violence if they cause reasonable fear in the prosecutrix
whereby she leaves a place where she had a right to be.80
In State v. Ingram,3 1 the famous "leering" case, the defendant drove
his automobile slowly along a public road and "leered" at the prosecutrix
some distance away. She became frightened and began to run upon
hearing the motor of the automobile stop, although she could not see
the defendant because of a small wooded area between the prosecutrix
and the place where the automobile was stopped. Upon clearing the
woods, the prosecutrix resumed walking, and when she saw the defendant
approaching, some sixty-five or seventy feet away, she continued walk-
ing to her destination. The conviction of the lower court was reversed,
the court saying: "It cannot be said that a pedestrian may be assaulted
by a look, however frightening, from a person riding in an automobile
some distance away."3 2 Although both rules are mentioned, it is not
clear whether the case turned on the finding of the court (a) that there
was no overt act, or (b) that the fear occasioned by the prosecutrix
was not reasonable under the circumstances. In either event, the case
cast some doubt upon the future applicability of the "show of violence"
rule in North Carolina.
The holding in the principal case clarifies any misunderstanding in
this latter respect, and definitely establishes the fact that both rules are
in full force today in this jurisdiction.
Failure to observe the distinction between civil and criminal liability
has resulted in conflict, as well as confusion, among the authorities. It
has unquestionably tended to enlarge the scope of the criminal law as it
pertains to assault. Perhaps there is some merit in the criticism ad-
vanced by some writers that through the use of the civil rule as a
standard in criminal prosecutions, a danger has arisen that unsuspecting
28 231 N.C. 313, 56 S.E.2d 604 (1949).
2" Words amounting to an indecent proposal where made only on one occasion
did not constitute a show of violence. State v. Silver, 227 N.C. 352, 42 S.E.2d
208 (1947).
28Annot., 12 A.L.R.2d 967, 974 (1950).
" 237 N.C. 197, 74 S.E.2d 532 (1953).3" Id. at 202, 74 S.E.2d at 536.
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males may find themselves prosecuted for crimes heretofore unknown.33
On the other hand, there is strong argument in favor of its use. The
individual right of citizens to be free from fear and apprehension of
injury by such offensive and threatening conduct as displayed in the
principal case deserves the protection of the state. Through the use
of such a rule, a gap in the criminal law has effectively been closed.
A definitive statute might bring more certainty to a field of the law
where certainty is of the utmost importance.
FREDERICK C. MEEKINS
Domestic Relations-Procedure-Abatement of Actions by
Pendency of Prior Actions
The question as to whether a pending action in the alimony-divorce
area will abate a subsequent independent action in the same area with
the parties reversed has again been passed on by the North Carolina
Supreme Court in the case of Beeson v. Beeson.'
The court initially held in Cook v. Cook2 that where the husband
commenced proceedings for absolute divorce and the wife thereafter
sued for divorce from bed and board in separate proceedings and during
pendency of the husband's prior suit, the former action did not abate
the latter. This decision seems to indicate that although a divorce action,
either absolute or from bed and board, may be brought as a counterclaim,
such is not mandatory. Later, however, the court in Cameron v.
Cameron3 held that whether the first action abated the second depended
upon certain well established tests.
The facts in the Cameron case were substantially as follows: The
wife sued for divorce from bed and board alleging abandonment. While
this suit was pending, the husband instituted an independent action in
a different county for absolute divorce on the grounds of two years
separation.4 The wife pleaded the pendency of her action in abatement
of the husband's subsequent suit. Her plea was sustained by the
Supreme Court. After stating the general rule to be that a subsequent
action is not abatable on the ground that the plaintiff therein might ob-
tain the same relief by a counterclaim or cross demand in a prior suit
pending against him, the court pointed out that this general rule is not
applicable where the cause of action asserted by the plaintiff in the seccind
action is essentially a part of the first action and will necessarily be
"A Survey of the Decisions of the North Carolina Supreme Court for the
Spring and Fall terms of 1953, 32 N.C.L. Ray. 379, 425 (1954). Cf. Notes, 13
U. DET. L.J. 227 (1950), 11 RocKY MT. L. Rzv. 104 (1939).
-246 N.C. 330, 98 S.E.2d 17 (1957).
'159 N.C. 47, 74 S.E.2d 639 (1912).
'235 N.C. 82, 68 S.E.2d 796 (1952).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (1950).
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adjudicated by the judgment in the first action. In such cases, the
court continued, the law devises a special test of identity of parties
and causes and holds that the pendency of the prior action abates the
subsequent action when, and only when, two conditions concur: "(1)
the plaintiff in the second action can obtain the same relief by a
counterclaim or cross demand in the prior action pending against him;
and (2) a judgment on the merits in favor of the opposing party in the
prior action will operate as a bar to the plaintiff's prosecution of the
subsequent action." 5 The court concluded that since the husband could
counterclaim for divorce in the wife's prior action6 and since if the wife
satisfied her allegation of abandonment the husband's subsequent action
for divorce on grounds of two years separation would necessarily be
barred, 7 the husband's counterclaim must be considered as mandatory.
Although the factual situation in the Cameron case is converse to
that of Cook v. Cook, in that it was the wife who commenced the first
action in the Cameron case, it would certainly seem that if the Cameron
tests were applied to facts similar to those in the Cook case the wife's
counterclaim would likewise be compulsory, for she, too, may counter-
claim in the husband's prior suit,8 and the husband's absolute divorce
decree would necessarily bar all subsequent alimony proceedings. 0 In
fact, the court in the Cameron case so intimated.10
. 5235 N.C. 82, 86, 68 S.E.2d 796, 799 (1952). Accord, Brothers v. Bell
Bakeries, Inc., 231 N.C. 428, 57 S.E.2d 317 (1950) ; Smith-Dwiggins v. Parkway
Bus Co., 230 N.C. 234, 52 S.E.2d 892 (1949) ; Johnson v. Smith, 215 N.C. 322, 1
S.E.2d 834 (1939) ; Brown v. Polk, 201 N.C. 375, 160 S.E. 357 (1931) ; Murchison
Nat'l Bank v. Broadhurst, 197 N.C. 365, 148 S.E. 452 (1929) ; Harris v. Johnson,
65 N.C. 478 (1871). For cases in accord with the Cameroli case, see Hill v. Hill
Spinning Co., 244 N.C. 554, 94 S.E.2d 677 (1956) ; McDowell v. Blythe Bros. Co.,
236 N.C. 396, 72 S.E.2d 860 (1952).
'Lockhart v. Lockhart, 223 N.C. 559, 27 S.E.2d 444 (1943); Ellis v. Ellis,
190 N.C. 418, 130 S.E. 7 (1925). It is now possible for the husband to counter-
claim in the wife's alimony without divorce action under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16
(Supp. 1955).
Pharr v. Pharr, 223 N.C. 115, 25 S.E.2d 471 (1943) ; Byers v. Byers, 223 N.C.
85, 25 S.E.2d 466 (1943) ; Brown v. Brown, 213 N.C. 347, 196 S.E. 333 (1938) ;
Parker v. Parker, 210 N.C. 264, 186 S.E. 346 (1936) ; Reynolds v. Reynolds, 208
N.C. 428, 181 S.E. 338 (1935).
' "If any husband shall separate himself from his wife and fail to provide her
and the children of the marriage with the necessary subsistence according to his
means and condition in life, or if he shall be a drunkard or spendthrift, or be guilty
of any misconduct or acts that would be or constitute cause for divorce, either
absolute or from bed and board, the wife may institute an action in the superior
court of the county in which the cause of action arose to have a reasonable sub-
sistence and counsel fees allotted and paid or secured to her from the estate or
earnings of her husband, or she may set up such cause of action as a cross action
in any suit for divorce, either absolute or from bed and board; and the husband
may seek a decree of divorce, either absolute or from bed and board, in any action
brought by his wife under this section . . . " N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16 (Supp.1955).
"After a judgment of divorce from the bonds of matrimony, all rights arising
out of the marriage shall cease and determine, and either party may marry again
unless otherwise provided by law . . . provided further, that except in case of
divorce obtained with personal service on the wife, either within or without the
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Nevertheless, the court in Beeson v. Beeson excluded actions for
alimony arising under G.S. § 50-16 subsequent to the husband's divorce
proceedings from compulsory counterclaim treatment. Although
Cameron v. Cameron was extensively argued before the court by both
parties on appeal, 1 the Beeson decision completely omits any mention
thereof. G.S. § 50-16 states: "[T]he wife may institute an action in
superior court... or she may set up such action as a cross action .... -12
The court reasoned that the wife's counterclaim could not be considered
as mandatory since she was given an election by the statute either to sue
independently or to counterclaim in her husband's prior suit. Had the
court desired to hold otherwise it could have drawn strong support from
the case of Reece v. Reece.13
Although this statutory construction seems susceptible to honest
criticism from the standpoint of pleadings and procedure, in that it
prevents application of the Cameron tests, the final result does seem
to be consistent with existing general policy throughout the country
today that the duty of support should continue notwithstanding termina-
tion of the marriage contract, excluding, of course, cases of the wife's
misconduct.1
4
In North Carolina absolute divorce and alimony cannot be obtained
by the wife at the same time.15 An alimony decree will survive an ab-
solute divorce, however, if obtained prior thereto16 unless the divorce is
obtained in an action instituted by the wife on the grounds of two years
separation or is granted to the husband on the grounds of the wife's
adultery.'1  Hence, unless the female spouse obtains her alimony decree
or settlement prior to the final divorce decree her claim for future sup-
State, upon the grounds of the wife's adultery and except in case of divorce ob-
tained by the wife in an action initiated by her on the ground of separation for the
statutory period, a decree of absolute divorce shall not impair or destroy the
right of the wife to receive alimony and other rights provided for her under any
judgment or decree of a court rendered before the rendering of the judgment for
absolute divorce." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-11 (Supp. 1955). See Hobbs v. Hobbs,
218 N.C. 468, 11 S.E.2d 311 (1940); Bidwell v. Bidwell, 139 N.C. 402, 52 S.E.
55 (1905).
10235 N.C. 82, 87, 68 S.E.2d 796, 800 (1952).
"Brief for Appellant, pp. 4, 7, Beeson v. Beeson, 246 N.C. 330, 98 S.E.2d 17
(1957) ; Brief for Appellee, id. at pp. 2, 3.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16 (Supp. 1955).
13231 N.C. 321, 56 S.E.2d 641 (1949). The husband sued for absolute divorce
and the wife thereafter sued for alimony without divorce in an independent action
during pendency of the husband's action. The court held that the first action did
not abate the second, for under the court's interpretation of G.S. § 50-16 at that
time the wife could not counterclaim for alimony, but was required to sue
independently. Since the court based its decision on the fact that the alimony
without divorce action had to be brought as an independent action at that time,
the intimation is that the pendency of the prior action would abate the subsequent
alimony without divorce action if the subsequent action could be brought as a
counterclaim. By amendment to G.S. § 50-16, the alimony without divorce action
may now be brought as a cross action. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16 (Supp. 1955).
" See Note, 31 N.C. L. REV. 482 (1953). "5 See note 9 supra.
1 Ibid. 17 Ibid.
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port will be forever barred. Therefore, the wife who has valid grounds
for absolute divorce is forced to bring suit for alimony before suing for
divorce if she desires both. The effect of the Beeson decision, then, is
dearly consistent with general policy for it enhances the wife's chances
of getting an alimony decree before final adjudication of her husband's
divorce action. Nevertheless, it is true that Beeson does violence to
the equally sound principles of avoiding piecemeal litigation and of
preventing a multiplicity of suits which frequently result in conflicting
verdicts based upon substantially the same evidence.' 8
It is unlikely that the Beeson case will undermine Cameron v. Cam-
eron, since the two cases are factually distinguishable. Furthermore the
Beeson decision is based upon a statutory interpretation of G.S. § 50-16.
The decision adds further weight to the contention that North Carolina
should amend its divorce laws in order to permit a wife who has valid
grounds for divorce to obtain her absolute divorce and alimony by either
suing for both in the same action or by means of a counterclaim in any
action instituted by her husband.19
JAmES N. GOLDING
Evidence-Opinion Testimony of Speed
In Fleming v. Twiggs,' the North Carolina Supreme Court held that
a witness's testimony that the defendant's car was traveling seventy
miles per hour when it struck the plaintiff was inadmissible because the
witness had not had sufficient opportunity to form an opinion of probative
value. The witness had heard the sound of brakes and looked back to
see defendant's car just before it struck the deceased. She then turned
her head away so as not to see the accident. The court stated: "When
a witness has had no reasonable opportunity to judge speed of an auto-
mobile, it is error to permit him to testify in regard thereto. ' 2
The above language was quoted from State v. Becker,3 where the
witness testified that she had first seen the car that struck her when it
was fifteen feet away, and that it was going fifty-five miles per hour.
There was other undisputed evidence that the car stopped twenty-five
feet after it hit the witness. The court rejected the estimate of speed,
saying that it would have been a physical impossibility for the defendant
to have stopped his car in so short a distance if at the time in question
it was traveling at such a rate of speed. However, this was a criminal
action, requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and not only was
'
8 Emry v. Chappell, 148 N.C. 327, 330, 62 S.E. 411, 412 (1908).
See note 14 supra.
'244 N.C. 666, 94 S.E.2d 821 (1956).
Id. at 669, 94 S.E.2d at 824.
S241 N.C. 321, 327, 85 S.E.2d 327, 331 (1955).
( ol. 36
NOTES AND COMMENTS
there no other evidence to support the witness's testimony, but there
was evidence which contradicted it. Still the case seems to have
enunciated a North Carolina rule that when the observation was very
limited, the witness should not be permitted to give his opinion as to
the speed of the vehicle; and, if admitted, it will be considered of no
probative value.
There is some conflict among the states which have ruled on the
point of opinion testimony as to vehicular speed based on limited observa-
tion. California4 and Missouri5 have gone to the extreme by admitting
testimony of witnesses who saw the vehicle in motion for a distance of
only five feet, and by allowing the jury to -make a finding as to speed
'based on this testimony alone. The Missouri court said, "The weight of
that testimony was for the jury after having the benefit of plaintiff's
cross-examination on the subject." An Alabama court allowed testi-
mony of a witness as to the speed of a vehicle which he saw "just before"
it hit him and "just afterward," saying that the extent of the observation
went to the weight of the testimony and not to its admissibility.7
Kansas,8 Kentucky,9 and Texas,10 have allowed the witness to testify
where his opportunity to observe was only slightly greater. In the
Kentucky case," however, there was corroborating evidence.
When the witness has seen the vehicle in motion for only fifteen
feet or less, most courts either will not allow him to testify as to the
speed of the vehicle or will not allow the jury to make a finding as to
speed based on this evidence alone.12 The Wisconsin court allowed a wit-
ness to testify that he had first seen the automobile which struck him
when it was thirty to thirty-five feet away and that in his opinion it was
traveling sixty-five to seventy miles per hour;13 the same court had
'Schwenger v. Gaither, 87 Cal. App. 2d 913, 198 P.2d 108 (1948) (witness
estimated speed to be forty miles per hour).
Johnson v. Cox, 262 S.W.2d 13 (Mo. 1953) (witness estimated speed to be
fift miles per hour). See also Nixon v. Hill, 52 S.W.2d 208 (Mo. 1932).
Johnson v. Cox, mipra note 5, at 15.
'Jack Cole, Inc. v. Walker, 240 Ala. 683, 200 So. 2d 768 (1941).
8 Himmelwright v. Baker, 82 Kan. 569, 109 Pac. 178 (1910) (plaintiff saw the
automobile ten or fifteen feet away and testified that it was traveling fifteen miles
per hour).
'Eubank v. Austin, 288 S.W.2d 358 (Ky. 1956) (witness testified he saw the
motorcycle when it was fifteen or twenty feet away and that it was traveling
fifty-five or sixty miles per hour).10 Humphries v. Louisiana Ry. and Irrigation Co., 291 S.W. 1094 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1927), in which the court allowed a witness who had first seen the train
when it was fifteen or twenty feet away to testify that in his opinion it was
traveling twenty-five miles per hour, and allowed the issue of speed to go to thejury on this evidence alone. See Note,' 1 BAYLOR L. Ray. 482 (1949).1 Eubank v. Austin, 288 S.W.2d 358 (Ky. 1956).
" Baker v. Shockey, 92 Ga. App. 443, 88 S.E.2d 741 (1955) ; Wiles v. Connor
Coal and Wood Co., 143 Me. 250, 60 A.2d 786 (1948) ; Davidson v. Beacon Hill
Taxi Service, 278 Mass. 540, 180 N.E. 503 (1932); Kelly v. Veneziale, 348 Pa.
325, 35 A.2d 67 (1944) ; Culver v. Webb, 244 Wis. 478, 12 N.W.2d 731 (1944).
13 Albrecht v. Tradewell, 271 Wis. 303, 73 N.W.2d 408 (1955). Pestotnik v.
Balliet, 233 Iowa 1047, 10 N.W.2d 99 (1943), also allowed a witness who had seen
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stated in an earlier case, in which a witness saw a car 700 to 800 feet
away and then did not look again until the car was fifteen feet from him,
that "It is inconceivable that he could make a useful estimate from a
fleeting glance a split second before the cars collided.114
In rejecting the witness's estimate of speed because he only saw the
vehicle in motion for a split second, the court must implicitly accept his
estimate of the speed of the vehicle and the distance which he stated he
saw it travel for the purpose of determining that he saw it for only a
split second.15 Moreover, when the court rejects the estimate of speed
merely because the witness testifies that he only saw the vehicle in
motion for a distance of ten or fifteen feet, it is accepting as accurate the
witness's estimate of the distance which he saw the vehicle travel, but
is refusing to accept his estimate of its speed. Sometimes there is evi-
dence to support the distance, such as where the witness was not able
to see the car until it emerged from behind a building. In such a case
the distance from where the witness could first see a car beyond the
building to the point of impact could be measured. 6 Often the estimate
of the distance is unsupported by other evidence and is an estimate of
a witness who only saw the vehicle coming directly toward him, yet the
courts seem to accept it as accurate in determining whether the witness
had sufficient opportunity to judge the vehicle's speed. Why should the
jury not be allowed to find that the witness observed the vehicle in motion
for a greater distance, i.e., that he erred in his estimate of distance and
not of speed, and, therefore, that he had seen the vehicle in motion for a
distance great enough to give probative value to his estimate of speed?
Michigan has made a distinction as to whether the witness saw the
vehicle from a side view or coming directly toward him. A witness in
each of two Michigan cases had seen the car in motion for a distance of
twenty feet, but the court rejected the testimony of the one who had
seen the automobile coming directly toward him,17 and allowed the
testimony of the other, a railroad engineer of long experience who had
seen the moving automobile from a side view.18 However, the court in
the latter case expressly took into consideration the fact that it was the
a vehicle in motion for a distance of thirty feet to testify as to his estimate of its
speed.14 Culver v. Webb, 244 Wis. 478, 485, 12 N.W.2d 731, 734 (1944).
" In Johnson v. Cox, 262 S.W.2d 13 (Mo. 1953), the court calculated that if,
as the witness testified, she saw the motorcycle when it was five feet away and it
was traveling forty-five to fifty miles per hour, then she saw it for only one-
sixteenth to one-eighteenth of a second. In State v. Baker, 241 N.C. 321, 85 S.E.2d
327 (1955), the court calculated that if the car were traveling fifty-five miles per
hour, it was traveling eighty-one feet per second, and a witness who saw it for a
distance of fifteen feet only was not allowed to give his estimate of its speed.
" See Jackson v. Leach, 160 Md. 139, 152 A.2d 813 (1931).
"Wright v. Crane, 142 Mich. 508, 106 N.W. 71 (1905).
Harnau v. Haight, 189 Mich. 600, 155 N.W. 563 (1915).
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witness's business to estimate vehicular speeds. Maryland has allowed
the testimony of a witness who, from a side view, had seen the vehicle
in motion for a distance of twenty-six feet,19 while Pennsylvania re-
jected the testimony of a witness who first saw the train which hit him
when it was twenty-five feet away. 20 Thus it seems that when the wit-
ness has seen the vehicle in motion for a distance of only twenty or
twenty-five feet, some courts will inquire into further circumstances be-
fore determining whether the witness had sufficient opportunity to form
an opinion as to the speed of the vehicle.
The Arizona court has stated, "We think that the correct rule is
that if there is any possibility the opinion has evidentiary value, however
slight, the trial court should not be reversed for admitting it."21
Georgia has held that opinion evidence as to speed based on a momen-
tary view, though admissible, was not sufficient evidence to furnish a
basis on which a jury could find the automobile's speed ;22 and the
Nebraska court stated, "In the final analysis it resolves itself into a
question of the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a verdict, rather
than the competency of the witness to testify. '" 2- This view, salvages the
corroborative value of evidence too weak, as a matter of law, to alone
support a verdict. The Pennsylvania court stated the proposition in
this fashion:
There is no rule of law whereof we are aware, that excludes
opinion evidence as to speed if the witness presents the requisite
qualifications, viz., an observation of the vehicular movement ....
The weight attributable to such testimony may ... be very slight
and even legally insufficient to carry the point for which offered.
Indeed if it is the sole evidence of the operative negligence alleged,
it may be legally insufficient to support an affirmative finding...
or its weight may be so negligible as to justify its practical exclu-
sion from the jury's consideration . ... 24
Though a witness may have seen the vehicle for only a short distance
before the collision, he may have seen or felt its impact and observed
the distance it traveled after the collision. Such a witness's opinion as
to the speed of the vehicle might be helpful to the jury if it tends to
corroborate other competent evidence of speed. However, if there is
Jackson v. Leach, 160 Md. 139, 152 A.2d 813 (1931).
'o Ealy v. New York Cent. R.R., 333 Pa. 471, 5 A.2d 110 (1939).
" Eldredge v. Miller, 78 Ariz. 140, 145, 277 P.2d 239, 242 (1955).
" Baker v. Shockey, 92 Ga. App. 443, 88 S.E.2d 741 (1955) (plaintiff testified
that he saw the automobile about ten or fifteen feet before it struck him and that
it was going fifty miles per hour) ; Allen v. Hatchet, 91 Ga. App. 571, 86 S.E.2d
662 (1955) (plaintiff testified that he saw the automobile one or two seconds before
it hit him and that it was traveling seventy miles per hour).
Carnes v. DeKlotz, 137 Neb. 787, 789, 291 N.W. 490, 492 (1940).24 Shaffer v. Torrens, 359 Pa. 187, 193, 58 A.2d 439, 442 (1948).
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no other competent evidence to support the witness's testimony the trial
judge could refuse to permit the witness to testify as to his opinion of
the speed of the vehicle when it alone would not be sufficient evidence
on which the jury could base a finding of speed.
Neither of the two previously discussed North Carolina cases 26
specifically stated that such opinion testimony could not be used to
corroborate other evidence, but from the language of those two cases
it would seem that North Carolina might altogether reject such evi-
dence.26 Yet in State v. Fentress,27 the North Carolina court allowed a
witness who did not see the automobile in motion or the accident to
testify that in his opinion the car was traveling eighty-five miles per
hour, based on the sound of the engine and the loud crash. The court
stated: "The evidence of Foster who testified that he heard the car
passing with a great noise and at a rapid rate of speed does not lack
circumstantial support, since its roaring progress stopped with a loud
crash at the point where he found it a moment later, torn to pieces and
its occupants lying on the ground about the wreck."'28
Would not one who actually sees the vehicle in motion and the
collision have a better opportunity to judge the speed of the vehicle than
one who only hears the sound of the motor and the following crash?
It seems that when there is other competent evidence to support a
witness's opinion as to the speed of a vehicle, the jury should be allowed
to hear such opinion unless the witness's observation was so limited that
his opinion is totally lacking in probative value.
ROBERT L. GRUBB, JR.
Evidence-Privileged Governmental Records-
Production and Examination by Trial Judge
The recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Jencks
v. United States1 has caused a great deal of criticism and controversy.
This Note will be limited to evidentiary questions concerning privileged
governmental records, their production, and examination of them by
See text at notes 1 and 2 supra.
2 But see Jones v. Bagwell, 207 N.C. 378, 177 S.E. 170 (1934), where witnesses
who testified that they saw the automobile immediately after it struck deceased and
while it was coming to a stop were allowed to testify that in their opinion the
automobile was traveling thirty to forty miles per hour when they saw it for the
purpose of inferentially showing a greater speed at the time of impact, and in
corroboration of other evidence.
2 230 N.C. 248, 52 S.E2d 795 (1949).
28 Id. at 251, 52 S.E.2d at 797. But see Tyndall v. Hines Co., 226 N.C. 620,
623, 39 S.E.2d 828, 830 (1946), where the court stated: "Conversely, one who did
not see a vehicle in motion will not be permitted to give an opinion as to its speed.
The opinion must be a fact observed." In Campbell v. Sargent, 186 Minn. 293,
299, 243 N.W. 142, 144 (1932), it was stated: "We do not know of any way by
which one can determine the speed of a car by the noise."
1353 U.S. 657 (1957).
[Vol. 36
NOTES AND COMMENTS
the trial judge. No attempt will be made to discuss the constitutional
ramifications of the decision.
The Court's determination, that where the government in a criminal
prosecution elects not to comply with an order to produce material in
its possession on the ground of privilege, it must drop the prosecution,
was in accordance with existing law.
2
The Court's holding as to the foundation necessary to support a
motion for the government to produce reports made by the witness to
the government is open to criticism. It was held that the motion need
only be for specific documents that constitute relevant, competent ma-
terial which is outside any exclusionary rule, and that there was no need
to show inconsistency between the testimony at trial and the reports
requested. The relevancy and materiality of the reports are established
when they are shown to relate to testimony of the witness.
3
In reaching this conclusion, the Court stated that Gordon v. United
States4 was not intended to limit production of reports to a case where
there has been a showing of inconsistency between the testimony of the
witness and the reports requested. It is submitted that this is an
untenable position. The Gordon opinion, in considering whether the
defendant has a comprehensive right to see documents in the hands of
the prosecution merely because they might aid in the preparation or
presentation of his defense, stated, "We need not consider such broad
doctrines in order to resolve this case which deals with a limited and
definite category of documents to which the holdings of this opinion are
likewise confined." 5  In addition, Goldman v. United States8 was dis-
tinguished in Gordon because the former did not concern notes used
in court nor was there any proof that the requested documents would
show prior inconsistent statements. Six cases were cited in the Gordon
opinion as supporting its decision. Five of them7 concerned inconsisten-
cy or contradiction in the testimony and the sixth8 concerned letters,
the contents of which the witness testified she had no knowledge. In
the light of these circumstances, it is difficult to support the Court's
2 United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 12 (1953) (dictum) ; United States v.
Beekman, 155 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1946); United States v. Krulewitch, 145 F.2d
76 (2d Cir. 1944) ; United States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1944).
In Arnstein v. United States, 296 Fed 946 (D.C. Cir. 1924), the privilege was
granted in a criminal prosecution, but apparently no consideration was given to
the fact that there might be a distinction between criminal and civil cases, and the
civil rule was applied.
3 353 U.S. at 669.
'344 U.S. 414 (1952).
5 Id. at 418.
8316 U.S. 129 (1942).
United States v. Krulewitch, 145 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1944); People v. Davis,
52 Mich. 569, 18 N.W. 362 (1884); State v. Bachman, 41 Nev. 197, 168 Pac.
733 (1917); People v. Schainuck, 286 N.Y. 161, 36 N.E.2d 94 (1941); People
v. Walsh, 262 N.Y. 140, 186 N.E. 422 (1933).8 Asgill v. United States, 60 F.2d 776 (4th Cir. 1932).
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conclusion in Jencks that Gordon was not intended to be so limited in
application.
Moreover, this holding cannot be justified under the provisions of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Under these rules, docu-
ments may be obtained by motion at any time after the filing of the
indictment or information or by subpoena duces tecum.10 Under the
former, it is necessary that the things sought be objects belonging to the
defendant or taken by seizure or process from the defendant or others l
and FBI reports have been held not to be included.' 2 Furthermore, the
granting of such motion is not mandatory, but is within the discretion of
the trial judge.13 Similarly, it has been held that the use of the subpoena
duces tecum under Rule 17(c) is only a method to shorten trial by
allowing examination and inspection of documents before trial. 14  It
cannot be used to circumvent the above rule that statements to govern-
ment agents are not within the scope of the limited discovery permitted
under these rules.'5
The great majority of both federal and state cases prior to the Jencks
case had required a showing of contradiction between testimony and the
records sought as a foundation for a motion to produce the records.' 0
This rule has been continued almost without exception up to the time of
the Jencks decision.' 7  One reason for denying such motions is to pre-
vent "fishing expeditions" into the case of the prosecution.. 8
Other state' 9 and federal20 cases have denied motions for production
FED. R. Cium. P. 16.
:"FED. R. Calm. P. 17(c).
" Shores v. United States, 174 F.2d 838 (8th Cir. 1949); United States v.
Chandler, 7 F.R.D. 365 (D. Mass. 1947).
"United States v. Black, 6 F.R.D. 270 (N.D. Ind. 1946).
13 United States v. Schiller, 187 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1951).
4 United States v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 9 F.R.D. 509 (D.
D.C. 1949).
1 United States v. Gogel, 19 F.R.D. 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
16 United States v. Rosenfeld, 57 F.2d 74 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 556
(1932) (papers of the district attorney); State v. Zimnaruk, 128 Conn. 124, 20
A.2d 613 (1941) (stenographer's copy of statements made by a witness under
questioning by a county detective) ; State v. Lee, 173 La. 966, 139 So. 302 (1932)
(police reports and written statements of witnesses in possession of the state);
State v. Arnold, 84 Mont. 348, 275 Pac. 757 (1929) (statements of witnesses made
in the office of the county attorney, even though the defendant contended that
there were variances in the statements).
17 Scales v. United States, 227 F.2d 581 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 992
(1955), redd per curian, 78 Sup. Ct. 9 (1957); Scanlon v. United States, 223
F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1955) ; United States v. Lebron, 222 F.2d 531 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 870 (1955); Shelton v. United States, 205 F.2d 806 (5th Cir.
1953) ; United States v. Simmonds, 148 F.2d 177 (2d Cir. 1945) ; United States
v. Cohen, 145 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 799 (1945) ; United
States v Rosenberg, 146 F. Supp. 555 (E.D. Pa. 1956).
" United States v. Rosenfeld, 57 F.2d 74 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 556
(1932).
"Vaughn v. State, 25 Ala. App. 204, 143 So. 211 (1932); People v. Nields,
49 Cal. App. 4, 192 Pac. 552 (1920); Padgett v. State, 59 So. 946 (Fla. 1912);
People v. Gatti, 167 Misc. 545, 4 N.Y.S.2d 130 (N.Y. County Ct. Gen. Sess. 1938);
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of documents and records at trial on the ground that allowance of such
motion is within the discretion of the trial judge. In 1942, the Supreme
Court stated:
We hold there was no error in denying the inspection of the
witnesses' memoranda . . . . We think it the better rule that
where a witness does not use his notes or memoranda in court, a
party has no absolute right to have them produced and to inspect
them. Where, as here, they are not only the witness' notes but
are also part of the Government's files, a large discretion must be
allowed the trial judge.21
The Jencks opinion impliedly overruled this language.
22
Only a few cases have been found where a motion for production of
records has been granted absent a showing of inconsistency or con-
tradiction.23  In an 1807 decision it was held that it was necessary to
aver only that it "may be material" to compel production of a letter to
the President in the hands of the prosecution. 24  No precedent was
cited. Two federal cases allowed that no contradiction was necessary,
but refused a new trial in one because examination by the trial judge
showed no relevant material 25 and denied the motion for production in
the other because it was not for specific material.2 6 Other recent federal
cases granting motions to produce concerned either inconsistent material
or possible entrapment.2
7
The Jencks decision disapproved the practice of producing govern-
ment documents to the trial judge for his determination of relevancy and
materiality without hearing the accused. It was held that since only
State v. Clark, 21 Wash. 2d 774, 153 P.2d 297 (1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 878(1945).
20 United States v. Lightfoot, 228 F.2d 861 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. granted,
350 U.S. 992, reV'd per curiam, 78 Sup. Ct. 10 (1957) ; Simmons v. United States,
220 F.2d 377 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Iva Ikuko Toguri D'Aquino v. United States,
192 F.2d 338 (9th Cir. 1951) ; Kaufman v. United States, 163 F.2d 404 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 333 U.S. 857 (1947).
21 Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 132 (1942).
22 353 U.S. at 668.
2" State v. Murphy, 154 La. 190, 97 So. 397 (1923) (only witnesses for state
were present when statement sought had been made) ; Sprinkle v. State, 137 Miss.
731, 102 So. 844 (1925) (dying declaration which district attorney testified that
he possessed) ; State v. Tippett, 317 Mo. 319, 296 S.W. 132 (1927) ; Gaffney v.
Kampf, 182 Misc. 665, 49 N.Y.S.2d 151 (Sup. Ct. 1944); People v. Radeloff, 140
Misc. 690, 252 N.Y.S. 290 (N.Y. County Ct. Gen. Sess. 1931). The three previous
cases all granted motions to produce documents on the ground that justice re-
quired no less for a fair trial.
2,United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. No. 14694, at 191 (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
2 Boehm v. United States, 123 R.2d 791 (8th Cir. 1941).
" United States v. Mesarosh, 116 F. Supp. 345 (W.D. Pa. 1953), Aff'd, 223 F.2d
449 (3d Cir. 1955), rev'd on other grounds, 352 U.S. 1 (1956).27 United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1950) ; United States v. Alper,
156 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1946) ; United States v. Beekman, 155 F.2d 580 (2d Cir.
1946).
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the defense is adequately equipped to determine use of reports for dis-
crediting witnesses, the defense rather than the court must initially be
entitled to see them to determine what use may be made of them. In
so determining, the Court ordered that the reports be delivered to the
defense, despite the fact that the original motion had been for their
production to the court to examine and determine whether they would be
useful to the defense.28 The only thing that can be said concerning
this is that it is a complete reversal of prior practice. Wigmore dis-
cusses with approval the practice of examination by the trial judge. -"
The Court failed to cite a single case where this former procedure had
been deemed improper. Its conclusion is supported simply by stating
that "justice requires no less."30  On the other hand, there are in-
numerable cases allowing such an inspection by the trial judge.81
The effect of the Jencks decision is yet to be measured, but several
things should be noted. As an almost immediate result, Congress
passed the Jencks Bill3 2 to protect FBI files. In brief, it calls for the
trial judge to first examine the material sought if the government con-
tends that it contains any material not related to the subject matter of
the testimony. He will remove such unrelated portions and then de-
liver it to the defendant. If the government refuses to deliver up such
material, the entire testimony will be stricken or a mistrial granted if
the circumstances of the testimony require it.
Another immediate effect of the Jencks decision has been the dis-
missal of a host of cases. According to a magazine summary,33 13 cases
involving 19 defendants on such charges as kidnapping, fraud and
bribery, tax evasion, draft evasion, narcotics violations, forgery, em-
bezzling, and bootlegging were dismissed at various stages of trial.
Thus far, the effect of the Jencks decision has not been as far-
reaching as was originally thought by some. Its application to the
field of pre-trial discovery has not yet been determined, according to
a recent state decision 34 which notes that such discovery was allowed
28 353 U.S. at 669.
"WIGMOOE, EVIDENCE § 2200, at 117-18 (3d ed. 1940).
30 353 U.S. at 659.1E.g., United States v. Lebron, 222 F.2d 531 (2d Cir. 1955); Shelton v.
United States, 205 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1953) ; United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629
.(2d Cir. 1950) ; United States v. Beekman, 155 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1946) ; United
States v. Cohen, 145 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1944); United States v. Krulewitch, 145
F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1944) ; Boehm v. United States, 123 F.2d 791 (8th Cir. 1941);
Vause v. United States, 53 F.2d 346 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 661 (1931)
United States v. Rosenberg, 146 F. Supp. 555 (E.D. Pa. 1956) ; United States v.
Flynn, 130 F. Supp. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); United States v. Mesarosh, 116 F.
Supp. 345 (W.D. Pa. 1953), cert. granted, 350 U.S. 922 (1955) ; United States v.
Schneiderman, 106 F. Supp. 731 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
" Pub. L. No. 85-269, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (Sept. 2, 1957).
" U.S. News & World Report, Aug. 30, 1957, p. .58.
"' State v. Thompson, 134 A.2d 266 (Del. 1957).
[Vol. 36
1958] NOTES AND COMMENTS 215
in two recent federal cases,35 but denied in a third.36 It cannot be denied
that the case will involve new procedure and more latitude in prepara-
tion of the defendant's case. However, the pessimistic predictions of
doom present in the dissenting opinion of Justice Clark would appear
without foundation, since the decision, in restricting defendant's right
of examination to specific and relevant material, never afforded the
defendant a "Roman holiday." 37
LAURENCE A. COBB
Federal Jurisdiction-Enforcement of Collective Bargaining
Agreements Under Section 301 of Labor-Management
Relations Act
Much of the confusion and uncertainty as to the constitutionality and
proper application of section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations
Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act),' created, at least in part, by the
Supreme Court's treatment of the Association of Westinghouse Salaried
Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. case,2 has now been somewhat
alleviated. By its decision in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills,3 the Court has clearly upheld the constitutionality of section 301.
It is not so clear how the Court reconciles its extension of federal
jurisdiction with article III, section 2 of the Constitution4 which limits
"United States v. Frank, D.D.C., June 20, 1957; United States v. Hoffa,
D.D.C June 20, 1957.
"'United States v. Benson, 20 F.R.D. 602 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
37 353 U.S. at 680-81.
161 STAT. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1953).
"(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organiza-
tion representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this
chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district
court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
"(b) Any labor organization which represents employees in an industry affecting
commerce as defined in this Act and any employer whose activities affect commerce
as defined in this chapter shall be bound by the acts of its agents. Any such labor
organization may sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of the employees whom
it represents in the courts of the United States. Any money judgment against a
labor organization in a district court of the United States shall be enforceable only
against the organization as an entity and against its assets, and shall not be
enforceable against any individual member or his assets."
2348 U.S. 437 (1955).
353 U.S. 448 (1957). The case involved an action brought by a labor union
in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama seeking
specific performance of the arbitration provisions of a collective bargaining agree-
ment The district court exercised jurisdiction and ordered the employer to comply
with the arbitration provisions. The court of appeals, in a split decision,
reversed, holding that although the district court had jurisdiction to entertain
the suit it lacked authority founded on either state or federal law to grant
the relief sought. 230 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1956). On certiorari, the Supreme Court
reversed the decision of the court of appeals.
'U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. "The judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority . .. .
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the national "judicial power" to those cases "arising under" the Con-
stitution, laws, and treaties of the United States. Not only did the
majority of the Court find little constitutional difficulty in extending the
federal judicial power to the enforcement of collective bargaining agree-
ments, including specific performance of arbitration provisions contained
therein, but it also directed the federal district courts to "fashion a body
of federal law" for the enforcement of such agreements.5
Justice Frankfurter, in a lone dissent, failed to find in the legislative
history of section 301 congressional intent to grant to the federal courts
the right to specifically enforce arbitration provisions in collective
bargaining agreements. He also felt that the section could not be
constitutionally construed to grant jurisdiction to federal courts over
contracts founded on state substantive law, in the light of the provisions
of article III of the Constitution. The majority was little bothered by
the constitutional problem set forth by Justice Frankfurter. 6 As stated
by Justice Douglas:
There is no constitutional difficulty. Article 3, § 2 extends
the judicial power to cases "arising under . . . the laws of the
United States . . . ." The Power of Congress to regulate these
labor-management controversies under the Comfnerce Clause is
plain . . . . A case or controversy arising under § 301 (a) is,
therefore, one within the purview of judicial power as defined in
Article 3.7
Justices Burton and Harlan concurred in the result, but disagreed
with the majority's conclusion that the substantive law to be applied
was federal law:
The power to decree specific performance of a collectively
bargained agreement to arbitrate finds its source in § 301 itself,
and in a Federal District Court's inherent equitable powers,
nurtured by a congressional policy to encourage and enforce labor
arbitration in industries affecting commerce.
8
Apparently, these two Justices viewed the case in a "remedial sense"
only, following the view of Judge Wyzanski in Textile Workers Union,
CIO v. American Thread Co.9 Justices Burton and Harlan also noted
with approval the view of Judge Magruder in International Brotherhood
bf "Teamsters, AFL v. W. L. Mead, Inc.,10 to the effect that some federal
S353 U.S. at 451.
'Id. at 469-84. Cf. Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westing-
houg Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437, 449-52 (1955).
353 U.S. at 457.
8 Id. at 460.
p113 F. Supp. 137 (D. Mass. 1953).1 230 F.2d 576 (1st Cir. 1956).
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rights may necessarily be involved in a section 301 case and, therefore,
the constitutionality can be upheld as a congressional grant to the federal
district courts of "protective jurisdiction." The reasoning of the con-
curring justices is probably best expressed by the dissent of Judge
Brown, in the court of appeals' determination of the principal case:
But the studied search for a federal statute, the painstaking
analysis of the cases under it [i.e., by the two-judge majority],
demonstrates, I think, a misconception of the fundamentals. It is
as though we were dealing with a court having statutory power
only. But that is not the case. The United States District Court
is a constitutional organ with the intrinsic capacity to grant tradi-
tional coercive relief as the cases over which it has jurisdiction
may require ....
The remedy sought here is common and traditional-the
equity injunction to compel or restrain action because of the
inadequacy of the usual money damage. Its availability need find
no source, as such, in specific statute."1
This reasoning would appear to be sound. But while it avoids some of
the logical difficulties presented by the majority's construction of section
301 (the "substantive law" approach), which does not seem to be
founded on any authority, it still falls to solve many of the constitu-
tional problems.' 2
It remains to be seen whether the Court has, in effect, attributed to
section 301 of Taft-Hartley an "occult content" as alleged by Justice
Frankfurter.' 3 What are the constitutional implications of the decision
in the field of federal jurisdiction, and what repercussions may be felt
in the area of labor relations?
FEDERAL JURISDICTION
The courts have not been without their difficulties in construing the
language, "cases . . . arising under the laws of the United States." A
very broad scope was accorded by Chief Justice Marshall in the leading
case of Osborn v. Bank of the United States,14 where the language was
held to confer jurisdiction on the federal courts over suits brought by or
against the national bank chartered by Congress. It was reasoned that
the original "law" which established the bank impliedly contained, as an
"original ingredient," a federal question which would satisfy the
11230 F.2d 81, 90-91 (5th Cir. 1956).
12 It might be noted that Judge Brown also indicated his belief that § 301 might
be used in a "modified substantive way." Id. at 95.
13 353 U.S. at 461 (dissenting opinion).
1422 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
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"arising under" test of article III. However, the broad construction of
the clause by Chief Justice Marshall in the Osborn case has not been
followed by the courts in most subsequent cases which have arisen
under either the Constitution or the federal jurisdiction statute.1
While the Pacific Railroad Removal Cases16 followed the rationale of
Osborn, such cases as Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co.,1 7 and Gully v. First
Nat'l Bank,18 while recognizing the validity of the charter cases (such
as Osborn) within their special field, treated them as exceptional and
refused to extend their doctrine: "Today, even more clearly than in the
past, 'the federal nature of the right to be established is decisive-not
the source of the authority to establish it.' "19
The importance of raising a "federal question" in the plaintiff's
complaint in order to establish the jurisdiction of the court is well-
illustrated by such cases as Bell v. Hood,20 and Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips
Petroleum Co. :_ "The plaintiff's claim itself must present a federal
question 'unaided by anything alleged in anticipation of avoidance of
defenses which it is thought the defendant may interpose.' "22 How-
ever, as illustrated by McGoon .v. Northern Pac. Ry.,2 a case may not
properly be brought within the "arising under" clause unless its de-
termination actually and substantially involves a dispute over a federal
law.24
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills would seem to represent a
radical departure from the traditional requisites for the exercise of
jurisdiction by a federal district court under article III. Here, there is
no federally created right to be vindicated, the substantive law being
state, not federal. Yet, Congress is permitted to create federal juris-
diction to the satisfaction of the "federal question" clause of article III
where there is no substantive federal law in existence to be construed
15 Congress also utilized the "arising under" language in a statute which pro-
vided for a general grant of federal jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1953).
1- 115 U.S. 1 (1885).7 288 U.S. 476 (1933).
's299 U.S. 109 (1936).1 Id. at 114, citing Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476 (1933). The
scope of the Osborn decision is further curtailed by statute. Federal incorporation
may not now serve as a basis for federal jurisdiction except where the United States
holds more than one-half of the corporation's stock. 28 U.S.C. § 1349 (1953).327 U.S. 678 (1946).
21339 U.S. 667 (1950).
I22 d. at 672.
23204 Fed. 998, 1002-03 (D.N.D. 1913). Here, a suit brought by a shipper
against a railroad company to recover for damage to property incurred while being
transported in interstate commerce was held to arise under the Interstate Commerce
Act and to involve a construction of that law for purposes of conferring federar
jurisdiction under the "arising under" clause. Cf. Doucette v. Vincente, 194 F.2cr
834, 845 (1st Cir. 1952) ; Annots., 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 n. 35 (1949).
"' Of course, any national source will suffice whether the particular case "arises
under" the Constitution, Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946), a federal law, Bock v.
Perkins, 130 U.S. 628 (1891), or a treaty, Wilson Cypress Co. v. Del Pozo y
Marcos, 236 U.S. 635 (1915).
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or enforced.25 The reference by the Court to the commerce clause and
the impossibility of basing the decision on any other portion of article
III would seem to leave little else to support the finding of jurisdiction
but the "federal question" clause. On what grounds is the Court justified
in finding this case to "arise under" a law of the United States? The
majority chose not to rationalize publicly its decision, simply relying on
the bald reference to the commerce clause. 26
The Osborn case might be thought analogous, but there, incorpora-
tion by an act of Congress supplied the "original federal ingredient" by
which the resulting jurisdiction could be rationalized by the Chief
Justice who, undoubtedly, "leaned over backward" to protect the bank
from local prejudices. 27  It can hardly be said that a labor union,
or a collective bargaining agreement, founded on no federal law, similarly
satisfies the "original ingredient" rule. Yet, Osborn demonstrates that
situations might develop where Congress may use the federal courts as
a means for protecting a special interest within the "arising under"
clause of article III. The use of the federal courts for "protective"
purposes is further illustrated by the provisions for jurisdiction under
article III, section 2, which follow after the "arising under" clause and
which create independent jurisdictional grounds not dependent on
federal substantive law. 28
The present case raises the question of how far Congress may go in
protecting a special interest through the use of the federal "sanctuary."
In determining what interests may be so protected, the theory has been.
advanced that any interest over which Congress has the power to legislate
may qualify. 29
From this point of view, each such interest is necessarily one
which the Constitution has determined to be a potential subject of
national concern; since Congress might act in behalf of such
interests in some substantive respect, it might choose instead to
provide them with a protective forum for all their litigation.
Under this approach, so long as the interest involved is of the
21 While Congress mght have provided the substantive law to govern collective
bargaining agreements, under § 301 of Taft-Hartley, it has not chosen to do so.
"8 353 U.S. at 457.
27 See, Shulman and Jaegerman, Some Jitrisdictional Limitati ns on Federal
Procedure, 45 YALE L.J. 393, 404-05 (1936).
"a U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. "The judicial Power shall extend .. . to all
Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls ;---to all Cases of
admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction ;-to Controversies to which the United States
shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or more States ;--between a
State and Citizens of another State :-between Citizens of different States ;-be-
tween Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States,
and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or
Subjects."
2 Mishkin, The Federal Question it; the District Courts, 53 CoLrm. L. REV. 157,
188 (1953).
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kind described, it is,of no concern whether the particular case be
one as to which CQngress might have enacted the substantive
rule.30
Another theory3 ' would permit the extension of the federal judicial
power to all cases in which Congress has the potential authority to make
rules governing the matter in controversy, but has left the state sub-
stantive law to govern, while vesting jurisdiction to enforce the law
in the federal courts. The grant of jurisdiction is here treated as an
assertion of Congress's regulatory powers.3 2  However, since the ma-
jority of justices in the principal case side-stepped state substantive law,
of the two theories noted above, the former would seem to be closer to
that followed in the Court's "holding."
Looking at the situation more realistically, it might well be concluded
that article III is not the exclusive source on which the Court bases the
grant of judicial power to the federal district courts, but that the
legislative authority of Congress under article I of the Constitution is of
equal importance. Perhaps, it is the over-all legislative power under
article I which provides the real source of (and limitation on) federal
jurisdiction, and article III is of only incidental significance. At least,
this would seem to be the effect of the present decision.
Such reasoning has received previous support in National Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co. 33  Justices Jackson, Black and Burton
there reasoned that while jurisdiction could not be sustained directly
-under article III, relying on the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall in
Hepburn and Dundas v. Ellzey,3 4 it could be sustained as an exercise
of Congress's article I power of "exclusive legislation" over the District
of Columbia, i.e., citizens of the District are proper subjects to be
accorded a protective federal forum by Congress. The remaining six
justices opposed the article I approach, maintaining that article III
was the exclusive source of federal jurisdiction. A fear was expressed
that under the article I approach the district courts might be swamped
with a flood of all types of .litigation.3 5 However, Justice Rutledge,
30 Ibid.
" See, Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code,
13 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 216, 224-25 (1948).
"The reasoning of Justices Burton and Harlan would seem to approximate
this theory. 353 U.S. at 459-60.
33 337 U.S. 582 (1949). The question involved was the validity of a congres-
sional act which sought to open all of the federal district courts to suits between
citizens of the District of Columbia and those of the states.
" 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 445 (1804). The Court, through Chief Justice Marshall
here held that the District of Columbia was not a "state" for purposes of federaljurisdiction based on the "diversity of citizenship" clause of article III.
" "If Article III were no longer to serve as the criterion of district courtjurisdiction, I should be at a loss to understand what tasks within the constitutional
-competence of Congress, might not be assigned to district courts. 337 U.S. at 616
(concurring opinion of Justice Rutledge).
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joined by Justice Murphy, concurred in the result reached by Justices
Jackson, Black and Burton, but on the precise ground opposed by the
latter-a rejection of Marshall's construction of the status of the
District of Columbia. Rutledge and Murphy felt that for purposes of the
diversity clause, the District could well be treated as a "state." 36
In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, it would seem that the
majority of the Court proceeded (either consciously or unconsciously)
along lines similar to those laid down by Justices Jackson, Black and
Burton in the National Mutual Insurance case. Thus, Congress has
enacted legislation governing the field of labor relations, and in section
301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, has utilized the federal courts to effectuate
its policies. While there may be no federal substantive law which can
be applied to particular cases, and, therefore, no "federal question"
raised in the technical sense, the majority apparently felt that over-all
national policies in the area of labor relations could better be protected
in the federal courts. In effect, we have a somewhat analogous situation
to that of the "original ingredient" in Osborn. There, the incorporation
act was deemed sufficient to confer jurisdiction. Here, the federal
legislation in the area of labor relations is, in itself, considered a sufficient
"original ingredient" to support the exercise, by the federal courts, of
a "protective jurisdiction" in support of congressional policy. Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills would seem to have resulted in a
blending of article I and article III in the area of federal jurisdiction.
While article III cannot here be considered as the original source of
judicial power, by implication it refers over to the legislative powers
granted to Congress by article I. So, in an oblique manner, the "arising
under" clause of article III may be said to have been satisfied.
The net result of Lincoln Mills, if the Court ultimately adheres to
such a theory as expressed above, could well result in the creation of
new areas of federal jurisdiction whenever Congress should see fit to
exercise its constitutional powers under article I by enacting legislation
to protect a special interest, and providing for "protection" of such an
interest in the federal courts.
LABOR LAW
The decision of the Supreme Court in the principal case results in
federal district courts' being permitted to order specific performance of
agreements to arbitrate contained in collective bargaining contracts, and
it settles the question of the constitutionality of section 301 of the Taft-
Hartley Act. But far from settled are various questions involving the
relationship between state and federal law in the area of labor relations,
30 "And so, conflicting minorities in combination bring to pass a result-para-
doxical as it may appear-which differing majorities of the Court find insup-
portable." 337 U.S. at 655 (dissenting opinion of Justice Frankfurter).
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and the further types of relief which might now be sought under section
301. When all the "returns are counted" it is quite possible that labor's
apparent "victory" in the Lincoln Mills case will turn out to be Pyrrhic.
The potential conflict of state and federal law posed by the Court's
decision is noted by Justice Frankfurter.3 7 While section 301 provides
the opportunity to bring a suit on breach of a collective bargaining agree-
ment in the federal courts, it does not preclude the maintenance of a
similar action in the state courts. Unless state courts are prepared to
follow the substantive law which the federal courts may "fashion" in
this area,3 8 considerable conflict could result between the decisions.
Difficulties might also be presented in the establishment of a uniform
federal substantive law. If independent federal district courts may
resort to state law where it is compatible with the purposes of section
301 "in order to find the rule that will best effectuate the federal
policy,"39 varying conceptions of the "federal policy" by different district
court judges in particular cases might well keep the circuit courts and
the Supreme Court very busy in trying to establish a uniform law. The
Court stated that, "Any state law applied, however, will be absorbed as
federal law and will not be an independent source of private rights. '40
But this "absorbing process" does not, in itself, resolve the problem of
the application of conflicting state laws by district court judges who,
in turn, may well have conflicting views of the "federal policy."
The greatest question left unsettled by Lincoln Mills is the extent to
which the federal district court may exercise its remedial powers in
enforcing collective bargaining agreements. In the principal case
specific performance was granted of an agreement to arbitrate. The
Court reasoned that, "Plainly the agreement to arbitrate grievance dis-
putes is the quid pro quo for an agreement not to strike. ' 41 Now if the
Court decreed specific performance of the quid pro quo for an agreement
not to strike, it may be reasoned that an agreement not to strike would
similarly be enforced. Suppose a union goes out on strike in violation
of such an agreement. Further suppose that the setting for the strike
is an industrial state such as New Jersey which has a "little Norris
LaGuardia Act."'42  The harried employer desires relief and wants it
fast. Under New Jersey law, he cannot enjoin the union from breaching
"' 353 U.S. at 462; Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. West-
inghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437, 454-55 (1955).
"s An illustration of the type of jurisdictional problem which can be raised by
a case which falls within the purview of Taft-Hartley Act provisions covering un-
fair labor practices, but also within the jurisdiction of a state court to grant
"traditional relief," is presented by J. A. Jones Constr. Co. v. Electrical Workers
Union, AFL, 246 N.C. 481, 98 S.E.2d 852 (1957).
30 353 U.S. at 457. Cf. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363,
367 (1943).
0 353 U.S. at 457.
I11d. at 455.
"See N.J. REv. STAT. §§ 2A: 15-51 to -58 (1952).
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its "no-strike agreement" if there is a genuine labor dispute involved.43
Query: can an injunction now be had in the federal district court under
section 301? It has been suggested44 that, even in light of the Lincoln
Mills decision, the Norris-LaGuardia Act45 would preclude the
federal courts from enjoining strikes arising out of genuine lbor dis-
*putes; but if Lincoln Mills is taken at face value, a different conclusion
might well be reached. As noted above, the Court collated its treatment
of the agreement to arbitrate to that of an agreement not to strike. The
line between "specific performance" and "injunction" in this area is
,certainly a fine one,46 and it would hardly seem consistent for the Court
to enforce the quid pro quo of an agreement not to strike while leaving
unenforceable the "quo pro quid." Yet, the Norris-LaGuardia Act is
said to require the Court to do just that.
In its search for legislative intent, the Court cites and relies on the
,view of the House sponsor, Congressman Hartley, in answer to a ques-
tion by Congressman Barden:
"Mr. Barden.... It is my understanding that section 302...
contemplates not only the ordinary lawsuits for damages but also
such other remedial proceedings, both legal and equitable, as might
be appropriate in the circumstances ....
" No judge may issue an injunction in any case involving or growing out
of a labor dispute, except after hearing testimony of witnesses in open court in
support of the allegations of a complaint made under oath, and testimony in op-
position thereto, if offered, and except after findings by the court of all the
following facts:
a. That unlawful acts have been committed and are likely to be continued
unless restrained;
b. That substantial and irreparable injury to plaintiff's property will follow
unless the relief is granted;
c. That as to each item of relief granted greater injury will be inflicted upon
plaintiff by the denial thereof than will be inflicted upon defendants by the
granting thereof;
d. That plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law. N. J. REv. STAT. § 2A: 15-53
(1952).
Neither will the types of relief available under formal NLRB proceedings
generally be adequate for the employer who cannot endure the effects of a strike
which runs longer than a few days.
"The Supreme Court, 1956 Term, 71 HARV. L. Rtxv. 83, 178, 176 n. 511 (1957).
" 46 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1953). Section 104 provides: "No
court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or
temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of a labor
dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in such dispute
(as these terms are herein defined) from doing, whether singly or in concert, any
of the following acts:
"(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation
of employment;
"(e) Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in, any labor
dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling, or by any other method not
involving fraud or violence ... "
"6,A court might "enjoin" a strike by ordering the union to "specifically per-
form" the terms of its collective bargaining agreement (including a no-strike clause
contained therein).
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"Mr. Hartley. The interpretation the gentleman has just given
of that section is absolutely correct. '47
While the Court was able to avoid the "obstacle" of the Norris-La-
Guardia* Act in the present case-"The failure to arbitrate was not a
part and parcel of the abuses against which the Act was aimed." 4 8-- if
section 301 does, in effect, contemplate "stch other remedial proceedings,
both legal and equitable," should Norris-LaGuardia constitute a bar to
the issuance of an injunction to prevent a strike in breach of a non-
strike agreement? It seems unrealistic to view the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, passed in 1932, as a vital part of federal policy governing collective-
bargaining agreements (and upon which federal substantive law is now
supposed to be fashioned), where such act conflicts with the Taft-
Hartley Act, passed fifteen years later. If congressional intent is con-
strued as calling for application of all equitable remedies of the federal
courts under section 301, and Norris-LaGuardia is in irreconcilable con-
flict with the intent, the conflict, seemingly, should be resolved in favor
of the more recent legislation.49 In any event, in the hypothetical New
Jersey situation set forth above, until the Supreme Court rules on the
matter, an attorney for the "harried employer" should certainly give
serious consideration to the possibility of obtaining injunctive relief in
the federal district court under section 301.50 Meanwhile, the influence
of section 301 is undoubtedly being felt in the area of labor relations in
settlement of controversies without the necessity of court proceedings.
By its very presence and potential use as a weapon for the attainment of
not only money damages, but also injunctive-type relief in the federal
courts, section 301 should serve to accomplish some of the ends sought
by its designers-primarily, the enforcement of collective bargaining
agreements.
The Supreme Court has, in Lincoln Mills, resolved one point of
controversy in the field of labor law. By its failure to spell out with
'1 353 U.S. at 455-56, quoting from 93 CONG. REc 3656-57 (1947).
'
8 Id. at 458.
judge Magruder, in W. L. Mead Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, AFL, 217 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1954), presents a vigorous argument in support of
a contrary conclusion: Cf. Amazon Cotton Mill Co. v. Textile Workers Union, CIO,
167 F.2d 183 (4th Cir. 1948), in which a union was unsuccessful in attempting to
overcome the Norris-LaGuardia obstacle in an action brought to enjoin the
employer from refusing to bargain collectively. However, the Norris-LaGuardia
Act need not necessarily prohibit a federal district court from issuing a mandatory
injunction in all cases involving a "labor dispute." "It is inaccurate to say that
the court is barred from issuing an injunction in any case involving a labor dispute."
Textile Workers Union, CIO v. Aleo Mfg. Co., 94 F. Supp. 626, 629 (M.D.N.C.
1950), citing the opinion of Judge Parker in Virginian Ry. v. System Federation
No. 40, 84 F.2d 641 (4th Cir. 1936), aff'd, 300 U.S. 515, 562-63 (1937).
'0The Norris-LaGuardia problem might also arise in situations where the
employer sues in a state court such as in North Carolina which has no "little
Norris-LaGuardia Act," and the union seeks removal to the federal courts. This,
however, raises other questions beyond the scope of this Note.
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greater clarity the rationale behind its decision, it has created numerous
potential difficulties in other areas of both labor law and federal
jurisdiction.
RIcHARD P. WEITZMAN
Mortgages-Effect of Assignment without Assigning the Debt-
Formalities Necessary to Transfer the Mortgagee's Title
to the Mortgaged Property
In a recent North Carolina case,1 X, Y, and Z together held a re-
corded mortgage. X and Y made a marginal entry on the mortgage as
follows: "For value received we hereby transfer and assign the within
mortgage deed from [mortgagors] to [Z] without recourse."2 Con-
cerning this assignment, the court uttered dicta to the effect that: (1)
The assignment sufficed to transfer only the debt which the mortgage
had been given to secure, and (2) The assignment did not pass any
title to the land. Z later conveyed the mortgaged land to a third party
by warranty deed. Concerning this conveyance, the court in a dictum
stated that the grantee in the warranty deed became a mere trustee
chargeable with a duty and responsibility to both the owner of the
equity of redemption and the owner of the debt secured by the instru-
ment. The court did not elaborate on any of these dicta and it is the
purpose of this Note to examine the validity thereof.
The statement that the assignment sufficed to transfer the debt only
seems to assume that it was sufficient to transfer the debt. No authority
for that assumption was cited. It seems to be well settled in North
Carolina that an assignment of the debt draws with it the mortgage.3
But there seems to be a dearth of authority in North Carolina as to the
effect of assigning a mortgage without transferring the debt also. One
" Gregg v. Williamson, 246 N.C. 356, 98 S.E.2d 481 (1957).
2 The plaintiff in this case claimed title through various conveyances of the
mortgaged land beginning with a deed from Z to a third party. The defendants
claimed title under a deed from the original mortgagors which was executed about
thirty years after the mortgage. The defendants contended that the land was free
from the mortgage since no one had filed an affidavit or made a marginal entry
on the mortgage showing that the debt was alive within fifteen years after due date
of the secured debt as is required by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-37(5) (1950), which
accordingly creates a conclusive presumption in favor of a purchaser of the land
that the debt is satisfied. The plaintiff contended that the statute was unconstitu-
tional since it was retroactive in effect and thus impaired the obligation of the
mortgage. The court dismissed the plaintiff's appeal on the grounds that he was
not an aggrieved party since the statute concerned only the holder of the secured
debt and the plaintiff did not claim to hold the debt. The court also said the
statute was not unconstitutional since the owners of debts affected by the statute
were given one year after enactment of the statute to comply with its provisions.
Citizens' Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. White, 189 N.C. 281, 126 S.E. 745
(1925) ; Hussey v. Hill, 120 N.C. 312, 26 S.E. 919 (1897) ; Hyman v. Devereux,
63 N.C. 624 (1869). However, the court stated in the principal case that the
transfer of a note secured by a mortgage does not transfer title to the mortgaged
nroperty nor the power of sale nor the right to release the mortgage.
1958]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
case was found where the court stated that an endorsement on the
mortgage would not convey the debt.4 But in a case involving a chattel
mortgage, the court stated that an assignee of a chattel mortgage ac-
quires an "'interest in the debt secured and the property pledged, which
courts of law as well as courts of equity, will recognize.' '' There does
not seem to be any reason for giving different effect to an assignment of
a chattel mortgage and a mortgage on real property so far as trans-
ferring the debt is concerned.
The courts in other jurisdictions seem to be in conflict on the point.
One court flatly stated that an assignment of the mortgage alone and
separate from the note it was given to secure would not transfer the note
unless it was in fact delivered. 6 Where a mortgage securing a negoti-
able note is assigned to one, and the note negotiated to another, it has
been held that the assignment of the mortgage did not carry title to the
note and that the assignment of the mortgage alone was a nullity. In
one case a mortgagee assigned the mortgage but kept the secured notes,
and the court held that the assignee acquired only a bare legal title to
the land to hold in naked trust for the owner of the debt.8 Notwith-
standing these dogmatic statements, it is believed that most courts, in
equity, will decree that the mortgage debt is transferred where such was
the intention of the parties.9 Where there is no bond or note given as
evidence of the indebtedness, there is some authority that an assignment
'Hodge v. Hudson, 139 N.C. 358, 359, 59 S.E. 954, 955 (1905). This case is
weak authority on the point because the court merely ruled that the endorsements on
the mortgage were properly excluded from evidence. The case did not indicate
what language was endorsed on the mortgage. The defendant was attempting to
prove he had bought the mortgage debt. The court said: "The mortgage note -was
not produced, the alleged endorsements on the mortgage would not have conveyed
the debt, nor the property (for title in the endorsers was not shown), and it does
not appear that the signatures of the alleged endorsers were proven." Ibid.
Hodges v. Wilkinson, 111 N.C. 56, 63, 15 S.E. 941, 943 (1892). The assign-
ment stated: "Value received, I hereby transfer this mortgage to [X]." The court
ruled that this assignment was admissible into evidence to show superior title to
the mortgaged property in X.
'In re Tobin's Estate, 139 Wis. 494, 121 N.W. 144 (1909).
' Rockford Trust Co. v. Purtell, 183 Ark. 918, 39 S.W.2d 733 (1931) ; Connally
v. State, 90 Tex. Crim. App. 284, 234 S.W. 886 (1921).8 Averill v. Cone, 129 Me. 9, 149 Atl. 297 (1930). The assignment was without
consideration, but the court made no point of this.
'Union Bank and Trust Co. v. Thompson, 202 Ala. 537, 81 So. 39 (1919)
Hawkins v. Elston, 58 Cal. 400, 146 Pac. 254 (1915) ; Bank v. Dyer, 121 Conn. 263,
184 Atl. 386 (1936) ; Parks v. Skipper, 164 Md. 388, 165 AtI. 319 (1933) ; Geffen
v. Palatz, 312 Mass. 48, 43 N.E.2d 133 (1942) ; Brown v. Yarborough, 130 Miss.
715, 94 So. 887 (1923) ; Merritt v. Bartholick, 36 N.Y. 44 (1867) ; Campbell v.
Birch, 60 N.Y. 214, 218 (1875) (dictum).
But if the evidence of the debt were in the hands of another party, or was later
sold to another party, the intention to assign it with the mortgage would be
ignored. Literer v. Huddleston, 52 S.W. 1003 (Tenn. App. 1898). Where the
mortgagee assigned the mortgage and a duplicate of the note secured thereby to
D, and transferred the original note to E to secure a debt of the mortgagee to E,
the court held that title to the mortgage and note vested in D subject to the lien
of E but was complete against all other persons. Miller v. Hicken, 92 Cal. 229, 28
Pac. 339 (1891).
[Vol. 36
NOTES AND COMMENTS
of the mortgage will also transfer the debt even though there is no evi-
dence, other than assignment of the mortgage, that such was the intention
of the parties.10
It is submitted that the intention of the parties should control even
where there is a separate instrument embodying the debt if the rights
of innocent third party transferees of the note or bond evidencing the
debt would not be injured thereby. Also, such an intention should be
presumed from the assignment of the mortgage because it is surely more
logical to presume that the parties intended for the assignment to have
legal effect than for it to be a nullity or a mere trust without substantial
interest in the assignee. 1 A fortiori, such a presumption should be made
where the mortgage is the only written evidence of the indebtedness.
The second point of dictum in the principal case raises the question
as to why the assignment did not pass title to the land. It is well
settled that North Carolina is a "title" jurisdiction, i.e., a mortgagee
acquires legal title to the mortgaged property.12 Therefore, a mere
assignment of the mortgagee's right, title, and interest in the mortgage
will not transfer the legal title to the subject-matter of the mortgage.
Such an assignment merely transfers the mortgage deed, the written
instrument of conveyance, and the security it affords to the holder of
the debt.'8 The assignment in the principal case seems to fall clearly
within this rule since the assignment mentioned only the mortgage and
said nothing of the mortgaged property. However, an assignment writ-
ten on the mortgage may convey the legal title to the land when it
purports to act on the land itself.
14
10 Carpenter v. O'Dougherty, 67 Barb. 397, 399 (N.Y. 1873) (dictum). In this
case there was some question as to whether there had been a bond given as evidence
of the secured debt. The court found that a bond had been given but stated that
if there had been no bond, the mortgage would have been the principal and only
security and the only evidence of indebtedness, and that an assignment of the
mortgage would give the assignee a good title thereto. To the same effect, see
Earl v. Stumpf, 56 Wis. 50, 52, 13 N.W. 701, 702 (1882). However, in this
case, the court also said: "The intention of the mortgagees to assign an interest
in the mortgage debt being clear, we apprehend the same result would follow had
the mortgagees held a note, or an obligation of the mortgagor other than the
mortgage, for such debt." Ibid.1 OSBORNE MORTGAGES § 226 (1951).
" Lewis v. Nunn, 180 N.C. 159, 104 S.E. 470 (1920) ; Kiser v. Combs, 114 N.C.
640, 19 S.E. 664 (1894).
1 Hussey v. Hill, 120 N.C. 312, 26 S.E. 319 (1897) ; Williams v. Teachey, 85
N.C. 402 (1881). The assignment in the latter case read: "For value received I
sell and transfer to [X] all my right, title, and interest in and to the following
mortgages .... ." No mention was made of the mortgaged property.
21In re Sermon's Land, 182 N.C. 122, 108 S.E. 497 (1921). The assignment
of the mortgage was in these words: "I hereby transfer and assign all my right,
title, and interest and estate in and to the within mortgage and the property con-
veyed therein to . . . " The court held that the assignment transferred the
mortgaged property. Thus it seems that the formalities of a deed are necessary
for an assignment of a mortgage to be effective as a transfer of the legal title to
the mortgaged land. Where a seal is not required, the formalities seem to be
merely a writing, signed by the holder of the legal title, purporting to transfer
the assignor's interest in the land with a reference to the description of the
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The third point of dictum in the principal case is related to the at-
tempted conveyance of the mortgaged property by Z, who was the as-
signee of the mortgage and also one of the mortgagees. The court
stated that conceding that one of the joint tenants had the right to
convey his interest in the land which was held as security for the debt,
his grantee becomes a mere trustee chargeable with a duty and re-
sponsibility to both the owner of the equity of redemption and the owner
of the debt secured by the instrument. Once it is conceded that the deed
was sufficient to transfer Z's legal title, and his legal title only, the
court seems correct in saying the grantee would hold it in trust. 1r
However, there seems to be some question as to whether the bare legal
title of the mortgagee can be conveyed without also transferring the
debt.16 Assuming that such a conveyance is possible in North Carolina,
as the court does, why did the court not say that the grantee acquired
an interest in the secured debt in proportion to the interest he acquired
in the mortgaged property, namely one-third? In the first point of
mortgaged land in the mortgage. See also Weil v. Davis, 168 N.C. 298, 84 S.E.
395 (1915), where the court found that the general scope of the assignment indicated
an intention to part with everything; therefore, title to the land passed to the
assignee. The court stated that it was a problem of construing the assignment so
as to arrive at the intention of the parties, the form of the expression being
immaterial. But see Morton v. Lumber Co., 154 N.C. 336, 339, 70 S.E. 623, 624
(1911)., where the assignment stated: "For value received, The Farmers and
Merchants Bank hereby bargains and sells to J. A. Morton, his heirs and assigns,
this mortgage and all its right, title, and interest to the property described therein,
together with all rights and powers contained in said mortgage, without recourse
to said bank." The court held that the assignment was not a deed because it
lacked the corporate seal. The court further said that even if the assignment had
been sealed, legal title to the mortgaged land would not pass because the assign-
ment did not in terms profess to act on the land. The court gave no explanation
as to why it considered the assignment as not purporting to act on the land. This
dictum seems to be contra to the holding in In re Sermon's Land, supra. Moreover,
the court stated that this assignment was in terms very similar to that in Williams
v. Teachey, supra note 13. The terms of the assignments in the two cases seem to
be clearly different.
" Where a mortgagee assigned the secured note and the mortgage, but retained
legal title to the mortgaged property, the court held that the mortgagee held the
legal title in trust for the owner of the debt and equity of redemption. Collins
v. Davis, 132 N.C. 106, 43 S.E. 579 (1903). By analogy, when the mortgagee
conveys only the bare legal title to the mortgaged property, the grantee would hold
the legal title in trust.
"
0Two North Carolina cases were found concerning the effect of a deed by a
mortgagee of only the mortgaged property. One, case stated that no estate will
pass by such a deed unless the debt is transferred at the same time, though in some
cases such a conveyance may operate as an assignment of the mortgage. Stevens
v. Turlington, 186 N.C. 191, 194, 119 S.E. 210, 211 (1923) (dictum). The other
case stated flatly that a conveyance by the mortgagee, except under foreclosure,
merely operates as an assignment of the mortgage as distinguished from an as-
signment of the mortgage debt. Cleve v. Adams, 222 N.C. 211, 214, 22 S.E.2d 567,
569 (1942) (dictum). Neither of these cases have been subsequently cited for the
point Collins v. Davis, supra note 15, is good authority for the point that the
legal title to the mortgaged property may be separated from the secured debt.
Thus it seems that the dictum in the two cases above is not well considered and
that bare legal title to the mortgaged property could be conveyed without a transfer
of the secured debt or an assignment of the mortgage.
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dictum the court stated that the assignment of the mortgage sufficed to
transfer the debt, so why should a transfer of a mortgagee's interest in
the mortgaged property not havre the same effect? No North Carolina
cases on this point were found. The courts in other jurisdictions adopt
various views. One view is that the grantee acquires at least an equitable
right to the secured indebtedness.17 Another view is that the grantee
acquires the secured indebtedness only if the mortgagee was in possession
of the mortgaged property at the time he executed the deed.1 8
It is submitted that the better view is to give effect to the intention
of the parties where such can reasonably be done. Normally, it seems
the intent would be to transfer all the mortgagee's interest in the
property and the debt, else the grantee would receive nothing of value.
However, where the mortgagee has transferred the secured debt to a
third party for value and then conveys the mortgaged property, the
grantee of the mortgaged property would have to suffer for his own
negligence or ignorance of the facts.' 9
PHILLIP C. RANSDELL
Partnerships-Liability of Partners-Marshalling Assets
The law in North Carolina relative to the rule of marshalling assets
for the benefit of firm and individual creditors is somewhat uncertain.
Before the Uniform Partnership Act' was passed in 1941, the court
held in Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. v. Walston2 that the firm creditor
did not have to exhaust the firm assets before reaching the individual
assets of the partners. The firm was in the hands of receivers who were
in the process of settling the affairs of the business. Partner A had died,
thus dissolving the partnership. Partner B was insolvent and the firm
owed some $62,000, of which $12,500 was owed to the Chemical Com-
pany. A's personal estate was valued at $9,000, with $3,000 out-
standing personal debts against it. The Chemical Company sought to
share in the personal assets of A along with the open unsecured credi-
tors of the personal estate. The trial court held that the Chemical
Company could share in the individual assets of A only to the extent of
the balance unpaid after all dividends from the firm assets had been
received. From this ruling the Chemical Company appealed and the
court, looking to C.S. § 3259,3 reversed the holding of the lower court.
"' Sadler v. Jefferson, 143 Ala. 669, 39 So. 380 (1905) ; Hawkins v. Elston, 58
Cal. 400, 146 Pac. 254 (1915).
18 Wyman v. Porter, 108 Me. 110, 79 Atl. 371 (1911).
"o For a general discussion of this problem, see Ross, The Double Hazard of a
Note and Mortgage, 16 MINN. L. REv. 123 (1932).
'UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 59-31 to 59-89 (1950).
2187 N.C. 817, 123 S.E. 196 (1924).
'N.C. CODE ANN. § 3259 (Michie 1935). The statute provided in part:
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The court, Justice Stacy writing the opinion, held that the equitable
doctrine that firm creditors could not reach the personal assets of the
partner until the obligations of the separate and private creditors had
been satisfied did not apply in this state since the effect of C.S. § 3259
was to convert creditors of the firm into individual creditors of each
member of the firm.4 Since the liability of the partners was joint and
several, and since the firm assets were not sufficient to pay the firm debts,
the creditors of the partnership were entitled to have their claims allowed
in full, both as against the firm assets and as against the individual
assets of partner A; they were allowed to enforce the two liabilities
concurrently and to obtain their ratable share of each fund.5
In 1941 the Uniform Partnership Act 6 was enacted and C.S. § 3259,
under which the Walston case was decided, was repealed. 7 The new
act provided that the partners were liable jointly for all firm debts and
obligations other than torts and breaches of trust.8
In 1954 Casey v. Granthar 9 was decided by the supreme court.
The plaintiff and another were partners in a cotton ginning and saw-
milling business. The plaintiff and his partner had executed notes
totaling $15,000 to the firm creditor and had secured these notes with a
deed of trust conveying the partnership property and the home and farm
of the plaintiff. The plaintiff sought to have a dissolution, a settlement
and an accounting of the firm assets, and an injunction to prevent the
trustee from selling the property under the power of sale contained in the
deed of trust. The court, in overruling the dissolution of the temporary
injunction by the lower court, 10 held that each partner had the right to
have partnership property applied to the payment of partnership debts
in order to relieve him from personal liability." The court further
stated:
"General and Special Partners; Liability. Such partnership may consist of one
or more persons, who are general partners, and are jointly and severally re-
sponsible as partners are now by law .... ." (Emphasis added.)
'187 N.C. at 821, 123 S.E. at 198.
187 N.C. at 822, 123 S.E. at 198.
8 See note 1 supra.
7 N.C. Public Laws 1941, c. 251, § 31.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 59-45 (1950). This statute provided: "All partners are
liable
"(a) Jointly and severally for everything chargeable to the partnership under§§ 59-43 [torts] and 59-44 [breaches of trust].
"(b) Jointly for all other debts and obligations of the partnership ... 
8239 N.C. 121, 79 S.E.2d 735 (1954).
" Transcript of Record, p. 11, Casey v. Grantham, 239 N.C. 121, 79 S.E.2d
735 (1954). The defendant demurred to the complaint on the grounds of mis-
joinder of parties and causes and that the complaint failed to state a cause of action.
The judge, hearing the motion on demurrer, sustained the demurrer, dismissed the
action, and dissolved the temporary restraining order.
2" The court relied, in part, on two Iowa cases: Bankers Trust Co. v. Knee,
222 Iowa 988, 270 N.W. 438 (1938), and Simmons v. Simmons, 215 Iowa 654,
246 N.W. 597 (1933).
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It appears that under the general rule as to marshaling partner-
ship and individual assets, or under the application of b principle
of equity similar to that rule, the rule that partnership debts may
be paid out of individual assets is subject to the modification that
the individual assets may be so applied where, and only where,
there are no firm assets, or where the firm assets have become
exhausted.1
2
The equitable doctrine of marshalling assets of a partnership is that
when the partnership property and the individual properties of the
partners are before the court for distribution, the firm creditors have
priority on firm assets, and individual creditors have priority on indi-
vidual assets.'8  G.S. § 59-70(h) 14 is a codification of that rule. The
court, in deciding the Casey case, did not cite this statute, but based its
decision, at least in part, on G.S. § 59-68 (1).15 This statute, while not
the rule of marshalling assets, is an application of part of the same
principle. It provides that upon dissolution, each partner, as against
his co-partners and all persons claiming through them, may have the
partnership property applied to discharge partnership liabilities. Thus,
if the statutes are read literally, the doctrine of marshalling assets can
only apply when the assets, both firm and individual, are before the court
for distribution. G.S. § 59-68 (1) may be applied.at the dissolution
stage. In applying G.S. § 59-68 (1) in the Casey case, the court spoke
of the rule of marshalling assets16 and cited two Iowa cases"7 to support
its view. This infers that in North Carolina the rule of marshalling
assets is applicable not only when the assets are before the court for
distribution, but also upon dissolution. It will be observed that in the
Casey case the point being decided was the propriety of an injunction
against the trustee to prevent sale of the individual property under the
deed of trust. The court did not order a dissolution. This leaves the
further inference that the rule of marshalling assets may be applied
even before the dissolution.
This raises a problem in the application of G.S. § 59-45.18 In 1953
this statute was amended' 9 so as to hold partners liable jointly and
severally for all obligations of the partnership. This was done to remove
a direct conflict with G.S. § 1-72,20 which declared partners to be
jointly and severally liable for contracts of the partnership.21 Hence,
12 239 N.C. at 126, 79 S.E.2d at 738. 13 187 N.C. at 820, 123 S.E. at 197.
1' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 59-70(h) (1950).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 59-68(1) (1950).
' 239 N.C. at 126, 79 S.E.2d at 738.
17 See note 11 supra.
'
8 N.C. Gr. STAT. § 59-45 (Supp. 1955).
See note 18 suPra. 20 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-72 (1950).
' A Survey of Statutory Changes in North Carolina in 1953, 31 N.C.L. REV.
375, 429 (1953).
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today the language in the statute is essentially that of C.S. § 3259 under
which the WaIston case was decided.
The effect of the 1953 amendment of G.S. § 59-45 was not referred
to in the Casey decision; the amendment did not become operative until
after the action was filed.22  However, should such a situation arise
today involving a simple unsecured partnership debt, 28 the court would
have to decide whether there is a conflict between the marshalling of
assets rule in G.S. § 59-70(h), giving the individual creditor priority
as to individual assets when assets of the dissolved firm and its partners
are being distributed by the court, and G.S. § 59-45, which makes all
firm debts joint and several obligations of the parties. The Walston
case, in such a situation, held that a statutory provision like the present
G.S. § 59-45 made every firm creditor a creditor also of each individual
partner, with a right to share in the separate assets of each on the same
basis as his separate personal creditors, and that consequently that
statutory provision barred or interfered with the marshalling of assets.
The same result might be ascribed to the present G.S. § 59-45.24
It is at least doubtful, however, whether there be any inconsistency
between these two sections of the North Carolina Uniform Partnership
Act. The marshalling of assets rule is expressly applicable only after
dissolution 25 and only when all the assets involved are in the hands of
the court for distribution. 26  Before that, the debts of the firm are joint
and several obligations under G.S. § 59-45, so that a firm creditor may,
if he desires, get a judgment against an individual partner and collect
from him alone. When the court takes over the assets for distribution,
in marshalling the assets the holder of such a judgment not yet paid
must be recognized as a creditor of any partners who are named as
judgment debtors, and presumably also as a creditor of the firm.
Similarly, the holder of a note signed by the firm, and signed or en-
dorsed also by the separate partners, would be entitled to proof against
the estates of all his promisors; the creditor who has taken steps to
formalize his claim against the individual partners must be given the
benefit of his foresight. But it does not follow that the creditor whose
" The action was filed in the superior court in December, 1952. Transcript of
Record, p. 1, Casey v. Grantham, 239 N.C. 121, 79 S.E.2d 735 (1954). The amend-
ment did not become effective until July 1, 1953. N.C. GEN. STAr. § 59-45 (Supp.1955).,23 The last clause in G.S. § 59-70(h) expressly excludes "lien and secured
creditors" from subjection to the rule of marshalling assets.
" The marshalling of assets provision in G.S. § 59-70(h) might be held so
inconsistent with the 1953 amendment of G.S. §. 59-45 that the latter enactment
repealed the former by implication. Or it might be held that the effect of the
amendment of G.S. § 59-45 is simply to enlarge the class of those who are to be
treated as creditors of the individual partners in applying G.S. § 59-70(h), placing
all firm creditors in that class.
" See'the first sentence in G.S. § 59-70.
"6 See note 14 suPra.
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contract was with the firm alone, a contract which is made by statute a
joint and several obligation of the several partners, is by that statute
entitled not only to priority in the firm assets as a firm creditor, but
also to parity of treatment in the separate partners' individual estates
with the partners' personal creditors. The rule of marshalling assets
contained in G.S. § 59-70(h) does not deny firm creditors rights also
as creditors of the separate partners; but it does deny them the pre-
ferred position as to individual assets which it grants to the personal
creditors of the partners (just as it gives firm creditors a like preference
as to firm assets).
The statute as to joint and several liability is procedural only.27
The firm creditor with no more than a joint obligation is in truth a
creditor of the separate partners; but in order to enforce his claim he
must join them all as defendants. Once he has overcome this procedural
obstacle and has his judgment, he may collect the whole amount out of
property of any one of the judgment debtors, exactly as if his claim were
joint and several.28  There seems to be no sound reason for any dif-
ference between a joint and several creditor, as to their substantive
rights.
The theory of the Walston case, however, is hardly consistent with
this view. Until the court deals with the problem again, it cannot be
concluded whether the Casey decision has resulted in a liberalization
of the rule of marshalling assets, confusion in the application of the
doctrine, or both.
HAROLD C. MAHLER
Property-Restrictive Covenants-Equitable
Servitudes and Notice
In Reed v. Elmore,' a landowner subdivided a tract of land into
seven lots and sold five of them with no restrictions as to use. She
conveyed Lot No. 3 to plaintiff by deed stipulating that the land therein
conveyed should be subject to the restriction that no structure be erected
thereon by the grantee within a stipulated distance from the public
road. This deed, which was properly recorded by plaintiff, contained
the further provision, "This restriction shall likewise apply to Lot No.
4, retained by the grantor, said Lot No. 4 being adjacent to lands hereby
conveyed." Subsequently, the owner sold this adjacent Lot No. 4,
which defendant had obtained by mesne conveyances, the deed contain-
ing no reference to the restriction. The plaintiff covenantee, owner of
CRANE, PARTNERSnIP 519 (2d ed. 1952).
2 WLmsTON, CONTRACTs § 316 (rev. ed. 1936) ; 4 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 928(1951).
1246 N.C. 221, 98 S.E.2d 360 (1957).
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Lot No. 3, brought action against the defendant, owner of Lot No. 4,
to restrain him from building on Lot No. 4 in contravention of the
restriction. The court held that the restrictive covenant in plaintiff's
recorded deed was constructive notice to the subsequent purchasers of
Lot No. 4, and that the restriction would'be enforced as between this
covenantee and this defendant even though no deed to Lot No. 4 con-
tained reference to such restriction.
The ratio decidendi of the court was that if this restrictive covenant
is to be enforced, the parties to the contract must have intended it to
impose a benefit on the landowner of Lot No. 3 and a burden on the
landowner of Lot No. 4; the existence of a uniform plan of development
evidences such an intention, but the absence of a uniform plan does not
preclude the finding of that intention. 2 Hence, the court construed the
restriction as clearly indicating an intention to impose "mutual restrictive
servitudes" on the land.
Although the court did not so state, it appears that the decision was
reached by applying the doctrine of equitable servitudes. Generally,
this doctrine works on the theory that the restrictive covenant gives the
covenantee an equitable property right in the land of the covenantor.3
In spite of the fact that the benefit and the burden are said to be ap-
purtenant to the land and to run with it,4 the real question is not whether
the covenant runs with the land, but whether the purchaser took the
land with notice, actual or constructive, of the covenant contract of the
grantor with respect to its use.5
This doctrine has developed in courts of equity as the means by
which the homeowner secures to himself a desirable place to live and
the real estate developer secures to himself an enhanced value for his
land.6  The doctrine has been applied in two classes of cases. Its
most frequent application has been in the cases involving a landowner
seeking to develop a particular area in accordance with a uniform plan.
However, it is generally held that a uniform plan is not a sine qua non
for sustaining the validity of a restrictive covenant,7 and that the
'Id. at 226, 98 S.E.2d at 364.
'Peck v. Conway, 119 Mass. 546 (1876); CLARK, COVENANTS AND OTHER
INTERESTS RUNNING WITH LAND c. 6 (2d ed. 1947) ; Reno, The Enforcement of
Equitable Servitudes in Land, 28 VA. L. Rav. 951, 1067 (1942). Another theory
offered for this doctrine is that equity is merely enforcing a contract by a form
of specific performance. De Gray v. Monmouth Beach Club House Co., 50 N.. Eq.
329, 24 Atl. 388 (Ch. 1892) ; CLARK, op. cit. supra at 172; Reno, supra, at 973-7
'Bauby v. Krasow, 107 Conn. 109, 139 Atl. 508 (1927); Hayslett v. Shell
Petroleum Corp., 38 Ohio App. 164, 175 N.E. 888 (1930) ; CLARK, op. cit. supra
note 3, at 175.
Tulk v. Moxhay, 2 Phil. 774, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch. 1848).
'Osius v. Barton, 109 Fla. 556, 147 So. 862 (1933).
' Osius v. Barton, supra note 6; Marra v. Aetna Constr. Co., 15 Cal. 2d 375,
378, 101 P.2d 490, 492 (1940) (dictum). The existence of a general scheme is
necessary for the enforcement of a restriction by a prior grantee against a subse-
quent grantee where there is a restriction in each grantee's deed but no express
[Vol. 36
NOTES AND COMMENTS
restrictions are enforced because rights have been or are about to be
invaded.8  In the principal case, the court adopted this view. The
three dissenting judges based their objections on the fact that analagous
North Carolina decisions9 in this area had refused to enforce similar
restrictive covenants in the absence of a uniform plan. But it would
appear, from analysis of those decisions, that none of them involved an
express covenant to bind the land retained by the grantor.1 0
A less frequent but equally important application of this doctrine
is in the group of cases involving restrictions on only one or two
parcels of land. In this group of cases, however, the complainant must
show that there was a covenant to bind the remaining land and that the
subsequent purchaser took that land with notice of the covenant.:"
Although notice is recognized as essential, the courts have not agreed
on what is sufficient to constitute record notice to the subsequent
purchaser. The weight of authority now appears to be that the owner
of land is bound by the restrictions only if they appear in some deed of
record to the same land in the conveyances to himself and his direct
predecessors in title.' 2 This view, recognizing the practical limitations
of title searching, only requires the searcher to examine deeds involving
the particular lot in question.' 3
The other view, which appears to be the minority view, is that
recorded deeds to other tracts of land give notice of the restrictions
placed therein on the other lots retained by the grantor.' 4 This is the
view which the court in the principal case adopted. In reaching its
decision, the court relied on two North Carolina cases, Starmount Co. v.
Memorial Park5 and Waldrop v. Brevard,'6 as indicating an inclination
toward this view. From an analysis of the decisions, however, it ap-
covenant by the grantor to bind the remaining land. Beattie v. Howell, 98 N.J.
Eq. 163, 129 Atl. 822 (Ch. 1925) ; Bessette v. Guarino, 128 A.2d 839 (R.I. 1957).
Clark v. Martin, 49 Pa. 289 (1865).
Craven County v. Trust Co., 237 N.C. 502, 75 S.E.2d 620 (1953) ; Sedherry
v. Parsons, 232 N.C. 707, 62 S.E.2d 88 (1950) ; Humphrey v. Beall, 215 N.C. 15,
200 S.E. 918 (1939).
10 See note 9 supra.
"Denhardt v. De Roo, 295 Mich. 223, 294 N.W. 163 (1940) ; Hart v. Little,
103 Misc. 320, 171 N.Y.S. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1918) ; Clark v. Martin, 49 Pa. 289 (1865).
"'Hancock v. Gummi, 151 Ga. 667, 107 S.E. 872 (1921) ; Glorieux v. Lighthipe,
88 N.J.L. 199, 96 Atl. 94 (Ct. Err. & App. 1915); Buffalo Academy of the
Sacred Heart v. Boehm Bros., 267 N.Y. 242, 196 N.E. 42 (1935); Hayslett v.
Shell Petroleum Corp., 38 Ohio App. 164, 175 N.E. 888 (1930) ; CLARK, COVENANTS
AND OTHER INTERESTS RUxNING WITH LAND 183 (2d ed. 1947) ; Philbrick, Limits
of Record Search and Therefore of Notice, 93 U. PA. L. REV. 125, 171 (1944).
" See cases cited note 12 supra; Philbrick, supra note 12, at 175; Note, 21
CORNELL L.Q. 479 (1936).
" Lowes v. Carter, 124 Md. 678, 93 Atl. 216 (1915); King v. Union Trust Co.,
226 Mo. 351, 126 S.W. 415 (1910); Finley v. Glenn, 303 Pa. 131, 154 Atl. 299(1931) ; 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 567 d (2d ed. 1920).
1t233 N.C. 613, 65 S.E.2d 134 (1951).
's 233 N.C. 26, 62 S.E.2t 512 (1950).
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pears that such is not the case. The Starmount case involved a re-
strictive covenant which was placed in a deed to a portion of the same
tract of land purchased by the defendant. Thus it would seem that this
case merely followed the majority view. The Brevard case involved
an easement and a covenant not to sue, placed in a deed by a common
grantor to another tract of land. The subsequent purchaser contended
that a deed could not be record notice if it were to a parcel of land other
than the one bought. Although it was held to be record notice, the
court there said, "This position might be well taken if we were dealing
with restrictive covenants rather than an easement. 1 "
Then turning to other authorities, the court relied on a statement by
Tiffany,18 and an annotation in the American Law Report.10 These
authorities lend support to the view adopted by the court and to its as-
sertion that this is the majority view. However, the statement by Mr.
Tiffany was written before 1920 and the annotation was written in
1922. Since that time, it seems that the weight of authority has shifted.20
Hence, it would appear that the decision as to the enforcement of
restrictions absent a uniform plan is in line with the weight of authority,
while the decision as to what constitutes record notice is in accord with
the present minority view.
JIMMY W. KISER
Taxation-Effect of North Carolina Inheritance Tax on a
Will Compromise Agreement
Testatrix devised several tracts of land located in North Carolina to
A, B, and C, a niece and two nephews, in fee simple. D, another niece
who was specifically excluded from the will, threatened to file caveat to
the probate of the will. In return for the promises df A, B, and C to
convey one-fourth of the property to D, she did not file caveat and the
will was admitted to probate. The executor paid the inheritance tax
on the basis that there were four beneficiaries in accordance with the
compromise agreement. The North Carolina Commissioner of Revenue
filed a tax judgment against the beneficiaries for an additional assessment
computed on the basis of the will with three beneficiaries instead of four.
A partition sale of one parcel of the land was made by a court-appointed
commissioner and the additional assessment was paid. A, B, and C then
brought suit against E, a purchaser from D of the parcel of land which
was sold, to compel payment of a proportionate share of the inheritance
tax. It was held that the liability for the tax is on those who are in-
11233 N.C. at 30.
182 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 14, at 2188.
Annot., 16 A.L.R. 1013 (1922).
10 See cases cited note 12 supra; Philbrick, supra note 12, at 173 & n.155.
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tended to take the property by the terms of the will and that a purchaser
from a party who takes part of the estate by a compromise agreement
with the devisees cannot be required to reimburse them for a portion
of the tax paid in the absence of an agreement to do so.'
There is a conflict of authority2 on the question of whether an in-
heritance tax should be computed by the terms of the will or by the
terms of the compromise agreement. The majority3 of jurisdictions
which have decided the question have held that the tax should be levied
by the terms of the will, without regard to the compromise agree-
ment. The reason given for this position is that a person who
takes property by compromise takes by contract with the bene-
ficiaries named in the will and not by inheritance.4 The will takes
effect as of the date of the death of the testator 5 and the rights and
obligations of all the parties in regard to payment of the inheritance
tax are fixed at that time.0 Any subsequent agreement among parties to
a will contest should have no effect on the tax.
The minority view is that the inheritance tax should be levied on
those who actually take the property by the compromise agreement, 7
disregarding entirely the terms of the will.8 The reason given for this
position is that the fundamental principle of an inheritance tax law is
to exact a tax upon the value of property transferred from the estate of
the decedent to the beneficiaries.9 Proponents of this view say that to
tax those who take by will when they do not get all the property is to
1 Pulliam v. Thrash, 245 N.C. 636, 97 S.E.2d 253 (1957).
2 28 Am. Jua., Inheritance, Estate, and Gift Taxation §§ 219, 220 (1940) ; Annot.,
36 A.L.R.2d 917 (1954); 29 CoLum. L. REV. 1164 (1929); 85 CJ.S., Taxation §
1143 (1954) ; PINKERTON AND MILLSAPS, INHERITANCE AND ESTATE TAXES §§ 70,
71 (1926).
Mackenzie v. Wright, 31 Ariz. 272, 252 Pac. 521 (1927) ; In re Cress' Estate,
335 Mich. 551, 56 N.W.2d 380 (1953); Lynchburg Trust & Savings Bank v.
Commonwealth, 162 Va. 73, 173 S.E. 548 (1934); In re Jorgensen's Estate, 267
Wis. 1, 64 N.W.2d 430 (1954).
' Cochran's Ex'r v. Commonwealth, 241 Ky. 656, 44 S.W.2d 603 (1931).
' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-41 (1950) ; In re Newton's Estate, 35 Cal.2d 830, 221
P.2d 952 (1950) ; In re Chevalier's Estate, 167 Kan. 67, 204 P.2d 748 (1949) ;
Butler v. Dobbins, 142 Me. 383, 53 A2d 270 (1947) ; Lee v. Foley, 224 Miss. 684,
80 So. 2d 765 (1955) ; Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Green, 239 N.C. 612, 80
S.E.2d 771 (1954).
' Succession of Popp, 146 La. 464, 83 So. 765 (1919) ; McDonald v. State Tax
Commission, 158 Miss. 331, 130 So. 473 (1930); 28 Am. Jui., Inheritance, Estate,
and Gift Taxation § 218 (1940).
"Taylor v. State, 40 Ga. App. 295, 149 S.E. 321 (1929) ; Hart v. Mercantile
Trust Co., 180 Md. 218, 23 A.2d 682 (1942) ; In re Gartside's Estate, 357 Mo.
181, 207 S.W.2d 273 (1947).
8 Several early Pennsylvania cases treated payments made by beneficiaries under
a will in compromise of caveator's claims against the estate as expenses of admin-
istration and therefore not subject to the inheritance tax. Hawley's Estate, 214
Pa. 525, 63 Atl. 1021 (1906) ; Kerr's Estate, 159 Pa. 512, 28 Atl. 354 (1894);
Pepper's Estate, 159 Pa. 508, 28 Atl. 353 (1894). This view was discarded in
a later case and Pennsylvania now follows the minority view. Taber's Estate, 257
Pa. 81, 101 Atl. 311 (1917); 16 MINN. L. Ray. 722 (1931).
In re Gartside's Estate, 367 Mo. 181, 207 S.W.2d 273 (1947); State ex rel.
Hilton v. Probate Court, 143 Minn. 77, 172 N.W. 902 (1919).
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impose a tax out of proportion to the property actually received.10
Another reason given is that if a devise or legacy in a will is re-
renounced," no tax is due from the person who renounces.' 2  The
person who actually takes the property must pay the tax. The com-
promise,' 3 therefore, is termed a partial renunciation 4 and those taking
by the agreement are required to pay the tax. Courts following the
minority view have also stated that policy is in favor of the tax-by-the-
compromise rule since it will encourage settlement of litigation by
offering a legatee or devisee a reduction in taxes.'0
The result of the principal case appears unfortunate at first glance,
since the three devisees are made to bear the entire burden 0 of the tax
0Pepper's Estate, 159 Pa. 508, 28 At. 353 (1894).
"I The general rule is that a legatee or devisee may escape inheritance tax by
renunciation within a reasonable time. People v. Flanagin, 331 Ill. 203, 162 N.W.
848 (1928) ; it re Estate of Stone, 132 Iowa 136, 109 N.W. 455 (1906) ; In re
Bute's Estate, 355 Pa. 170, 49 A.2d 339 (1946) ; Annot., 60 A.L.R. 312 (1929).
12 A renunciation of a share of a decedent's estate may have unsatisfactory
consequences for the tax payer under the federal gift tax. In Hardenberg v.
Commissioner, 198 F.2d 63 (8th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 836 (1952), when
two heirs renounced their shares of the estate of the decedent to which they suc-
ceeded under the intestacy laws in favor of a third heir, they incurred a gift tax
on the shares transferred. The court said that the property vested in the heirs
at the date of the decedent's death and that any subsequent transfer by them even by
renunciation was subject to the gift tax. See also Maxwell v. Commissioner, 17
T.C. 1589 (1952). But see Brown v. Routzahn, 63 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1933),
cert. denied, 290 U.S. 641 (1933), involving a renunciation of a gift by will,
where the court stated that the devisee has a right to reject the bequest up to the
time of distribution without incurring gift tax liability. The North Carolina
authority appears to be in accord with the above-cited decisions. Perkins v. Isley,
224 N.C. 793, 798, 32 S.E.2d 588, 591 (1945) ; Opinion of the Attorney General,
CCH INH., EsT. & Gnr TAx REP. (7th ed.) 11 18262 (N.C. September 10, 1954).
But cf. A Survey of Statutory Changes in North Carolina in 1953, 31 N.C.L. REV.
375, 376 (1953). See 3 AmERicAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 14-15 (Casner ed. 1952).
The rule of the Hardenberg Case is criticized in ALI FxD. INcOME, EsTAE AND
GIFT TAx STAT., Tentative Draft No. 10, 113-15 (1955); ATxINSON, WILLS § 139
(1953). ,
13 Transfers pursuant to a compromise of a will contest are not treated as
taxable gifts if bona fide and made at arm's length. Maud Hadden Farrell, P-H
1954 T.C. Mem. Dec. ff 54085; Cf. Housman v. Commissioner, 105 F.2d 973 (2d
Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 656 (1940).
1" Partial renunciation is generally permitted unless an intent is indicated on
the part of the testator for the beneficiaries to take all or nothing. Foulkes v.
Foulkes, 173 Ark. 188, 293 S.W. 1 (1927) ; State Banking Co. v. Hinton, 178 Ga.
68, 172 S.E. 42 (1933) ; ATxINSON, WILLs § 139 (1953).
1" State ex Tel. Hilton v. Probate Court, 143 Minn. 77, 172 N.W. 902 (1919);
80 U. PA. L. REV. 920 (1932).
"The application of the majority view will not always mean more revenue for
the state. If parties of more distant relation than the devisees or legatees take
part of the property by compromise, the state might gain more by taxing those
who actually take the property since the more distant the relation the higher the
rate of tax. English v. Crenshaw, 120 Tenn. 531, 110 S.W. 210 (1908). Usually,
however, the tax-by-the-will rule results in more tax since there will be fewer
persons taking the property subject to the tax and therefore fewer personal exemp-
tions to reduce the total amount of the property subject to the tax. State ex rel
Hilton v. Probate Court, supra note 15; Annot., 36 A.L.R.2d 917, 920 (1954).
If the devisee or legatee is a charitable institution which is tax exempt and it
compromises with some of the heirs of the testator, the state will not be able to
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while the party who threatened caveat received an equal share of the
nroperty and was not required to pay any of the tax.17 However, the
case seems clearly correct. The history of the North Carolina in-
heritance tax statute indicates an intent on the part of the legislature to
have the property taxed by the terms of the will.18 Cases involving will
compromise agreements also point toward the result reached by the
court. The North Carolina court in previous cases has refused to
"make a will"' 9 for a decedent unless the doctrine of family settlement2
applies.2 ' If the will is found to be valid the property is transferred
according to the provisions of the will. If the will is successfully at-
tacked, the property passes by the intestacy laws. Any property received
by individuals who are neither devisees or legatees, if the will is ad-
mitted to probate, nor heirs or next of kin, if the property is distributed
levy any tax on the transfer if the majority view is followed. Taylor v. State,
40 Ga. App. 295, 149 S.E. 321 (1929); People v. Kaiser, 306 Ill. 313, 137 X.E.
826 (1922); In re Stephani's Estate, 164 Misc. 240, 300 N.Y.S. 813 (Surr. Ct.
1937). Since a charity is a favored entity in the tax law, the courts might over-
look the tax-by-the-will rule as a matter of policy and allow an exemption only
for property actually received by the charity. See Toeller's Estate v. Commissioner,
6 T.C. 832, aff'd on other grounds, 165 F.2d 665 (7th Cir. 1946); U.S. Treas.
Reg. 105, § 81.44 (1939).
The result is hardly unfortunate to the individual who is taking by the
compromise agreement. While he is deemed a party taking by contract for in-
heritance tax purposes, he is considered an heir for income tax purposes since his
claim is based on inheritance rights and he is not liable for any income tax on the
property received. Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 196 (1934). But cf. White v. Thomas,
116 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 581 (1941).
"8 N.C. CODE Au'. § 7880(1) (Michie, 1939) provided in part that an inheri-
tance tax should be levied, "When the transfer is by will or by the intestate laws
of this State .. .or when the transfer is by settlement, contract, or agreement,
or by any court order or otherwise, to any person or persons, by reason of claim
or claims arising by virtue of the intestate laws, in controversies or contests as to
the probate or construction of any will or wills . . . ." This clearly indicated an
intent on the part of the legislature that a compromise should be followed in
computing the taxes. However, this provision was deleted from the Revenue Act
in 1941. N.C. SEss. LAWS 1941, c. 50, § 2. The provision was amended to provide
that a tax should be levied, "When the transfer is by will or by intestate laws of
this state from any person dying, seized or possessed of the property while a
resident of this State." This seems to indicate an intention on the part of the
legislature to adopt a provision exactly opposite to the deleted provision which
would place N.C. in accord with the tax-by-the-will rule. Note, 21 N.C.L. REV.
99, 102 (1942); A Survey of Statutory Changes in North Carolina in 1941, 19
N.C.L. Rxv. 435, 526 (1941) ; 29 REsT's Arr'y GEN. 220 (N.C. 1947). The present
statute has retained the same language. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-2 (1950).
" Bailey v. McLain, 215 N.C. 150, 1 S.E.2d 372 (1939) ; In re Westfeldt, 188
N.C. 702, 125 S.E. 531 (1924).
"Rice v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 232 N.C. 222, 59 S.E2d 803 (1950);
Hunter v. Trust Co., 232 N.C. 69, 59 S.E.2d 313 (1950) ; Reynolds v. Reynolds,
208 N.C. 578, 182 S.E. 341 (1935).
" The equity power of the court is extended to situations where, in the interest
of family harmony, the provisions of the will should not be carried out. All parties
having any interest in the estate of the decedent may enter into a binding agreement
under court supervision providing for a distribution of the property in practical
disregard of the will. See note 20 supra. Quaere: Whether the inheritance tax
in this situation should be levied according to the terms of the will or according to
the terms of the family settlement agreement.
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by the laws of intestacy, is taken by contract and not by inheritance
rights.2
2
While the arguments in favor of the minority view are persuasive,
the reasoning does not stand up under close analysis. 23  Though the
fundamental principle of an inheritance tax is to exact a tax on the
transfer from the estate of the decedent to those who actually take the
property due to the death of the decedent, the tax is levied24 on those
taking by the will or by inheritance. To hold otherwise is to rewrite
the language of the inheritance tax statute. Also, it is true that a
legatee or devisee may renounce a part of the will, and this being done,
that part of the legacy or devise is not taxable to him. But in a re-
nunciation the laws of wills or of intestacy take the property to the
taxable party, not the agreement among the parties. A compromise
presupposes a prior confirmation of the will rather than a partial re-
nunciation since the legatee or devisee is exercising his dominion over
the property by entering into the compromise.25 The argument that
the tax-by-the-compromise rule will encourage settlement of litigation
does not seem to be of much merit 26 because the parties to the agreement
can reach the same result among themselves that is reached in jurisdic-
tions following the minority view by merely stipulating who will pay
what portion of the tax or by dividing the property in such a way that
each will have an equal share after the tax is paid.2 7
Attorneys for the beneficiaries in a will compromise agreement
would be well advised to include a provision in the settlement that each
party to the agreement will bear a pro rata share of the inheritance tax
in order to protect their clients from a result such as was reached in the
principal case.
HENRY C. LOMAX
'Bailey v. McClain, 215 N.C. 150, 1 S.E.2d 372 (1939), cites with approval
Cochran's Ex'r v. Commonwealth, 241 Ky. 656, 659, 44 S.W.2d 603, 604 (1931),
which states, "Although his right to maintain the contest of the will is derived from
his relationship to the testator, his title to the money came from the contract with
the legatees."
23Warren, The Progress of the Law, 33 HARV. L. REV. 556, 574 (1920) ; 29
CoLum. L. REV. 1164 (1929); 16 MINN. L. REv. 722 (1932); 80 U. PA. L. REv.
920 (1932).
21 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-2 (1950) provides in part: "A tax shall be and is
hereby imposed upon the transfer of any property, real or personal ....
"First. When the transfer is by will or by the intestate laws of this State
from any person dying, seized or possessed of the property while a resident of
the State."
25 See note 23 supra.
' Some courts have indicated that the tax-by-the-compromise rule might lead
to sham agreements by an individual subject to a high rate of tax with an indi-
vidual subject to a lower rate in order to avoid the tax. People v. Union Trust Co.,
255 Ill. 168, 99 N.E. 377 (1912) ; In re Pepper's Estate, 159 Pa. 508, 28 At. 353
(1894).
27 Brown v. McLoughlin, 287 Mass. 15, 190 N.E. 795 (1934).
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Taxation-Fire Insurance Premium-Deductibility in Year of
Payment by Cash Basis Taxpayer
The problem of whether a cash basis taxpayer may deduct in the year
of payment the full premium on a fire insurance policy which covers a
period of more than one year or whether he must prorate the deduction
over the term of the policy has been troublesome to the courts and to the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
In Waldheim Realty and Investment Co. v. Commissioner,' the tax-
payer corporation had purchased single-premium policies covering a
number of years and had deducted the full premium on each policy as a
business expense in the year of payment. The corporation kept its books
and made its tax return on a cash basis and had since 1905 uniformly
treated such insurance premiums as business expense in the year paid.
The Commissioner disallowed the deduction and assessed a deficiency.
The Eighth Circuit held that the corporation could deduct the premiums
in the years paid and was not required to prorate the premiums over the
years of coverage.
The problem had its beginning in 1934, when the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue ruled that a cash basis taxpayer could deduct only the
pro rata portion of the insurance in the year of payment.2 In 1938, the
First Circuit decided in Welch v. De Bloiss that a prepaid premium on
a policy running several years was deductible in its entire amount in the
year of payment by a cash basis taxpayer. The Commissioner accepted
the decision and revoked the ruling made in 1934. Welch v. De Blois
was overruled in 1942 by Commissioner v. Boylston Market Ass'n5
The Commissioner then revoked his ruling of 1938 and reverted to his
original position requiring proration. 6 Now comes the Waldheim
Realty and Investment Co. case. Will the Commissioner revoke the
1943 ruling and issue one similar to the one of 1938?
These three cases are the only ones found where appellate courts
have decided the question of deductibility of fire insurance premiums by
a taxpayer who files on the cash basis. It is interesting to note that
in each of these cases the court upheld the method of accounting em-
ployed by the taxpayer.
The cash basis taxpayer reports income in the year received and
deductions in the year paid, whereas the accrual basis taxpayer reports
income in the year earned and deductions in the year in which the ex-
pense is incurred.7 It can readily be seen that the accrual method
1245 F.2d 823 (8th Cir. 1957).
2 G.C.M. 13148, XXIII-1 Cum. BuLL. 67 (1934).
294 F.2d 842 (lst Cir. 1938). 'G.C.M. 20307, 1938-1 Cum. BULL. 157.
5131 F.2d 966 (1st Cir. 1942). 6 G.C.M. 23587, 1943 Cum. BnuL. 213.
7 The methods of accounting specifically permitted by INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 446 (c), are not limited to the cash and accrual basis. This section also allows
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presents a more accurate reflection of income in terms of economic gain.
The cash method falls short of being a perfect measure of income be-
cause generally at the end of a taxable year some amounts due the tax-
payer will not have been collected and some amounts owed by him will
not have been paid. But this method has the virtue of simplicity.
In the field of deductions generally, a departure from a strict ap-
plication of the cash method is made (1) when the disbursement is a
capital one and (2) when, even though an ordinary expense, allowance
of deduction in the year of payment would distort income. Once an
outlay is determined to be a capital expenditure, the deduction of the
entire amount in the year of payment is disallowed on the grounds that
the Code permits only a deduction for depreciation or amortization over
the useful life of the asset which is acquired. There will be no decrease
in the economic wealth of the taxpayer if the value of the asset acquired
equals his expenditure. A clear example of a capital outlay is the
purchase of a building.
The court in Commissioner v. Boylston Market Ass'n said that it
could find no basis for distinguishing between prepaid rentals, which
have been held to be a capital expense,8 and prepaid insurance, and
that by treating prepaid insurance as a capital expense it was obtaining
some degree of consistency.9 But in Waldheim Realty and Investment
Co. v. Commissioner the idea that prepaid insurance was a capital asset
was rejected, although the court conceded that prepaid rent was a
capital asset. Why would these two disbursements require different tax
treatment? The court said:
The payment of insurance premiums adds nothing to the tax-
payer's plant or equipment or his ability to produce income.
In this respect the insurance premium differs from prepaid rent
... as such expenditures [rent] are for the purpose of providing
the taxpayer the place in which to carry on his business.10
One important objective of business firms in purchasing fire insurance
coverage is the assurance that if fire does occur the insurance proceeds
will enable them to restore their premises to a condition proper for
"any other method permitted by this chapter," such as the completed contract and
installment method, and "any combination of foregoing methods permitted under
regulations prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate."
8 Galatoire Bros. v. Lines, 23 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1928) (rent paid in advance
for forty-five months gave rise to a capital asset) ; J. Alland & Bros., Inc. v. United
States, 28 F.2d 792 (D. Mass. 1928) (three and one-half year lease was a capital
asset). Both of these decisions relied upon Duffy v. Central R.R., 268 U.S. 55(1925), where the Court held that amounts expended for improvements by a lessee
to comply with the provisions of long term leases were capital investments and
therefore not deductible in the year the expenditures were made.0 131 F.2d at 968.
10 245 F.2d at 825.
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business purposes. If so, the court's distinction between prepaid rent
and prepaid insurance seems vulnerable.
The second ground on which a departure from the strict cash method
may be placed is prevention of distortion of net taxable income. The
revenue laws have long provided as a general rule that the taxable
income shall be computed under the method of accounting regularly used
by the taxpayer in keeping his books provided it clearly reflects income..'
The court in the principal case cited Security Flour Mills Co. v. Com-
missioner,12 which stated: "This [failure clearly to reflect income] must
mean distortion of true income, not of a given year, but in the'light of
ultimate gain, from a series of transactions over a period of years, grow-
ing out of, or in some way related to an initial transaction in the taxable
year." '3  Welch v. De Blois held that the phrase "clearly reflects in-
come" only means that the taxpayer's books should be kept fairly and
accurately. However, in Caldwell v. Commissioner,1 4 the court held
that this phrase meant that the income should be reflected with as much
accuracy as standard methods of accounting practice permit.
In determining whether the cash basis taxpayer should be allowed the
full premium deduction in the year of payment, two conflicting interests
must be weighed. On the one hand, Congress had authorized the use of
the cash basis, which does have the virtue of simplicity. A taxpayer
who keeps his books on the cash basis should not be put to the labor and
expense of adjusting his books to prorate his expenses. On the other
hand, it is desirable to limit the taxpayer's power of selecting the year
in which the deduction would be most profitable to him if such would
not clearly reflect income. Somewhere between these two, a line is to
be drawn. Ordinarily, the deduction in the year of payment of a three
year premium distorts income.' 5 Is its inaccuracy great enough to out-
weigh the advantage of its simplicity of computation?
The rule that an expenditure must be prorated because total de-
I' Waldheim Realty and Investment Co. v. Commissioner was decided under
Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 41, 53 STAT. 24 (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 446(a),(b)). The 1939 Code provided:
"The net income shall be computed upon the basis of the taxpayer's annual ac-
counting period . . . in accordance with the method of accounting regularly em-
ployed in keeping the books of such taxpayer; but if no such method of accounting
has been so employed, or if the method employed does not clearly reflect the income,
the computation shall be made in accordance with such method as in the opinion of
the Commissioner does clearly reflect the income."
The language of § 41 first appeared in the Revenue Act of 1921, § 212 (b), 42
STAT. 237, and remained unchanged until the 1954 Code. It was incorporated in
the 1954 Code with minor changes in wording.
12 321 U.S. 281 (1944).
11 Id. at 287.
14202 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1953).
" Conceivably, there could be a situation in which the deduction of a three year
premium payment would not distort income. If a taxpayer had three insurance
policies, each requiring the same amount of premium for a three year period, the
payment of one policy premium annually would not distort income.
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duction in one year would result in distorting taxable income has been
applied to prepayment of rentals,'0 bonuses for the acquisition of leases,
17
bonuses for the cancellation of leases,' 8 and commissions for negotiating
leases.19 On the other hand, it has been held that prepaid interest is
deductible in the year paid by a cash basis taxpayer.20
It is unfortunate that the courts have reached numerous conflicting
decisions on matters that should be kept uniform, simple, and clear.
It is submitted that there should be no difference in the tax treatment
of a three year prepayment of fire insurance premium, interest, or rent.
RICHARD J. TUGGrAr
Taxation-Stock Purchase Agreements-Life Insurance
Premiums as Constructive Dividends
The Internal Revenue Code of 1939 defined the term "dividend" as
"any distribution made by a corporation to its shareholders, whether in
money or in other property, (1) out of its earnings and profits ac-
cumulated after February 28, 1913, or (2) out of the earnings or profits
of the taxable year .... . 1  With a slight change, this definition has been
repeated in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.2
In Sanders v. Fox3 it was held that premiums paid by a closely held
corporation for life insurance policies on the lives of the stockholders
were taxable as dividends to the stockholders in proportion to their hold-
ings.4  The policies had been taken out pursuant to an agreement be-
tween the corporation and stockholders providing that the corporation
would insure each stockholder and that the proceeds would be used to
buy the shares of a deceased stockholder.8 The agreement recited that
the insured would designate the beneficiary, but that the corporation
would be considered the owner of the policies during the lifetime of the
16 Baton Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 51 F.2d 469 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 284
U.S. 674 (1931).
Home Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 65 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1933).
Steele-Wedeles Co., 30 B.T.A. 841 (1934); Harriet B. Borland, 27 B.T.A.
538 (1933).
1 Bonwit Teller & Co. v. Commissioner, 53 F.2d 381 (2d Cir. 1931), cert.
denied, 284 U.S. 690 (1932).
2" John D. Fackler, 39 B.T.A. 395 (1939) (three year payment) ; Court Holding
Co., 2 T.C. 531 (1943), rezld on other grounds, 143 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1944),
rev'd without discussion. of this point, 324 U.S. 331 (1945) ; Joseph H. Konigsberg,
P-H 1946 T.C. Mem. Dec. ff 46024 (five year payment).
IInt. Rev. Code of 1939, § 115(a), 53 STAT. 46 (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,§ 316).
2 Ibid.
2149 F. Supp. 942 (D. Utah 1957).
' "The Corporation did not claim the premiums as a deduction for income tax
purposes, but accounted for these premiums as an asset on its balance sheet." Id.
at 945.
'The consideration given by the stockholder was his promise not to sell his
stock except as specified in the agreement.
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insured. On the death of the insured the beneficiary named by him
"would receive the insurance proceeds on the condition that the bene-
ficiary would sell the stock of the decedent to the corporation at an
adjusted price determined by the stockholders," plus a pro-rata share of
the cash surrender value of all the policies, or the amount of the pro-
ceeds of the policy, whichever was greater.6
In holding against the taxpayer, the court stressed that the parties
who really benefited from the life insurance were the stockholders,7 and
that while no dividends were declared, the payment of the premiums by
the corporation amounted to a constructive dividend.8 That the court
was willing, if necessary, to look through the corporate entity was
indicated by its quoting at length from the Tax Court decision of
Oreste Casale9 and paraphrasing language in that case with the state-
ment that, "For all practical purposes it might be stated the four stock-
holders were the corporation . ...- "
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in reversing the Tax
Court decision of the Casale case,11 applied reasoning which presents
an interesting contrast to that adopted in Sanders v. Fox.
Casale, who owned ninety-eight percent of the stock of 0. Casale,
Inc., and who was also president and chairman of the board, entered into
a deferred compensation agreement with the corporation which provided
that on his reaching age sixty-five, the corporation would pay him a
monthly income, and if he died prior thereto, would pay a certain sum
to his nominees.' 2 The corporation then purchased a $50,000 retire-
ment income policy on the life of Casale, paid all premiums, and was the
owner and beneficiary of the policy.' 3 At maturity or on the death of
Casale, all proceeds of the policy were to be paid to the corporation.
0Saiders v. Fox, 149 F. Supp. 942, 945 (D. Utah 1957). It is important to
note here that while the agreement gave the insured the right to designate the
beneficiary, the fact that the beneficiary would receive the insurance proceeds only
on condition that he sell to the corporation indicates that the corporation retained
additional rights in the proceeds not discussed by the court.
'The stockholder (actually his beneficiary) was given a guaranteed market for
stock that might otherwise be difficult to sell, and should he survive and the
decedent's stock be retained by the corporation, his proportionate share of
ownership of the corporation would be increased.
' The cases cited by the court in support of the application of the doctrine of
constructive dividends are discussed in note 22, infra.
°26 T.C. 1020 (1956), rezd, 247 F.2d 440 (2d Cir. 1957).
'o 149 F. Supp. at 946.
Casale v. Commissioner, 247 F.2d 440 (2d Cir. 1957).
"As consideration, Casale promised he would not start a competing business,
or work for a competitor of the corporation. For a discussion of similar plans see
Lasser and Rothschild. Deferred Compensation for Executives, 33 HARv. Bus. REV.
89 (1955) ; McCarthy, A Survey of Types of Supplementary Compensation for
Executives, 30 TAXEs 878 (1952).
" As in the principal case, the corporation did not attempt to deduct the
premium payments. 5 CCH 1954 STAND. FED. TAX RE'. 1 8684 states, "Until
a short while ago, a consistent pattern of tax treatment was applied. The premiums
were not deductible because the corporation was directly or indirectly the bene-
ficiary, and the proceeds were not taxable when received by the beneficiary."
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The Commissioner, as in the Sanders case, sought to tax the insurance
premiums as dividends to the stockholders, asserting that, "For all
practical purposes he was the corporation."'1 4 In refusing to adopt this
view, the court pointed out that should the corporation go bankrupt, the
policy would be subject to creditors' claims as would any other corporate
asset, and that while Casale completely dominated the corporation, he
had no legal interest in the policies.' 5
I In addition to the fact that the courts in the above cases differed
considerably in their willingness to look through the corporate entity,'
it is interesting to note that each court seemed to apply a different test
in reaching its conclusion. In the Sanders case the court emphasized
the fact that the real benefit of the insurance policies was to the stock-
holders and not to the corporation."1 In Casale, while acknowledging
that the stockholder derived a benefit from the insurance, the court
stressed the fact that the stockholder had no "legal interest" in the
policy.' 8
In the Sanders case, the stock purchase agreement recited that the
insurance policies and the values therein were to be considered as a
reserve to enable the corporation to acquire the shares of any deceased
stockholder. 19 This statement, coupled with the fact that the corpora-
'ion was named the owner of the policy during the insured's life, would
indicate that the policies remained assets of the corporation. Therefore,
rather than having the effect of a dividend, the purchase of the life
insurance policy was really an appropriation of earned surplus for a
' 247 F.2d at 443.
". The court also mentioned that the corporation was not bound to use the
insurance proceeds to meet its obligations under the deferred compensation contract,
but could use any available surplus.
'. 1 It is settled law that where the corporation is a sham (created solely for
purposes of tax avoidance) the corporate entity will be disregarded. See Higgins
v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473 (1939) ; Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
: - The "benefit test" was also applied in Paramount-Richards Theatres Co. v.
Commissioner, 153 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1946). There, the corporation paid for the
life insurance on a stockholder, who was both owner and beneficiary of the policy.
In Prunier v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1957),' the court, in holding
that life insurance premiums were not taxable as dividends, stated that the real
benefit was to the corporation, not the stockholders. During the tax year in
question the stockholders were the named beneficiaries, but the insurance proceeds
were subject to a stock retirement agreement that was enforceable in equity. The
court emphasized the over-all tax scheme of treating the corporation as a separate
entity.
8 The court dealt rather summarily with Paramount-Richards Theatres Co.
v. Commissioner, supra note 17, by stating that there, the policies were owned by
the stockholder and could not have been reached by corporate creditors. Emeloid
Co. v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 230 (3d Cir. 1951), applied the "business reason"
test. The court held that purchase of the stockholders' shares to promote harmony
among management was a proper business purpose. In that case, the policies
were initially purchased as key-man insurance and later assigned under a stock
purchase agreement. The court held that loans obtained by the corporation to
purchase the policies constituted borrowed, invested capital within the meaning
of the excess profits tax, and credit was allowed.1 149 F. Supp. at 944.
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specified purpose, namely, to meet the corporate obligations under the
stock purchase agreement.20  The court cited numerous cases in sup-
port of its holding that the premiums amounted to constructive divi-
dends, 21 but in each of those cases the funds in question had either been
removed from the corporate till, or could have been removed at any
time the stockholder chose to exercise a right of withdrawal.22  In each
case the result had been a reduction of earned surplus, which normally
occurs upon payment of a dividend.
23
Little objection may be found to the Commissioner's position where
the corporation pays the insurance premiums on a stockholder's life, and
the policy is completely owned and controlled by the stockholder.
24
20 "Earned surplus is sometimes appropriated-earmarked-by action of the
board of directors, for a particular purpose, in which case it is known as appropri-
ated surplus." McF.a1.AXD AND AYERs, ACCOUNTING FUNDAMENTALS 384 (2d ed.
1947).
"1 149 F. Supp. at 948. The term "constructive dividend" should not be
confused with "constructive receipt." See Hedrick v. Commissioner, 154 F.2d 90
(2d Cir. 1946); Note, Constructive Receipts: When Must the Taxpayer Pay?,
45 Irz- L. REV. 77 (1950).
22 Regensberg v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 41 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S.
783 (1944) (Stockholders obtained interest-free "loans" from the corporation.
Corporation made no attempt to collect "loans" until Commissioner investigated.
Held, loans were taxable as dividends even though no formal declaration.) ; Fitch
v. Helvering, 70 F.2d 583 (8th Cir. 1934) (Stockholder indebted to corporation.
Directors cancelled debt by declaring a gift to stockholder. Gift credited against
accumulated surplus. Held, taxable as income to stockholder.); Christopher v.
Burnet, 55 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1931) (Controlling stockholder withdrew funds
from corporation at no interest. Funds never repaid or any evidence of indebtedness
executed. Held, withdrawals taxable as dividends though no formal declaration.) ;
Phelps v. Commissioner, 54 F.2d 289 (7th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 285 U.S. 558
(1932) (Corporation purchased 7200 of 7500 outstanding shares. After purchase, the
only property owned by the corporation was real estate. Held, gain was taxable as a
liquidating dividend rather than a gain resulting from a sale.) ; Chattanooga Say.
Bank v. Brewer, 17 F.2d 79 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 274 U.S. 751 (1927) (In
1920, stockholders withdrew funds from corporation through a drawing account in
proportion to their holdings. Corporation declared a dividend in 1921 which was
credited against drawing accounts. Held, amounts withdrawn were taxable as a
dividend in 1920.). For a general discussion of this problem see Werner, Stock-
holders' Withdrawals-Loans or Dividends?, 10 TAx L. REv. 569 (1955).
Cases not cited by the court, but dealing with the question of constructive divi-
dends: Weise v. Commissioner., 93 F.2d 921 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 562
(1938) (Over a period of years stockholder "borrowed" a total of $103,000 from
the corporation, free from interest and for which no evidences of debt were given.
In 1932, the corporation wiped out the debt and reduced surplus by $103,000. Held,
stockholder received a $103,000 dividend in 1932.); Hadley v. Commissioner, 36
F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1929) (Earnings credited to an account for each stockholder,
roughly in proportion to their holdings with each shareholder having unrestricted
right to withdraw from his account. Held, taxable as dividends.).
The court also cited Estate of Weil, 22 T.C. 1267 (1954) ; Estate of Salt, 17
T.C. 92 (1951) ; Third Nat'l Bank v. United States, 64 F. Supp- 198 (M.D. Tenn.
1946) ; and Lomb v. Sugden, 82 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1936), all holding that where an
estate is obligated to sell the stock or interest of the deceased at a certain price,
that price is the proper valuation to be placed on the stock or interest, for estate tax
purposes.
2" "It is a sound principle of accounting that dividends are payable out of
earned surplus." McFARLAND AND AYERs, op. cit. supra note 20, at 390.
" Paramount-Richards Theatres Co. v. Commissioner, 153 F2d 602 (5th Cir.
1946). That such a result will not always be reached is indicated- by Lewis v.
O'Malley, 140 F.2d 735 (8th Cir. 1944).
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There still may be no objection to a finding that an outlay results in a
dividend though not formally declared as such.2 5 However, it is difficult
to support the view that the stockholder has received a dividend when the
asset he supposedly received is still owned by the corporation, and re-
mains subject to creditors' claims and the hazards of business.26
Perhaps inclusion of the following provisions in a life insurance
funded stock purchase agreement would permit the taxpayer to avoid
the result of the Sanders case. First, state that the corporation is not
bound to the use of any specific funds with which to purchase the shares
of a deceased stockholder.2 T Second, state clearly that the corporation
is the beneficiary and sole owner of the policies, and that all proceeds
are payable only to the corporation. Third, provide that the stockholder
has no legal interest in the policies, and that all rights exercisable under
the policy (loan, cash surrender, change of beneficiary, etc.) are exercis-
able solely by the corporation. Fourth, emphasize that the agreement
is for the benefit of the corporation and not the stockholders. 28
Should the Commissioner be more successful in the future in having
corporation-paid life insurance premiums declared taxable as dividends
to the insured stockholders, it is likely that closely held corporations will
stop financing stock purchase agreements with life insurance. Rather
than purchase life insurance, the corporation will retain surplus with
which to meet its obligations under the stock purchase agreement.20
It is the writer's feeling that the parties who will probably be hurt most
by decisions such as that of Sanders v. Fox will be shareholders of cor-
" Regensberg v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 41 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S.
783 (1944); Christopher v. Burnet, 55 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1931); Hadley v.
Commissioner, 36 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1929); Werner, Stockholders' Withdrawals
-- Loans or Dividends?, 10 TAx L. REv. 569 (1955).
26 If a stockholder leaves the earned surplus within the corporation, makes a
legacy of his stock with a collateral agreement that the legatees sell the stock to the
corporation, not only is the ordinary income tax avoided, but the legatees who,
under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1014, acquire the stock at a new basis (value at
decedents death), are able to avoid capital gains tax. However, there is the
possibility that the government might then allege that the accumulations of surplus
were excessive and subject to the accumulated earnings tax imposed by INT. REv.
CODE OF 1954, § 531.
27 This can be accomplished by including a clause stating that any available
surplus may be used to meet the corporation's obligations under the agreement.
If the agreement recites that the insurance proceeds must be used, the Commissioner
has grounds for asserting that the stockholder has a legal interest in that particular
asset.
2 The benefits to the corporation may be considered largely illusory, but such
things as continuity of management and corporate policies, harmony among
management, and the fact that the policies are sound investments with good loan
values have been accepted by the courts. See Emeloid Co. v. Commissioner, 189
F.2d 230 (3d Cir. 1951) ; Lewis v. O'Malley, 140 F.2d 735 (8th Cir. 1944).
9 The corporation could become a "self-insurer" for this particular obligation.
See Lewis v. O'Malley, supra note 28, for a holding that investment of corporate
funds to meet the corporate obligations under a stock purchase agreement was a
proper business purpose. It would not be advisable to appropriate the earned sur-
plus to a specific fund since then the Commissioner might asert that the stockholders
have vested rights in the fund.
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porations that cannot afford to finance stock purchase agreements in-
ternally and the life insurance companies who will lose many potential
buyers of business life insurance.
ROBERT M. HUTTAR
Torts-Privacy-Bad Debt Letters to Employer
In a Georgia case, Gouldmnan-Taber Pontiac, Inc. v. Zerbst,1 the
defendant had written the plaintiff's employer a letter in which the
plaintiff's debt was described and the employer's aid in collecting the
debt was solicited. The employer confronted the plaintiff with the
letter, asked her to explain her failure to pay, and informed her that
the letter would be kept in the permanent file on her until the defendant
sent another letter stating the debt had been paid. An action was
brought by the plaintiff for damages for invasion of her privacy, which
invasion was alleged to have caused her great mental pain and distress.
Held, an employee has a right of privacy as against his employer in the
matter of the debts he owes, and a creditor who gives such information
to the employer is liable to the employee for an invasion of his privacy.
2
Judge Townsend concurring specially in denying a motion for rehearing
stated, "The spirit and intent of Georgia law on the subject of the right
to sue in tort for an invasion of the right of privacy is sufficiently broad
to cover a case such as is made here. I do not think this rule of law
should be given lip service only. Coercive action which tends to limit the
free choice of an individual in resisting what he feels to be an unjust
claim for money upon him is reprehensible, and there have been many
times in this state where employment was so scarce that to threaten an
-employee with discharge was equivalent to threatening him with starva-
tion."3
A tort action for the invasion of the right of privacy has been
recognized in twenty states, Alaska, and the District of Columbia.
4 It
has been limited by statute in two other states5 and has been declared
199 S.E.2d 475 (Ga. 1957).
'The court referred to McDaniel v. Atlanta Coca Cola Bottling Co., 60 Ga.
App. 92, 2 S.E.2d 810 (1939), wherein it was held that publication or commerciali-
zation of the information by the defendant is not necessary in order for the
plaintiff to recover for an invasion of privacy. The court also adverted to Quina v.
Roberts. 16 So. 2d 558 (La. App. 1944), wherein the defendant's letter to the
-plaintiff's employer requesting aid in collecting a debt of $1.45 was held to warrant
a recovery by the plaintiff of $100. (The Gouldinan-Taber Pontiac and theQuina cases are the two most extreme holdings protecting a debtor from an
invasion of his privacy by a creditor.) That the plaintiff claimed the alleged debt
was not owed and that the defendant had not brought suit nor gotten judgment
.gainst her was emphasized by the court in the principal case.
99 S.E.2d at 479.
'Annots., 138 A.L.R. 25 (1942), 168 A.L.R. 448 (1947), 14 A.L.R.2d 753
(1950), A.L.R. Supp. Service 771 (1957).
UTAH CoE ANN. §§ 76-4-8, 9 (1953), Donahue v. Warner Bros. Picture's
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not to exist in at least two states.0 However, the majority of these juris-
dictions hold, or at least would very likely hold, that under the facts of
the Gouldman-Taber Pontiac case there is no violation of this right.
In Voneye v. Turner,7 the court held that there was no actionable
invasion of the plaintiff's privacy, that any invasion to be actionable
must be an unwarranted one in the sense that it unreasonably and seri-
ously interferes with another's interest in keeping his affairs unknown
to the public.8 The court expressed the view that employers properly
have an interest in debts of their employees and that debtors realize that
most employers have such an interest and will approach them in regard
thereto.
In Patton v. Jacobs,9 the defendant sent to the plaintiff's employer
letters describing the plaintiff's failure to pay, and the court concluded
that since the information was given only to the employer and not to the
general public and was not accompanied by libelous or coercive matter, it
was not an unreasonable interference with the plaintiff's right of privacy.
The court decided that the employer was not in the same category as
the general public and that he has the right to know the status of the
financial obligations of his employees by virtue of his expense and in-
convenience in defending against garnishment proceedings and in mak-
ing garnishee entries on books.
Housh v. Peth °' follows the majority in holding that the defendant's
conduct to be actionable must have been unreasonable. There are cases
which hold that advertisement of the plaintiff's debt by the creditor in
his store window 11 is an invasion of privacy and that publishing the debt
in a local newspaper 12 subjects the creditor and the newspaper to lia-
bility for invasion of the right. But recovery has been denied where the
plaintiff's account was advertised by handbill as being for sale,'8 and
also where the creditor telephoned the employer.
14
Distributing Corp., 2 Utah 2d 256, 272 P.2d 177 (1954): N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW§§ 50, 51, Metzger v. Dell Publishing Co., 136 N.Y.S.2d 888 (Sup. Ct. 1955);
Schumann v. Loew's Incorporated, 135 N.Y.S.2d 361 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
0 Brunson v. Ranks Army Store, 161 Neb. 519, 73 N.W.2d 803 (1955) ; Yoeckel
v. Samonig, 272 Wis. 430, 75 N.W.2d 925 (1956).
"240 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1951).
s See RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 867 (1939).
1 118 Ind. App. 358, 78 N.E.2d 789 (1948).
1099 Ohio App. 485, 135 N.E.2d 440 (1955) (the court held that a campaign
of telephone calls to the plaintiff was an invasion of her privacy, but one call
would not have been enough).
" Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927).
""Trammel v. Citizens News Co., 285 Ky. 529, 148 S.W.2d 708 (1941).
"Judevine v. Benzies-Montanye Fuel & Warehouse Co., 222 Wis. 512, 269
-N.W. 29 (1936) (the holding here may be explained by Wisconsin's refusal to
recognize the right of privacy).
1" Lewis v. Physicians & Dentists Credit Bureau, Inc., 27 Wash. 2d 267, 177
P.2d 896 (1947) (the court seems to hold that if the right of privacy exists in!
the state of Washington, it cannot be violated by oral publication).
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In Flake v. Greensboro News Co.,15 the Supreme Court of North
Carolina recognized the right of privacy. But there is no indication in
that case as to how the court would hold if confronted with facts similar
to those in the Gouldman-Taber Pontiac case.
EARmiNE L. POTEAT, JR.
Torts-Trespass to Land-Unintential and Non-Negligent
Entry as a Defense
The early English common law imposed liability for trespass upon
one whose act directly brought about an invasion of land in the posses-
sion of another. It mattered not that the invasion was intended, was the
result of reckless or negligent conduct, occurred in the course of ex-
trahazardous activity, or was a pure accident; nor did it matter that no
harm resulted. All that seems to have been required was that the actor
did the act which in fact caused the entry.-
It has been stated by eminent authority that, "The law on this sub-
ject is undergoing a process of change. Among the more important
tendencies is the limitation of liability to invasions which are intended,
or negligent, or the result of abnormally dangerous activity."'2
Smith v. Pate3 presented the North Carolina Supreme Court, for
apparently only the second time in its history, the question of whether
unintentional and non-negligent entry to land constitutes trespass. The
defendant driver's automobile crashed into the plaintiff's building; the
plaintiff sued for trespass to land, without alleging negligence; and the
defendant pleaded unavoidable accident. The trial court struck the
defense, but the supreme court held this to be error on the ground that
unavoidable accident is a valid defense if pleaded.
The first North Carolina case on the subject, Newsom v. Anderson,4
followed the early common law rule. There, the defendant, "without
design or carelessness," cut down a tree on his own land, the top of the
tree falling on plaintiff's land. Plaintiff prevailed in his subsequent suit
for trespass, the court holding that design or carelessness were not
essential ingredients of trespass.
In Smith v. Pate, the court attempted to distinguish the earlier case
-212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938) (By mistake the plaintiff's picture was
used for advertising purposes, and, in the absence of allegations and proof of special
damages, the plaintiff was allowed to recover only nominal damages. This has
been North Carolina's only case concerning the right of privacy).
'REsTATEmENT, ToRTs § 166, comment b (1934).
PaossER, TORTS § 13 (2d ed. 1955).
246 N.C. 63, 97 S.E.2d 457 (1957).
"24 N.C. 42 (1841). In Dougherty v. Stepp, 18 N.C. 371 (1835), it was said
that "every unauthorized, and therefore unlawful, entry into the close of another
is a trespass." This was dictum since the question of accidental entry was not
involved.
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on the ground that unavoidable accident or sudden emergency had not
been shown, but that the damage had resulted from negligence. How-
ever, the words of the court in the earlier case were, "There was no
evidence to show that the tree was felled by design or carelessness."
In fact, the trial court had charged that intent or carelessness in felling
the tree would have to be shown; and for this error in the charge, the
defendant's judgment below was reversed. The conclusion seems
inescapable that both cases involved unintentional and non-negligent
entry, yet different results were reached.
5
However, the present position of the court, taken in Smith v. Pate,
brings North Carolina in accord with what purports to be the weight
of authority on this point.6
WILTON RANKIN
Trade Regulation-State Fair Trade Acts-Trading Stamps
Fair trade laws, enacted in all states except Missouri, Texas, and
Vermont,' permit vertical price fixing 2 contracts between a manufacturer
and a wholesaler or a retailer which establish a fixed resale price of
the manufacturer's product. The acts provide that as soon as one such
contract is entered into with a distributor within a state, all other
distributors on the same level of competition who receive notice of the
contract are bound by it, even though they are non-signers.3
For the purpose of preventing evasion of the resale price maintenance
contracts, twenty states and territories 4 have specifically prohibited
For an example of another state recently changing from the early common
law to the modem trend, compare Louisville Ry. v. Sweeney, 157 Ky. 620, 163 S.W.
739 (1914); Consolidated Fuel Co. v. Stevens, 223 Ky. 192, 3 S.W.2d 203 (1927)
with Jewell v. Dell, 284 S.W.2d 92 (Ky. 1955); Randall v. Shelton, 293 S.W.2d
559 (Ky. 1956).
' RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 166 (1934). "Except where the actor is engaged in
an extrahazardous activity, an unintentional and non-negligent entry on land in
the possession of another, or causing a thing or third person to enter the land,
does not subject the actor to liability to the possessor, even though the entry
causes harm to the possessor or to a thing or third person in whose security the
third person has a legally protected interest."
This Note is not concerned with trespass to person, but it should be pointed
out that unavoidable accident is also a defense to trespass to person. REsTATEMENT,
TORTS §§ 18, 21, 35 (1934).
1 A complete compilation of fair trade laws may be found in 2 CCH TRADE
RBG. REP. (10th ed.) ff 10000-15585 (1956).
2 Both horizontal and vertical price fixing were originally prohibited by the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (Supp. IV 1957),
but vertical price fixing was later exempted from the Sherman Act by the Miller-
Tydings Act, 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. IV 1957) and the McGuire
Act, 66 STAT. 632, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1952).
'However, some parts of the acts, and generally the non-signer provisions,
have been held unconstitutional in.Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Indiana,
Kentucky, Michigan, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oregon, South Carolina, and Utah.
See Note, 31 N.C.L. -Ev. 509 (1953).
"Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho,
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certain practices by adding "anti-concession" provisions to their fair
trade acts.5
A perplexing problem under state fair trade laws is whether or not
the issuance of trading stamps by retailers who sell fair trade items at
the minimum resale price results in a reduction in price and a consequent
violation of the act. The problem arises in those states having the "anti-
concession statutes" as well as in those that do not.
In the states that do not have the "anti-concession" provisions, the
weight of authority in the cases decided thus far seems to be that the
giving of trading stamps does not violate the fair trade acts., There
are two reasons generally given for this view: (1) trading stamps,
having a redemption value appropriate to a normal discount for the
payment of cash, are in all respects a cash discount and not a reduction
in price; 7 (2) the stamps are merely a trade promotional scheme and
are similar to other advertising devices or the extension of credit.8
Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, North Carolina, Oregon, South
Dakota, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. In addition, Nevada has
part of the anti-concession statute prohibiting combination sales, and Wisconsin
has the anti-concession wordage in a statute separate from its Fair Trade Act.
See 1 CCH TRADE REG. REP. (10th ed.) ff 3008 (1950).
'These provisions generally read as follows: "For the purpose of preventing
evasion of the resale price restrictions imposed in respect of any commodity by
any contract entered into pursuant to the provisions of this article (except to the
extent authorized by the said contract) :
"(a) The offering or giving of any article of value in connection with the sale of
such commodity;
"(b) The offering or the making of any concession of an kind whatsoever
(whether by the giving of coupons or otherwise) in connection with any such sale;
"(c) The sale or offering for sale of such commodity in combination with any
other commodity, shall be deemed a violation of such resale prices restriction .. .
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-53 (1950) (Emphasis added).
The issue may be raised in two ways: (1) the manufacturer or retailer may
sue the user of the stamps claiming that their use results in a sale below the
minimum price. See Bristol-Myers Co. v. Picker, 302 N.Y. 61, 96 N.E.2d 177
(1950) ; or (2) the manufacturer may sue an obvious price cutter who asserts as
a defense that the manufacturer's right to an injunction is waived because he has
permitted others to violate his resale price maintenance contracts by giving the
stamps to their customers. See Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Max Dichter & Sons,
Inc., 142 F. Supp. 545 (D. Mass. 1956).
'Weco Products Co. v. Mid-City Cut Rate Drug Stores, 55 Cal. App. 2d
684, 131 P.2d 856 (1942); Food and Grocery Bureau v. Garfield, 20 Cal. App. 2d
228, 125 P.2d 3 (1942); Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. McBride, 307 Mass. 408,
30 N.E2d 269 (1940) ; Gever v. American Stores Co., 387 Pa. 206, 127 A.2d 694
(1956); Bristol-Myers Co. v. Lit Bros., 336 Pa. 81, 6 A.2d 843 (1939) ; Sperry
& Hutchinson Co. v. Margetts, 15 N.J. 203, 104 A.2d 310 (1954); Benjamin v.
Palan Drug Co., 144 Misc. 879, 88 N.Y.S.2d 291 (Sup. Ct. 1948), aff'd, 275 App.
Div. 1036, 92 N.Y.S.2d 413 (1st Dept. 1949); Nechamkin v. Picker, 67 N.Y.S.2d
60 (Sup. Ct. 1946).7This is the so-called "cash discount" theory. The stamps are said to be a cash
discount, measured by the economic worth to the merchant of the prompt use of
his money and the corresponding reduction in working capital requirements and
the avoidance of the expense of maintaining credit and the inevitable losses from
bad debts. These courts also argue that it is a term of payment, not a price
adjustment. It is a mode of financing, and the "cooperative" feature permits the
accumulation and redemption of stamps issued by any or all of the merchants in a
given area. In a word, the cash discount thus provided measures the value of
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Bristol-Myers Co. v. Lit Bros., Inc.,9 is an illustrative case of both
of the above propositions. The plaintiff sought an injunction to restrain
the defendant from violating his fair trade contract. Defendant, who
sold his fair-trade products at the minimum prices, gave one trading
stamp for each ten cents of purchases. Each book of 990 stamps
represented $99 in purchases and could be redeemed in merchandise
worth $1.75. The court held that there was no violation of the act,
reasoning that the stamps amounted to a 1.76% cash discount. The
defendant, said the court, could have provided his customers with a
nursery service to care for children while the mother shopped, with
free bus service to and from his store, or he could have extended credit
for 30 or 60 days, and none of these practices would have violated the
act, even though all would benefit the customer. The court emphasized
that the fair trade laws were not designed to prevent all forms of busi-
ness competition, but only "cut-throat" competition."'1
On the other hand, a contrary view has been taken in other jurisdic-
tions with similar statutory provisions on the grounds that: (1) even
though it may be an advertising scheme, the benefit to the customer is
directly, proportionately and inseparably related to the article purchased
and its price, and amounts to a reduction in price ;"1 (2) the stamps are
actually a quantity discount because they have no value until a book is
filled, and quantity discounts are generally considered as a reduction in
price.Y2
the use of money to the merchant, and makes for economic equality between the
merchant selling for cash and the merchant selling on credit. It does not in any
real sense work an inequality of price within the intendment of the act. Weco-
Products Co. v. Mid-City Cut Rate Drug Stores, supra note 6; Sperry &
Hutchinson Co. v. Margetts, supra note 6.
' Gever v. American Stores Co., 387 Pa. 206, 127 A.2d 694 (1956).
'336 Pa. 81, 6 A.2d 843 (1939).
10 The court also concluded that this practice antedated the fair trade laws by
many years, and that nothing in the act indicates that its provisions were intended
to prevent the practice. Even if the issuance of trading stamps did constitute a
violation of the act, no injunction should be issued, said the court, because theinjury to the plaintiff is very slight, if any, whereas the damage to the defendant
caused by a restraining order might well be substantial and irreparable. There-
fore the maxim "de inininis non curat lex" should apply.
"1 Bristol-Myers v. Picker, 302 N.Y. 61, 96 N.E.2d 177 (1950). Actually the
case involved cash register receipts instead of trading stamps, but the court said
there was no distinction between the two and held that they violated the actbecause they have a value in themselves and are directly related to price and thus
amount to a price cut regardless of how small. The court did distinguish the cash
receipts and trading stamps from other types of advertising and promotional
"service" plans by saying that the latter have no direct relation to price and are
completely separated and too remote from the pricing element to come within the
statutory prohibition. For a criticism of this point, see Note, 45 CALIF. L. REv.
378 (1957).
12 Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Max Dichter & Sons, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 545 (D.
Mass. 1956). This case has been criticized on the grounds that it is contrary toprior Massachusetts decisions and is contrary to the general view that quantitydiscounts usually relate to volume sales of one item between one buyer and one
seller and not a voluminous variety of items and more than one buyer and seller.
See Notes, 30 TEmp. L.Q. 205 (1957) ; 21 ALBANY L. REv. 272 (1957).
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In jurisdictions having "anti-concession" provisions in their acts,
the fate of the trading stamp is almost certain.' 3 The "anti-concession"
statutes were designed to prevent evasion of the fair trade contracts.
They expressly forbid the giving of coupons as a concession to the
customer. Accordingly, the courts of Connecticut and Oregon have
held that the terms of the statute forbid the giving of trading stamps
and preclude a judicial distinction between a legal cash discount and an
illegal price cut.' 4
These decisions obviate almost any argument that the trading stamp
proponents could make in states having the express prohibitions. It
would seem that the only defense available in a suit by a manufacturer
for an injunction would be a showing that the manufacturer had not
been diligent in his efforts to enforce his contracts.' 5 But in a jurisdic-
tion where the question has never been raised, the court should be hesi-
tant in holding that a manufacturer has waived his rights to an in-
junction because of the conflicting opinions in other jurisdictions.
Since the North Carolina "anti-concession" statute16 is substantially
identical to those of Connecticut and Oregon, it is believed that if the
question arises in North Carolina, the court will reach a result similar
to that in those states.
RIcHARD R. LEE
Trusts-Statute of Uses-Trusts for Separate Use of
Married Women
Does the fact that a passive trust is for the sole and separate use of
a married woman prevent it from being executed by the Statute of Uses?
This question was raised in Pilkington v. West' and answered by the
North Carolina Supreme Court in the negative. The plaintiff wife had
conveyed land to a trustee to' be held in trust during her lifetime. By the
terms of the trust instrument the property was to be held for her "sole
1See note 5 srupra.
1Mennen Co. v. Katz, CCH TRADE REG. REP'. (1950-1951 Trade Gas.) f 62,734
(Conn. Ct. Corn. Pl. 1950); Lambert Pharmacal Co. v. Roberts Bros., CCH TRADE
Rm REP'. (1950-1951 Trade Gas.) f 62,669 (Ore. Cir. Ct. 1950), rev'd on~ other
grounds, 192 Ore. 23, 233 P.2d 258 (1951). If the court were allowed to make a
distinction, it might possibly say that the trading stamp is a transaction independent
and separable from the sale of the protected articles, and therefore could not be
a cut in price. This would open the way for the court to make an analogy between
the trading stamps and the cash discount, and possibly decide that they are the
same thing, as the majority of the courts have done in the jurisdictions not having
the "anti-concession" statutes.
13 It is generally held to be a defense to the manufacturer's action if it is shown
that he has not been reasonably diligent in enforcing his fair trade contracts.
See Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Max Dichter & Sons, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 545 (D.
Mass. 1956).
11 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-53 (1950).
- 246 N.C. 575, 99 S.E.2d 798 (1957).
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use, behoof and benefit," and she was to "have, hold, use and occupy
and enjoy" the property and "all rents, issues and products arising
therefrom, separate and apart from all other persons."'2 The trustee,
having no duties or responsibilities, was a mere depository of the legal
title. While recognizing that trusts created for the sole and separate use
of married women were treated as active trusts at common law3 and
therefore not executed by the Statute of Uses,4 the court concluded that
the property rights of married women had been so modified by the North
Carolina Constitution of 1868' that the reason for the common law
exception no longer existed. Since the trust was passive,6 the court
declared that the wife's equitable estate was executed by the statute
into a legal life estate.
7
Prior to 1868, North Carolina was in accord with the common law
rules concerning the disabilities of married women.8 But the equity
courts recognized the separate estate doctrine9 developed by the English
2 Id. at 577, 99 S.E2d at 799. No technical language is necessary to create an
equitable separate estate, but it must appear unequivocally on the face of the
instrument that such is the intention. The words "separate use" are appropriate
for that purpose. Rudisell v. Watson, 17 N.C. 430, 432 (1833).
'Wilder v. Ireland, 53 N.C. 85, 88 (1860).
' N.C. Gai STAT. § 41-7 (1950).
'N.C. CONST. art. X, § 6. "The real and personal property of any female in
this State acquired before marriage, and all property, real and personal, to
which she may, after marriage, become in any manner entitled, shall be and
remain the sole and separate estate and property of such female, and shall not be
liable for any debts, obligations, or engagements of her husband, and may be
devised and bequeathed, and, with the written assent of her husband, conveyed by
her as if she were unmarried."
S.A trust is active if it imposes upon the trustee any duties which he could not
perform without holding the legal title. Lummus v. Davidson, 160 N.C. 484, 487,
76 S.E. 474, 476 (1912).
"The scope of this Note is limited to a discussion of this aspect of the case.
The trust instrument also provided that the property was to revert to the wife's
heirs at her death. If she died survived by a husband, he was to become the bene-
ficiary of the trust for the remainder of his life. If children also survived the wife,
they were to share the benefits of the trust with the husband until his death, when
the estate was to pass to the heirs. The court found that the husband's interest
was voided by the failure of the notary public, who privately examined the wife
when the trust was executed, to include in his certificate the findings and con-
clusions required by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-12 (1950). The avoidance of the
husband's interest coupled with the stipulation that the wife had no children and
could never have any, left the trustee holding the bare legal title for the lifetime
of the wife. The trust was executed by the statute into a legal life estate in the
wife followed by a remainder in fee to the heirs. The court held that the wife's
life estate was converted by the Rule in Shelley's Case into a fee simple absolute.
The wife could therefore convey a good title to the defendant who had contracted
to buy her property.
S Perry v. Stancil, 237 N.C. 442, 445, 75 S.E.2d 512, 515 (1953) (a husband
was seized of an estate in the real property of his wife during coverture which
gave him the right of possession and control and he could appropriate all the rents
and profits for his own use and could convey her land for a period not exceeding
coverture); Harrell v. Davis, 53 N.C. 359 (1861) (a married woman's personal
property acquired before and after marriage was vested in the husband) ; Revel v.
Revel, 19 N.C. 272 (1837) (a married woman's choses in action which her husband
reduced to possession during her lifetime were vested in her husband).
'Davis v. Cain, 36 N.C. 304 (1840).
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Chancery Court' ° to mitigate the harshness of the common law rules.
Accordingly, when an intent was manifested in a conveyance for a
married woman that the property was to be held for her sole and sepa-
rate use, the conveyance was treated as a trust." In respect to this
property a married woman was regarded as a feme sole; thus the
property was free from the control of her husband and the claims of
his creditors . 2 Such a trust was declared to be active during coverture,
even when there were no express provisions conferring duties of manage-
ment on the trustee.'5 Otherwise, her resulting legal estate would be-
come subject to the husband's control and thus defeat the purpose of
the trust.
According to the English rule, a married woman had an absolute
right of disposition over her equitable separate estate unless restricted
by the terms of the conveyance.' 4 North Carolina followed the English
rule in regard to trusts of personal property,' 5 and to a limited extent
to trusts of real property,' 6 until the decision in Draper, Knox & Co. v.
Jordany1 which declared that "a separate estate ... of a married woman
does not confer any faculties upon her except those which are found in
the deed."
Following the adoption of the Constitution of 1868, which secured to
married women a right to their separate property,'8 dicta in Withers v.
Sparrow'9 indicated that there was no reason why the English rule
should not be followed. But the constitutional provision was declared
to have had no effect on a married woman's equitable separate estate in
Pippin; V. Wesson,20 hence such trusts were to remain active. The court
in Hardy v. Holly,2 1 referring to the Draper case as the settled law of
the state, held that a married woman's power of disposition over her
104 PomRmoY, EQUITY § 1098 n.17 (Sth ed., Symons 1941) cites Drake v.
Storr, 2 Freem. 205, 22 Eng. Rep. 1162 (Ch. 1695), as showing that the wife's
equitable separate estate was a well-settled doctrine of equity as early as 1695.
""Steel v. Steel, 36 N.C. 452, 455 (1841).
1" Dick v. Pitchford, 21 N.C. 480, 484-85 (1837).
Pilkington v. West, 246 N.C. 575, 579, 99 S.E.2d 798, 800 (1957).1 4Jackson v. Hobhouse, 2 Mer. 483, 35 Eng. Rep. 1025 (Ch. 1817).
"'Harris v. Harris, 42 N.C. 111 (1850). Chief Justice Ruffin cited Chancellor
Kent's decision to the contrary in Methodist Episcopal Church v. Jaques, 3 Johns.
Rep. 77 (N.Y. Ch. 1817), commenting that even the chancellor's great name could
not uphold such a position, his decree having been reversed on appeal in Jaques v.
Methodist Episcopal Church, 17 Johns. Rep. 548 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1819). Harris v.
Harris, sitpra at 118.
10 Newlin v. Freeman, 39 N.C. 312 (1846).
'158 N.C. 175 (1859).
10 See note 5 supra.
19 66 N.C. 129, 138 (1872).
20 74 N.C. 437, 444 (1876). As Vernier has pointed out, family law reform
has not always been encouraged by the courts and innovations in the property rela-
tionships of spouses have been looked upon with distrust. 3 VERNIER, AmERICAN
FAMILY LAWs § 167 (1935).2184 N.C. 662 (1881).
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equitable estate was limited to the mode and manner provided in the
trust instrument, and if none were provided, she was powerless.
22
This rule was acknowledged in subsequent decisions,23 but the
question was raised by Justice Connor as to whether the reason for
construing a trust for a married woman as active still existed now that
she was protected from the importunities of her husband by the constitu-
tion.2 4  In Freeman v. Lide,2 5 the court departed from this policy,
holding that a married woman could devise property held in trust for
her sole and separate use unless expressly prohibited by the terms of
the trust. In the principal case Justice Rodman concludes that the activ-
ity of married women in the business world today demonstrates the
baselessness of the fear that the wife would be so subject to the dom-
inance of her husband that she could not exercise sole and separate use
of her property without the protection of a third person.
The principal case appears to recognize the fact that a married
woman's equitable separate estate is now obsolete. While this view is
shared by some writers,26 it has been urged that there is an implied
statement of the duties of management by the trustee, and that there is
an implied intent against execution because of the practical power which
a husband has over his wife's property.27  But it would be unrealistic
to assume that this practical power could be eliminated by declaring an
otherwise passive trust to be active. Certainly such was never attempted
by the equity courts, for it was their practice to appoint the husband as
the wife's trustee when none was indicated in the trust instrument.2 8
There is a conflict of authority in other jurisdictions where the
question in the principal case has arisen. Ten jurisdictions29 have held
22 The trust then under consideration was active; nevertheless the court went
to great length to explain its disposition to pay greater respect to the intention of
the parties, for experience had taught that such intention was in danger of
disappointment "so long as the wife was left to the solicitations of the husband
or was allowed to indulge her own generous impulses." Id. at 668-69.
2 Kirby v. Boyette, 166 N.C. 165, 166, 21 S.E. 697 (1895), aff'd on rehearing,
118 N.C. 244, 24 S.E. 18 (1896); Broughton v. Lane, 113 N.C. 16, 18, 18 S.E.
85, 87 (1893) ; Mayo v. Farrar & Jones, 112 N.C. 66, 69, 16 S.E. 910, 911 (1893) ;
Monroe v. Trenholm, 112 N.C. 634, 640 (1893); Clayton v. Rose, 87 N.C. 106,
110 (1882).
24 Perkins v. Brinkley, 133 N.C. 154, 158, 45 S.E. 541, 543 (1903).2 176 N.C. 434, 97 S.E. 402 (1918). Justice Walker expressed the view that
the mere use of the words "sole and separate" in trusts created since the adoption
of the constitution, unless active or creating contingent remainders, ought not to
prevent the statute from executing the use. Id. at 439, 97 S.E. at 404.
2826 Am. Ju., Husband and Wife § 46 (1940) ; 1 AmERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY
§ 5.55 (Casner ed. 1952). Equitable separate estates are not considered in the
Restatement on the subject of trusts "since the special rules of law applicable" to
such trusts "are almost entirely superseded as a result of Married Women's
Property Acts." 1 RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 1, comment b (1935).
1 IA BoGERT, TRUSTS § 207 (195J) ; 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 234 (3d ed.,
Jones 1939).28 Steel v. Steel, 36 N.C. 452, 455 (1841).
" Frey v. Allen, 9 App. D.C. 400 (1896) ; Nave v. Bailey, 329 Il1. 235, 160
N.E. 605 (1928) ; Brandau v. McCurley, 124 Md. 243, 92 Atl. 540 (1914) (Mary-
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that trusts for the sole and separate use of married women are not ex-
ecuted by the Statute of Uses, while eight jurisdictions30 have regarded
such trusts as no longer active, with the result that legal title passes
directly to the beneficiary.
FRANCES H. HALL
land provides by statute that a married woman may apply to a court of equity to
have a trustee appointed for her sole and separate estate. MD. CODE ANN. art.
45, § 3 (1951) ; Cushing v. Spalding, 164 Mass. 287, 41 N.E. 297 (1895) (Massa-
chusetts provides by statute that a probate court may appoint a trustee for a
married woman's separate estate if she so petitions. MAss. ANN. LAWS c. 209,
§ 12 (1955) ; Schiffman v. Schmidt, 154 Mo. 204, 55 S.W. 451 (1900) ; Pittsfield
Savings Bank v. Berry, 63 N.H. 109 (1884); Dicarlo v. Licini, 156 Pa. Super.
263, 40 A.2d 127 (1944) ; Bowlin v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co., 31 R.I. 289,
76 Atl. 348 (1910); Temple v. Ferguson, 110 Tenn. 84, 72 S.W. 455 (1902);
Hutchings v. Commercial Bank, 91 Va. 68, 20 S.E. 950 (1895).
" Connolly v. Mahoney, 103 Ala. 568, 15 So. 903 (1894) ; Smith v. McWhortef,
123 Ga. 287, 51 S.E. 474 (1905) ; Allen v. Craft, 109 Ind. 476, 9 N.E. 919 (1887) ;
Snell v. Payne, 25 Ky. L. Rep. 1836, 78 S.W. 885 (1904); Burdeno v. Amperse,
14 Mich. 91, 97 (1866) ; Milton v. Pace, 85 S.C. 373, 67 S.E. 458 (1910) ; Wood v.
Wood, 83 N.Y. 575 (1881) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4731 (1955) discontinues the
distinction between statutory separate and equitable separate estates, and § 4741
provides that title to property held by a trustee for a married woman is to pass
to the beneficiary.
